





Controlled and efficient processing of psychological and 
spatial perspectives in children and adults 
by 
Andrew D. R. Surtees 
 
A thesis submitted to 
The University of Birmingham 
for the degree of 









            School of Psychology 
















This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third 
parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect 
of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or 
as modified by any successor legislation.   
 
Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in 
accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged.  Further 
distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission 








Many people have helped this thesis to be better than it would have been otherwise, and 
without a number of them I am not entirely convinced it would have existed at all. 
 
Many thanks to my supervisor, Ian Apperly, who has been everything I could have asked for 
in a supervisor and has helped me to understand things on countless occasions. 
 
Thanks to Stephen Butterfill, to Matthijs Noordzij, and to Patrick Burns, Sarah Beck and 
Kevin Riggs for collaboration on work involving Level-1 and Level-2 perspectives, frames of 
reference and executive functions respectively. All of the previous also deserve thanks for 
reading and providing suggestions on earlier drafts of one or more of the following chapters 
as do Jessica Wang, Dana Samson, Daniel Acquah and Eric Robinson. 
 
Thanks also to all members of the Developmental Psychology group in Birmingham. Of those 
not already mentioned by name, conversations with Adam Qureshi, Daniel Weisberg, Joe 
McCleery, Sotaro Kita, and Elsa Loissel have helped to shape my thinking on a number of 
issues. 
 
Thanks to the many children, parents and teachers at the numerous schools in which I have 
worked. Special thanks should go to , three 
head teachers who have allowed me to test in their schools on numerous occasions and often 
when finding another school seemed unlikely. 
 
Finally, I’d like to thank my girlfriend Hayley, my friends and my family for putting up with 






Eight experiments investigated psychological and spatial perspective-taking in 
children and adults. Experiments were designed to identify under what circumstances 
and at what stage of development computing the perspectives of others is cognitively 
effortful and when it is cognitively efficient. 
 
Level-1 perspective-taking requires judgements of whether or not another person can 
see a given object. Level-2 perspective-taking requires judgements of how another 
person sees a given object. Using an indirect measure of perspective-taking, 
Experiments 1-3 found Level-1 perspective-taking to be somewhat automatic, even in 
children, whilst we found no evidence of automatic Level-2 perspective-taking. Using 
a direct measure, all forms of perspective-taking required cognitive control and were 
susceptible to egocentric interference. Such interference is a feature of perspective-
taking of both children and adults and in Experiment 4 it was shown to be related to 
individual differences in executive function. In Experiments 5A and 5B children and 
adults made spatial frame of reference judgements, in where they integrated 
information from their own spatial viewpoint and that produced by the frame of 
reference of an object or agent.  
 
Perspective-taking makes conflicting demands for efficiency and flexibility on 
cognitive systems. This thesis lends support to the idea that one way these demands 
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Understanding the beliefs, desires, intentions and perspectives of other people is 
important in predicting and interpreting their behaviour and in guiding our own. Such 
abilities are often grouped together and considered within a single concept, variously 
referred to as Theory of Mind, Mentalising, Mindreading or Folk Psychology. Since 
Premack and Woodruff (1978) asked whether the chimpanzee had a Theory of Mind, 
30 years of research into these abilities has mainly focussed on how typically 
(Wellman, Cross & Watson, 2001; Wimmer & Perner, 1983) and atypically 
developing children (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985) first gain such abilities. 
Located within a wider discipline of cognitive development, such studies have been 
multiple and informative. Notwithstanding this, it is hard to argue that we actually 
have anything close to a complete picture of the cognitive processes involved in 
Theory of Mind, and for that matter how these processes develop. This thesis will 
focus on various aspects of that very problem.  
 
1.0.1 Problems posed by Theory of Mind on cognitive systems 
Theory of Mind (ToM) poses two conflicting problems (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009). 
On the one hand ToM must occur on-line and quickly: to keep up with rapidly 
moving social situations we often have to make judgements in a very short time 
period, otherwise the information becomes redundant. Conversely, ToM judgements 
often require the integration of large quantities of varied information; flexible off-line 
judgements guarantee a greater chance of success. Resolving these, often 
contradictory, demands causes one of the greatest problems to research in this area.  
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1.0.2 Focuses of research on Theory of Mind 
Whilst it seems clear that ToM is involved in many aspects of social functioning, 
what is much less clear is how we can test when and how people are computing the 
mental states of others. Many theories of ToM posit a role for automatic and efficient 
on-line ToM (Leslie & Thiass, 1993; Sperber & Wilson, 1986), but the paradigms 
generally employed in ToM research may be largely irrelevant in testing this. 
Specifically, most research on ToM has tended to ask children to make judgements 
under no time pressure and with very limited demands beyond those required to 
perform the judgement itself. Whilst informative about the flexibility and capacity of 
people’s ability to reason about mental states, such studies have left us largely 
uninformed about how on-line or efficient ToM might operate. 
 
As well as focussing on testing just one kind of ToM judgement, until recently, 
research in ToM has also largely been restriced to one age group, pre-school children. 
More recently, there has been some progress on this, with the field expanding to test 
ToM abilities in infants (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2006; Sodian, Theormer & Metz, 
2007; Song & Baillargeon, 2008; Southgate, Senju & Csibra, 2006) and non-human 
animals (Call & Tomasello, 2008; Emery & Clayton, 2004; Santos, Flombaum & 
Phillips, 2006) more regularly. Other work has begun to ask the question of whether 
there are any limits to the abilities of adults (Epley, Morewedge & Keysar, 2004; 
Keysar, Lin & Barr, 2003; Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews & Bodley-Scott, 
2010) and also to actively test whether (and perhaps more importantly under what 
circumstances) ToM is automatic or spontaneous (Apperly, Riggs, Simpson, Samson 
& Chiavarino, 2006; Back & Apperly, 2010; Cohen & German, 2009; Kovacs, 
Endress & Teglas, 2010; Samson et al., 2010).  
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1.0.3 This thesis 
This thesis aims to directly address some of the problems raised by the conflicting 
demands on ToM. Specifically, I will explore the roles for efficient and controlled 
processing of ToM using tasks that allow for testing of adults as well as children and 
measure efficiency of ToM as well as flexibility. By testing older children and adults 
it is possible to detail what constitutes a mature ToM and also how children develop 
towards this. Improvements made by children after early childhood have widely been 
attributed to increasing general processing resources. In the current thesis, I will 
investigate whether this assumption is necessarily the case and will also propose that 
where general processing improvement does underlie quantitive development, this 
does not make such development any less informative. To understand day-to-day 
ToM, investigating the fluency and capacity that prescribe the limits on actual ToM 
performance is just as important as investigating the “concepts” that prescribe the 
limits on possible ToM performance (See Samson & Apperly, 2010 for a recent 
review of this suggestion). 
 
This thesis contains 5 experimental chapters. Chapters 2-4 focus on elements of 
control and automaticity in visual perspective-taking. Chapter 5 examines the links 
between ToM and executive functions in middle childhood. Chapter 6 looks at one 
case in which automaticity vs. control in perspective-taking plays a role in spite of no 
explicit perspective-taking being required; that is in judgements about spatial frames 
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1.1 Controlled, Effortful Processing of ToM 
The paradigms employed in Chapters 2-5 all contain conditions in which participants 
are actively asked to take the perspective of someone else. In other words, they are 
asked to make explicit ToM judgements and respond in line with them. This sort of 
perspective-taking we will consider to be controlled as participants actively select 
responses in line with their perspective-taking. 
 
1.1.1 An example of what effort affords 
The British legal system (along with most others in the world) makes a distinction 
between Murder and Manslaughter on the basis of intention (A similar distinction 
exists between Attempted Murder and Grievous Bodily Harm). As a member of a jury, 
(largely) untrained members of the public have to decide whether the defendant 
intended a given action. Important outcomes for the defendant, the victim’s family 
and potentially society as a whole, rest on the jury making such judgements with 
accuracy. To make this decision correctly the juror may need to interpret a large 
amount of information to impute mental states of others and then flexibly interpret 
how these mental states might predict certain intentions and thus behaviours. The fact 
that we expect jurors in such cases to make decisions “beyond reasonable doubt” (oh 
hang on, do we then need to impute another mental state to work out how much doubt 
it is “reasonable” for a person to have...) suggests that humans consider this task 
achievable, if difficult. We should expect the processes involved in this sort of 
decision making to trade for flexibility and capacity in the quest for accuracy. Up to a 
point, the speed with which such decisions are made is inconsequential, what matters 
is the range of information we can successfully incorporate. This is an important 
point, as later we will discuss ToM which makes precisely the opposite trade off. 
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1.1.2 Tests of children’s flexible ToM 
Most tests of ToM in young children have investigated flexible decision-making. 
Children have generally been asked to make single judgements under no time 
pressure. Results from these studies have provided a fascinating insight into the limits 
of young children’s reasoning when confronted with such problems. Perhaps most 
famously, false belief tasks have demonstrated very clearly that pre-school children 
make errors when making these sorts of judgements (Hogrefe, Wimmer & Perner, 
1986; Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Wellman et al., 2001). In the classic false belief- 
change of location task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983), a boy, Maxi, puts his chocolates 
into a drawer and then goes out to play. Unbeknownst to Maxi, while he is out 
playing, his mother moves his chocolates from the drawer to a cupboard. Maxi returns 
to the scene and children are asked to predict where Maxi will look for his chocolates. 
Adults, almost exclusively, predict that Maxi will look in the drawer where he 
originally left his chocolates. At the age of three, children across a wide range of 
cultures and settings mostly fail this task (Wellman et al., 2001). At the age of four, 
most children pass this task. Three-year-olds do not fail this task at random, for 
instance suggesting Maxi will look under the table, or using semantic knowledge 
(there is no reason why any location is more commonly associated with chocolates), 
rather they expect Maxi to share their own, correct, knowledge of the location of the 
chocolates. 
 
Similar demands on reasoning are thought to be made by false belief- unexpected 
contents tasks (Hogrefe et al., 1986). In the classic version of this task, children are 
shown a “Smarties” tube and asked to guess its contents. After reporting that they 
expect Smarties to be inside, children are shown that the tube actually contains 
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pencils. They are then asked what another child would think would be in the tube 
when confronted with it for the first time. As with the change of location task, most 4-
year-olds respond like adults, they expect another person to predict Smarties to be in 
the tube, but most 3-year-olds predict that the new child will correctly guess that the 
tube contains pencils. The incidental demands of unexpected contents and change of 
location tasks are really quite different, suggesting that the effects found are really not 
just due to the methods themselves. Modifying these experiments can make marginal 
changes to the precise age at which children can pass this task. For example, by 
including a temporal marker such as “where will he look first?” or by increasing the 
salience of the protagonist’s belief children pass these tasks marginally earlier in 
development (Wellman et al., 2001). Importantly though, over the course of 25 years 
of research, these findings have been largely robust. 
 
1.1.3 Converging success around the age of four 
Aside from false belief tasks, a number of other ToM abilities emerge around the age 
of four years. This is a similar age to when children are first able to pass Level-2 
visual perspective-taking tasks (Flavell, Everett, Croft & Flavell, 1981; Masangkay, 
McCluskey, McIntyre, Sims-Knight, Vaughn & Flavell 1974). Level-2 visual 
perspective-taking requires an understanding that someone else may see an object 
differently from oneself. In Chapters 3 and 4, we will provide the first studies 
designed directly to look at Level-2 perspective-taking in older children and adults. 
Level-2 perspective-taking can be thought to be similar to false belief tasks in 
requiring conflicting representations about a single item.  Also, children around the 
age of four begin to make the distinction between appearance and reality (Flavell, 
1999; Flavell, Flavell & Green, 1983). The convergence of evidence of a shift in 
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performance around this age on tasks involving seemingly different concepts suggests 
that children’s performance cannot be explained by the acquisition of a suitable 
concept of false belief alone. If the acquisition of conceptual apparatus is to explain 
children’s performance, either a more substantial concept(s) of the minds of others, or 
a concept(s) that is not specific to the domain of ToM must be acquired. One 
suggestion (Perner, 1991) is that children have to acquire a suitably refined concept of 
representation, which is general across many domains (this idea is discussed in 
section 1.1.7).  
 
1.1.4 Early success 
Recent studies showing infants’ success in tasks that appear to require ToM have used 
indirect measures where no controlled response is required (Onishi & Baillargeon, 
2005; Sodian, Theormer & Metz, 2007; Surian, Caldi & Sperber, 2007). I will discuss 
these findings more in section 1.2 when I consider ToM that is achieved in a manner 
that is efficient. There is, however, also good evidence of success by children before 
the age of four in tasks that demand controlled responses. Before passing false belief 
tasks, children make correct explicit decisions about Level-1 visual perspectives (the 
ability to understand whether or not someone sees a given object, Masangkay et al., 
1974; Moll & Tomasello, 2005) and can also make explicit judgements about what 
different people will do based on diverging beliefs (Bartsch & Wellman, 1989). Pre-
school children have also been demonstrated to show some knowledge of intention (in 
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1.1.5 What four-year-olds still have to learn 
The youngest children tested in the experiments detailed in this thesis were 6-years-
old. Whilst for the most part I will justify this strategy in allowing for testing the 
development of specific cognitive processes involved in ToM, there are still tasks that 
children fail after they can consistently pass standard false belief tasks. Some of these 
tasks involve the concept of referential opacity, and are generally failed until around 
the age of 6-7 (Apperly & Robinson, 1998, 2001; Russell, 1987). Such problems 
require the ability to understand that a given person or thing may have more than one 
reference, which may not be known to all. For example a boy, Mark, may know Mrs. 
Barclay as his class teacher. If Mrs. Barclay has to rush home ill one day, and Mark is 
aware of this, we can safely assume that Mark will correctly answer the question 
“where has your teacher gone?” Mrs. Barclay as well as being Mark’s class teacher, 
may also be the mother of another child in the school, Michael. If Mark does not 
know this, it would be wrong to assume that Mark could correctly answer Michael’s 
question “where has my Mum gone?” Whilst adults seem to find such opacity 
relatively easy to understand (and authors such as Shakespeare, Sophocles and 
Dostoyevsky have taken advantage of it for humour, tragedy or suspense), children up 
until the age of 6 or 7 respond as if they assume that all references available to them 
are necessarily available to others. 
 
It is also the case that the ability to understand some complex social situations 
develops well beyond the age at which children pass standard false belief tasks. 
Baron-Cohen, O’Riordon, Stone, Jones and Pliasted (1999) tested children’s ability to 
understand faux-pas and found development from 7-years of age up to the age of 11. 
Faux-pas situations involve individuals making socially inappropriate comments or 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
10 
 
behaviours, often because of being only partially informed about others. Ability to 
understand irony and sarcasm is thought to develop somewhere between the age of 6 
and 12 (Capelli, Nakagawa & Madden, 1990; Creusere, 1999; Demorest, Meyer, 
Phelps, Gardner & Winner, 1984; Winner & Leekam, 1991). Again such abilities 
require subtle social understanding, in this case understanding that others may not 
only deliberately communicate something that contradicts that person’s knowledge or 
beliefs, but also that they may do so in the knowledge that others will understand that 
this is what they’re doing. Whilst these abilities do develop beyond the age at which 
children pass false belief tasks, it is generally thought that they do not require new 
concepts as such, rather a greater flexibility in use. 
 
Even within the area of reasoning about beliefs and desires some more complex tasks 
are failed by children after the age at which they pass standard versions of the task 
(Leslie, German & Polizzi, 2004; Leslie & Polizzi, 1998; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). 
Many theories of human communication require humans to impute recursive mental 
states (Sperber & Wilson, 1986; Tomasello, 2008), for example, it is proposed that 
when we communicate, we do so in a way that demonstrates that “You know that I 
know” given information, or that I know that “You intend me to know” certain things 
(Tomasello, 2008). Interestingly, when such reasoning, involving mental states about 
mental states, is tested explicitly (using so-called second order false belief tasks), 
children fail such tasks until around the age of 6 (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). In such 
tasks, children may, for example, have to reason about what one character will do 
based on her false belief about the beliefs of another character. Whilst such scenarios 
seem quite complicated, it is really worth emphasising that this is exactly the sort of 
reasoning many believe that mature communicators are able to do without demanding 
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extensive cognitive resources (Sperber & Wilson, 1986; Tomasello, 2008). It is not 
just these second order tasks which cause children problems, however, similar 
performance is found on tasks requiring children to reason about false beliefs and 
avoidance desires (Leslie & Polizzi, 1998; Leslie, German & Polizzi, 2005). An 
avoidance desire, in these circumstances, is held by an individual who wishes, only, to 
avoid a given item. For example, Friedman and Leslie (2004) asked children to reason 
about where a character would place her dress given that she knew one of the 
locations to contain a dirty frog. Clearly, here, her only desire is to avoid the dirty 
frog and within the boundaries of the paradigm she should aim for an empty box. 
When children have to reason about such desires paired with false beliefs; for 
example, she wishes to avoid the frog, but wrongly believes it to be in a given 
location, they fail these tasks until around the age of 6 (Leslie & Polizzi, 1998; Leslie, 
German & Polizzi, 2004). Leslie and colleagues have suggested that such tasks 
require no more conceptual knowledge, but are more demanding of executive 
resources (Leslie & Polizzi, 1998; Leslie, German & Polizzi, 2004). In Chapter 5 I 
include a task which specifically requires children to reason about these composite 
belief and desire problems (Adapted from Apperly, Warren, Andrews, Grant & Todd, 
in press). In comparing individual differences on this task with individual differences 
in executive functions, I will address some of the reasons why such problems are 




When children are asked explicitly to make judgements about others’ mental states, 
findings are fairly consistent. There seems little doubt that there is a shift in 
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performance in this flexible and controlled reasoning about ToM around the age of 4; 
although this is by no means the beginning or the end of development in flexible ToM 
reasoning or use. There has, however, been heated debate over how we should explain 
this shift in children’s performance. Whilst the children and adults tested in the 
following experimental chapters have clearly undergone this development, how this 
shift in performance is explained goes some way towards outlining some of the major 
theoretical stances across the literature as a whole, I will treat each potential 
explanation relatively cursorily at this stage, hoping to cover only the elements that 
relate to explaining children’s explicit reasoning about mental states. Many of the 
issues raised will be returned to in further discussions as what underlies this shift in 
performance is highly relevant to the empirical data presented in Chapters 2-6 and 
how we should view controlled processing of ToM as a whole. 
 
1.1.7 Representational Shift 
One interpretation of the results that a wide range of tasks involving the ability to 
reason about others’ thinking and behaviour changes around the age of four is that this 
marks the emerging ability to metarepresent, (Perner, 1991). Metarepresentation 
involves the ability to understand representations as representations (Leekam, Perner, 
Healey & Sewell, 2008). This is, of course, a general ability also required outside of 
the social domain. For example, in False Sign tasks (Parkin, 1994) a sign points that 
an object is in a given location, the object is then moved and children have to report 
where the sign shows the object to be. In other words, children must understand that 
the movement of the object itself is not relevant to the content of the representative 
sign. Interestingly, Parkin (1994) found performance on a false sign task to correlate 
significantly with performance on a standard False Belief task. False Photograh tasks, 
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in which a photograph representing a past state of the world that is now incorrect 
(Zaitchik, 1990), have also been suggested to control for general demands of false 
belief tasks. Performance on False Photograph tasks have also been found to correlate 
with False Belief performance (Zaitchik, 1990; and are often used as a control 
condition in neuroimaging studies of ToM; Saxe, Carey & Kanwisher, 2004). 
Interestingly, though, False Belief performance and False Photograph performance do 
not always converge (perhaps most interestingly in studies of autistic children who 
tend to pass False Photograph tasks, but not False Belief tasks; Leekam & Perner, 
1993). Perner and Leekam (2008) suggest that this is because the False Photograph 
task does not successfully match the metarepresentational demands of the False Belief 
task. False Photographs are not in fact “False”, for they do not mis-represent 
information, but rather accurately represent information at a different time. 
Importantly, Maxi’s false belief about the location of chocolates is false because maxi 
thinks that the chocolates are in the drawer, not because he thought they were when he 
saw them placed there. Some support for this view (in addition to its apparently sound 
logic) comes from the fact that the relationship between performance on False Belief 
and False Sign tasks remains significant even when False Photograph performance is 
controlled for, whilst False Photograph performance no longer correlates with False 
Belief performance if False Sign performance is controlled for (Leekam, Perner, 
Healey & Sewell, 2008). Evidence of such a close relationship between False Belief 
and False Sign performance suggests that general cognitive abilities, such as the 
ability to metarepresent, may be crucial in passing False Belief tasks. If the ability to 
metarepresent underlies the significant shift in performance around the age of four, 
one might predict qualitatively similar performance after this age (with general 
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resources for processessing information prescribing performance based on their 
general demands). 
  
1.1.8 Performance Shift 
Another alternative is that the apparent qualitative shift in performance around the age 
of four is the result of quantitative increases in general executive abilities (Leslie & 
Thaiss, 1994; Scholl & Leslie, 1998). For this viewpoint, the change in children’s 
abilities supposes that children, even before the age of four, have all the conceptual 
ability necessary to reason about concepts such as false beliefs, but that what is 
difficult is some specific part of the tasks which test these abilities. Particularly, it 
could be suggested that what is difficult in ToM tasks is the ability to ignore one’s 
own perspective when making the judgement to respond as to the content of another’s 
belief/desire/perspective. Whilst avoiding answering purely from your own 
perspective is clearly an important part of reasoning about another’s mental states, it 
is not necessarily involved in creating a representation of a mental state of another. 
Leslie and colleagues (Leslie, German & Polizzi, 2005; Scholl & Leslie, 1999, Scholl 
& Leslie, 2001) suggest that there are two components involved in ToM. Firstly, a 
Theory of Mind Module (ToMM) that represents the mental states of others and 
secondly a Selection Processor responsible for selecting between mental states to use 
in responding. The ToMM is proposed to be an innate module allowing for 
representation of others’ beliefs, whilst the selection processor must develop in line 
with developments in executive functioning to allow children to “pass” standard, 
explicitly framed ToM problems.  
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Performance accounts will be particularly relevant to discussion of the findings in 
Chapter 5, in which we investigate the role of the executive functions in ToM in 
children, but also relevant throughout each of our studies that chart processing 
difficulty. A performance account would predict that conditions and tasks that are 
failed by children at an early age will still be most demanding of the resources of 
older children and adults. Showing this is not sufficient to validate a performance 
account, but is necessary. 
 
1.1.9 Competence Shift (Russell, 1996)  
Errors made in ToM tasks may correspond to a limit to executive functions, but this 
does not necessarily mean that they are uninformative about ToM itself. Whilst Leslie 
and colleagues suggest that the links between ToM performance and executive 
functioning are largely due to superficial elements of the task and occur after a ToMM 
has imputed the relevant mental states, Russell (1996) suggests another alternative: 
that executive functions may be crucial to forming the ToM concepts themselves. It is 
suggested that the increasing sophistication of such concepts, brought about by 
developments in executive control, leads to success in traditional measures of ToM.  
A competence account, like a performance account would predict that the most 
demanding conditions for adults and older children would be those that are the latest 
to be passed in children’s development. Unlike a performance account a competence 
account should predict that some abilities should be unavailable to sufficiently young 
children, regardless of how far we reduce incidental task demands (or to put this 
another way, it may be that sufficiently reducing incidental task demands is 
impossible). 
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1.1.10 The Executive Functions 
So far, whilst talking of controlled processing of perspectives, controlled processing 
itself has perhaps been rather undefined. By controlled processing, I include all 
processing that is not automatic, rather that it requires a role for deliberate, effortful 
action. If there is a role for controlled processing in ToM, which seems relatively 
clear, a question still remains: When and how do we utilise control? Particularly, if we 
decide to take the perspective of another, how can we hold in mind another’s 
perspective, switch to it and ignore our own when making a decision? Even such a 
superficial analysis of the demands of ToM could be seen to suggest a role for the 
Executive Functions in ToM. 
 
The executive functions are a set of related yet independent abilities commonly found 
to recruit brain activity in the frontal lobes (Collette et al., 2005; Hwang, Velanova & 
Luna, 2010; Luria, 1973; Miller & Cohen, 2001). They are thought to be responsible 
for the planning, enacting and termination of complex thinking and behaviour. Whilst 
there is debate about exactly what components make up the executive functions, there 
is some consensus behind a tripartite division (Collette et al., 2005; Diamond, 2006; 
Fisk & Sharp, 2004; Miyake et al., 2000). Executive function can be divided into the 
subcomponents of inhibition, task switching and working memory.  
 
Chapter 5 of this thesis focuses on the link between Executive Functions and ToM in 
middle childhood. Whilst only one chapter specifically addreses this aspect of control, 
the ideas from it are prevalent throughout. ToM and Executive Functions are known 
to be strongly linked (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Hughes & Ensor, 2007). As I will 
show evidence of continuing development in ToM beyond the age of four, what 
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underlies this development becomes a significant question. As there is known to be 
evidence of significant developments in the executive functions after the age of four 
(Davidson, Amso, Anderson & Diamond, 2006; Simpson & Riggs, 2005), these 
executive developments provide a plausible hypothesis for the underlying cause of 
improvements in ToM. As there is meaningful variability in older children (Davidson 
et al., 2006) and even adults (Miyake et al., 2000), such a hypothesis is not only 
testable, but may have some part in explaining individual differences in, as well as 
development of, ToM. 
 
1.2 Automaticity, Spontaneity and Efficiency 
Whilst much of what might be considered ToM seems to be very demanding of 
cognitive resources, recent research has highlighted that this is not always the case. 
Whilst the majority of three year olds fail false belief tasks when they have to provide 
explicit responses, when infants’ looking time is considered, they seem to show 
sensitivity to the mental states of others (Kovacs, Teglas & Endress, 2010; Onishi & 
Baillargeon, 2005; Sodian, Theormer & Metz, 2007; Southgate et al., 2007; Surian, 
Caldi & Sperber, 2007). Also, similar, indirect, measures have suggested some 
success in these abilities in Chimpanzees (Call & Tomasello, 2008), Macaques 
(Santos et al., 2007) and Western Scrub-Jays (Emery & Clayton, 2004). Clearly, 
infants and the non-human animals mentioned, whilst impressive in their 
performance, are limited in cognitive resources. Importantly, they are limited in the 
very executive abilities thought to be crucial for ToM. It is also the case that infants’ 
and non-human animals’ lack of abilities in language should predict very poor 
performance. Language has been strongly linked to performance in ToM tasks 
(Astington & Baird, 2005), with both syntactic ability (particularly the ability to 
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embed propositions, de Villiers and de Villiers, 2000) and semantics (Cutting & 
Dunn, 1999) predicting performance on standard false belief tasks. Language does, 
however, seem to be more important in developing ToM abilities than passing theory 
of mind tasks (Apperly, Samson, Carroll, Hussain & Humphreys, 2006; Astington & 
Jenkins, 1999). That infants and non-human animals show, even basic, ToM abilities 
sugeests that there must be routes to success in ToM that do not require substantial 
language or executive abilities. 
 
1.2.1 How ToM can be achieved with limited resources 
Much of the next three chapters of this thesis addresses the question of how ToM can 
be achieved with relatively few resources. Added to evidence of studies from infants 
and non-human animals, a recent study by Samson et al. (2010) evidenced a possible 
route to such efficient ToM in adults. Specifically, Samson and colleagues tested 
adults using a Level-1 visual perspective-taking task and showed that they were 
taking the perspective of another in the scene in a somewhat automatic manner. In 
Chapter 2 I investigate whether such automaticity generalises to children as well as 
adults. My interest in automaticity comes from its association with efficiency (Bargh, 
1994). The main gain from processing information automatically is that it frees up 
cognitive resources and saves valuable time and this is something we would expect an 
efficient system to trade in favour of. Whilst the main point of principle for the 
current thesis is efficiency, an important issue to raise at this stage is what we mean 








One of the most influential descriptions of automaticity (particularly for those 
interested in social cognitive processes) comes from Bargh (1994) who described 
what he termed the “four horsemen of automaticity”: these being Intentionality, 
Controllability, Efficiency and Awareness. It is worth being aware that most 
researchers see some element of flexibility in how processes should be considered, 
and Bargh (1994) points out that “mental processes at the level of complexity studied 
by social psychologists are not exclusively automatic or exclusively controlled, but 
are in fact combinations of the features of each.” (Bargh, 1994; p3). This may be 
highlighted by recent research which suggests that certain highly efficient processes 
may be, to some extent, accessible to certain elements of top-down control (Teufel, 
Fletcher & Davis, 2010). For example, even if automatic following of gaze may not 
occur when a participant believes another not to be sighted (Teufel, Alexis, Todd, 
Lawrance-Owen, Clayton & Davis, 2009), this does not suggest that gaze following 
does not show many of the relevant features of automaticity. It may often depend on 
the theoretical use to which the automaticity of a given process is put to determine the 
importance of given elements of automaticity. For the discussion of visual 
perspective-taking in Chapters 2-4, there are two things which are of interest in 
whether visual perspective-taking is automatic or not. Firstly, if a process is 
automatic, then it would generally be considered not to require extensive cognitive 
resources. Evidence that visual perspective-taking is not demanding of significant 
cognitive resources may help to explain how infants and non-human animals manage 
to process perspectives to some degree and how adults can manage rapid on-line 
tracking of the perspectives of others. Secondly, as we are interested in how cognitive 
processes for ToM develop, such a bifurcation of processes into automatic and 
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controlled may allow for a greater understanding of what extra cognitive resources 
really allow us to achieve.  
 
1.2.2.1 Intentionality 
The intentionality of a process is related to what drives the process: is it driven by an 
internal decision of a person to do so or a direct response to a stimulus? For the 
purposes of this thesis we will take participants’ intentions to be linked to the task 
which they have been asked to complete. This does not preclude that they may 
introduce alternative strategies (or intentions), however I will argue, for the most part, 
that it is safe to assume that if participants are acting in a way that is actively 
detrimental to their performance on the task then they are not doing so intentionally. 
 
1.2.2.2 Controllability 
Controllability, like intentionality, relates to an individual’s ability to manage a given 
process. Whilst intentionality refers to the initiation of a process, controllability refers 
to its continuation; i.e. can we stop the process once it has begun? This is perhaps the 
most discussed area of automaticity and many consider any evidence of top-down 
influences on processes to mean that the process is necessarily non-automatic. 
Controllability is a tough concept to define. Participants can clearly close their eyes to 
avoid a visual stimulus that might otherwise trigger an automatic response. For the 
current discussion, our consideration is in fact similar to that of intentionality. 
Specifically we make the assumption that if a given process is having a detrimental 
effect on task performance, then participants are unable to control it (or it at least 
costs them significant cognitive effort to do so). Importantly in the experiments in 
Chapters 2-4 participants will receive the crucial information as to whose perspective 
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they should take prior to each picture stimulus. This means that participants have the 
option of strategically preparing for processing the stimulus. We will assume that if 
they can control their processing, part of their strategy will be to do so.  
 
1.2.2.3 Efficiency 
If a process is automatic it should be computed efficiently. This is, in fact, the element 
of automaticity that interests us most in the following chapters. If visual perspective-
taking is shown to be automatic, and therefore efficient, then this may go some way to 
explaining the success of infants and non-human animals. By Bargh’s (1994) 
definition, the efficiency of a process refers the extent to which the process demands 
attentional resources. In fact, for our purposes, we will extend efficiency to include 
making limited demands on executive resources as well. If an efficient mechanism for 
perspective-taking were to be of use in explaining the performance of infants and non-
human animals, it should make limited demands on memory and inhibition as well as 
on attention and it should also be able to operate without language. This is what could 
plausibly allow perspective-taking to occur in very young children and non-human 
animals and when adults are clearly dedicating significant resources to other aspects 
of social interaction. For my current purposes, I will take a process to be efficient if 
participants remain able to complete a task which is demanding of general resources. 
For the perspective-taking tasks used this will involve participants actively having to 
make a judgement about their own perspective on a scene.  
 
1.2.2.4 Awareness 
That a process occurs without the awareness of the processor is the final “horseman” 
of Bargh’s automaticity. There are many different forms of awareness, varying from 
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whether a person is unaware that they have even seen a stimulus (subliminal 
influence) to simply unaware of the influence it has had on their decision making 
(Bargh, 1994). In Chapters 2-4 we will put only limited demands on participants 
being unaware of any automatic perspective-taking process, other than to make the 
assumption that if participants were aware of their automatically taking the 
perspective of another, they would make active attempts to use this when making 
judgements from that perspective and to avoid doing so when judging a secondary 
task. Lack of awareness is also less essential here as awareness does not necessarily 
reduce efficiency and thus, does not necessarily speak to this as a plausible 
explanation for the success of infants and non-human animals. 
 
1.2.2.5 Summary 
In summary, I will place two main critetia on our investigations of the automaticity of 
visual perspective-taking. If visual perspective-taking is automatic, participants 
should take the perspectives of others in a way that actively hinders their performance 
on another task. Also, this should be the case even when participants have prior 
information that taking the perspective of another is not their task. In addition to these 
main criteria, to confirm that it is truly social perspective-taking that is automatic, 
such effects should not be replicated in non-social control conditions. 
 
1.2.3 Original Automaticity and Automatisation 
If the automaticity of perspective-taking is to be important in the discussion of the 
development of ToM it is just as vital how the process has become automatic as 
whether the process is automatic or not. Specifically, as I will discuss in Chapters 2 
and 3, the degree to which automatic processes found in adults may provide 
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explanatory power for the impressive abilities of infants may rest on whether these 
processes are originally automatic or whether they are automatised. The important 
difference between these two alternatives is in their development. Specifically an 
originally automatic process is a process that emerges as an automatic process, i.e. it 
is efficient and outside of cognitive control from the beginning. For example, it is 
thought that infants have an innate pre-disposition for processing small sets of 
numbers (Feigenson, Dehane & Spelke, 2004). Importantly, infants have this ability 
before they can explicitly report knowledge of, or have any training in, the counting 
process. If a process is automatised, it begins as a process that requires cognitive 
control, but with exposure and practice the need for cognitive control and attentional 
resources becomes reduced. A good example of this is in the automatisation of 
addition (Lefevre, Bisanz & Markonjic, 1988). It is clear that formal addition of 
numerals cannot be initially automatic (for different cultures have used different 
number systems), however, with exposure cognitive control is no longer needed to 
calculate familiar sums with small numerosities. 
 
1.3 Reconciling Efficient and Controlled Processing 
To a greater or lesser degree, theories of ToM have acknowledged the role for both 
efficient and more effortful processing of others’ mental states. Such accounts can be 
loosely classified on the basis of how they expect that efficient ToM may work, and 
what they expect it to achieve. Differences are particularly clear when examining 
different explanations of the success of infants in tasks which seem to require ToM. 
Whilst the empirical findings in the following chapters assess more specifically the 
development towards a mature, efficient, effective ToM, explanations of infants’ 
performance are highly relevant. 
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1.3.1 Infant Mentalisers and the Modularity of Mind 
Given the consistent evidence from studies with young children (Welman et al., 
2001), the fact that infants’ looking behaviour suggests any knowledge of the beliefs 
or perspectives of others is quite remarkable. One way of interpreting these findings is 
to suggest that these tasks have been able to demonstrate infants’ true abilities by 
removing irrelevant task demands placed by less sensitive measures. To this way of 
thinking, infants’ ToM has all the essential sophistication of that of adults, though not 
necessarily all the general information or executive abilities required to perform in the 
same way. Onishi and Baillargeon (2005, p255) make the bold proposition that 15-
month old infants “...realize that others act on the basis of their beliefs and that these 
beliefs are representations that may or may not mirror reality”. This echoes the 
sentiments of Leslie on the “specific innate basis for our common-sense theory of 
mind” (Leslie, 1987, p424). Leslie and colleagues propose that efficiency is the 
results of an encapsulated theory of mind module processing specific inputs (Leslie & 
Thaiss, 1993; Scholl & Leslie, 1998). A module is able to achieve efficiency as it 
operates on a very restricted set of inputs and produces a very specific set of outputs. 
 
Modular accounts for cognitive processes in general are influential and encapsulation 
provides much explanatory power. Fodor (1983, 2001) proposes that modular 
processesing helps to address the frame problem, or problem of relevance. This is the 
problem of how cognition can possibly work when the potential information that 
could be used in any problem is unbounded (this is relevant to concerns about how 
ToM can be both flexible and efficient). Specific, bounded, modules help to avoid the 
problem of relevance as they are encapsulated; they do not need to consider 
information outside of a very strict set of inputs and thus can operate efficiently. 
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Importantly, such encapsulation comes at a cost: a cost of the hard constraints on such 
modules. If only a very specific set of inputs can be processed, then only a specific set 
of real world situations can be negotiated. For a cognitive process such as vision, such 
hard constraints may not cause such a problem (though they do give rise to perceptual 
illusions); all important inputs could be seen to be relatively similar. However, for a 
complex, higher cognitive, problem such as are encountered in ToM, such constraints 
may cause major problems. Can we really expect a module to track the content of 
another’s visual perspective and also their beliefs about the role of the monarchy in a 
post-colonial world? Of course, Leslie and colleagues do not suggest that all specific 
information on beliefs can be processed innately, rather that the systems for belief 
reasoning are innately pre-described.  
 
Whilst Leslie and colleagues are clear in their suggestion that a ToMM generates 
mental states of others, which are then coordinated by a separate Selection Processor 
which develops with age (Leslie & Thaiss, 1993; Scholl & Leslie, 1998), they are less 
clear on where the limits lie to this kind of processing. Scholl and Leslie propose that 
a modular theory of mind may only be considered as “early theory of mind” and also 
that aspects of this may “be triggered by the environment during maturation”. There is 
really very little attention paid, however, to how these processes are divided, or even 
to whether it is possible to test this. In other words, Leslie and colleagues suggest two 
processes by which ToM can be achieved: One route which involves automatic and 
involuntary processing of perspective which is subsequently organised by the 
Selection Processor, but also a much less defined route for “later” or “triggered” ToM 
(which may also require the Selection Processor). A big question remains as to 
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whether and if so, how, such later or triggered ToM can account for the flexibility 
achieved by ToM.  
 
1.3.2 Core Cognition 
 I strongly believe that it is worth defending the notion that some form of ToM can be 
achieved through an encapsulated, modular-like process, though of course this does 
not mean that it is always done in this way. Modular or core processing clearly 
provides one route to efficiency and success by increasingly young infants suggests 
the likelihood that some abilities may be innate. I find it unlikely, however, that all 
ToM is achieved in this way as such a system would be predefined to operate on a 
very specific set of inputs, chosen for their adaptive advantage, which would strictly 
limit such a system. Accounts of core cognition in developmental psychology (Carey, 
2009) more easily afford a role for both innate abilities and significant future 
development than purely modular accounts.  
 
Core conceptual systems proposed by Carey (2009), Spelke (Spelke & Kinzler, 2007) 
and others, promote the existence of important, innate, core concepts. Whilst Carey 
supports evidence for the existence of innate representations that are not merely 
perceptual in character, she also proposes the development of more complex concepts 
and theories beyond this (which are not modular in nature). Both sides of this 
proposition are somewhat controversial, but it generates clear predictions. Core 
cognitive systems should be specifically limited in terms of the scope of information 
they can process, and should not vary through development, though general 
processing associated with it may do so. Like purely modular accounts of ToM a core 
cognition account allows for complex concepts being innate, but contrary to purely 
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modular accounts suggests that later development may be important. Such an account 
also differs crucially from most other accounts that afford for “learning” of conceptual 
information (Gopnik & Metlzoff, 1997; Perner, 1991) in suggesting that learning can 
be specific to a given domain. In Chapter 2 I will discuss a system for Level-1 
perspective-taking as being originally automatic, which I believe to be consistent with 
a core cognitive apparatus for ToM.  
 
1.3.3 Infant Behaviourists 
Of course, there is an alternative to the conclusion that infants have the necessary 
conceptual apparatus to pass false belief tasks, if not the necessary executive capacity 
to express their knowledge. Perner and colleagues (Perner & Ruffman, 2005; 
Ruffman & Perner, 2005) have maintained that the recently found success of infants 
can be explained through their application of behavioural rules. Perner and Ruffman 
maintain that it is only at four that children have the appropriate domain general 
concepts to truly understand the minds of others. 
 
1.3.3.1. Behavioural rules 
The suggestion that behavioural rules can allow for seemingly impressive 
performance has been made for both infants and non-human animals (Penn & 
Povinelli, 2007; Perner & Ruffman, 2005; Ruffman & Perner, 2005). The idea of such 
accounts is that by tracking regularities in the behaviour of agents we can achieve 
something that looks a lot like ToM, but really does not require any ascription of 
anything that might be considered a mental state. For example, one might solve a false 
belief task not by imputing and using Maxi’s belief that the chocolates are in the 
drawer, but rather by having a rule that people normally look for things where they 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
28 
 
saw them last. Perner and Ruffman propose that such behavioural rules may provide 
for some success in conventional situations, but should later be reinterpreted in terms 
of mental states to provide for extra flexibility. For example, if we always reason that 
people will look where they last saw things, our judgements will at times be incorrect 
for they don’t always do so. People may wish to avoid an undesirable item, or lead 
someone else away from a favoured item. Of course, even more complicated series 
like these may also be attributable to more complex behavioural associations (Epstein, 
Kirshnit, Lanza & Rubin, 1984; Sobel & Kirkham, 2007). Behavioural rules are a 
possible route to efficiency, and plausibly even some degree of flexibility, however, 
proponents of this view must find evidence to address two related issues (Apperly & 
Butterfill, 2009). Firstly, it is crucial that such behavioural rules that are complex 
enough to support the relevant inferences are truly evident in agents’ behaviours. 
Following this, it is equally important to show that we are capable of, efficiently, 
recognising such patterns. For the purposes of this thesis, I will take it as sufficient to 
say that such a route to efficiency is plausible (even in infants), and also suggest that 
if such behavioural rules really do provide for explanation of how we solve some 
ToM problems, this does not make such a solution any less interesting or informative 
(Shettleworth, 2010). Importantly, if behavioural rules are responsible for success on 
indirect measures of ToM, then explanations of the shift in performance on direct 
measures (section 1.1.7-1.1.9) become more important (and it is unlikely that this shift 
is purely the result of improvements in general performance).  
 
1.3.4 Implicit Theory of Mind 
Even before the recent studies showing success by infants on False Belief-like tasks, 
there was some debate about whether traditional False Belief tasks were really the 
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best way to test ToM abilities (Bloom & German, 2000; Leslie, 1994). Whilst there 
are good reasons to believe that standard False Belief tasks may not capture all the 
competencies of young children, it is worth highlighting the remarkably consistent 
finding that children fail these seemingly simple tasks, in many different forms up to 
the age of four (Hogrefe et al., 1986; Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Wellman et al., 2001). 
In other words, there is the big question to answer of why children still fail tasks at the 
age of 3 if they have been able to solve these tasks since the age of 15-months (or 
even 7 months, Kovacs et al., 2010). One response to this is to suggest that measures 
involving eye gaze are more sensitive “implicit” measures, whilst “explicit” measures 
inherently require more executive resources (Baillargeon, Scott & He, 2010).  
 
The idea that explicit and implicit tasks may allow children to show different abilities 
is not a new response to the recent work, in fact Clements and Perner (1993), 
suggested the very same distinction to explain the lack of relationship between 3-year 
olds’ first eye movements and their explicit responses in false belief tasks. Clements 
and Perner (1993) propose that “implicit” knowledge of false beliefs may precede 
“explicit” false belief understanding, suggesting that each portrays a different “type of 
knowledge” (Clements & Perner, 1993, p391). Specifically, Clements and Perner 
tentatively propose that gaining knowledge about a fact may be very different from 
making a judgment about a fact. This is a very different suggestion to that made by 
Baillargeon et al (2010), in that here an implicit knowledge is thought to be 
qualitatively different from mature ToM. Both descriptions of implicit theory of mind 
directly address the surprising differences in performance on different tasks. 
However, descriptions of implicit and explicit ToM seem to provide little extra 
explanation of the findings, as what makes a response “explicit” or “implicit” remains 
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somewhat ill-defined. This is also a particular problem if one supports a notion that 
early ToM abilities are the basis of later ToM performance. 
 
1.3.5 Two Systems for ToM 
It may seem that both broad kinds of account discussed so far have similarities, in 
allowing for infants achieving impressive, efficient performance, but accepting that 
infants may not have a fully fledged ToM. The key difference, of course, lies in the 
fact that those who propose a purely modular/innate ToM (Leslie, 1993; Onishi & 
Baillargeon, 2005) suggest that infants have all the conceptual abilities to process 
others’ mental states, but not necessarily all the general knowledge or processing 
power. On the other hand, those who propose infants’ success can be explained by 
behavioural rules (Perner & Ruffman, 2005; Ruffman & Perner, 2005) suggest that 
only later children develop fully fledged conceptual apparatus. A third plausible 
alternative is that infants’ understanding is neither a pre-cursor to later abilities, nor a 
fully-fledged ToM, but rather that it represents just one independent system for ToM. 
 
That humans may have two systems for ToM has recently been suggested by Apperly 
and Butterfill (2009) as a potential solution to the conflicting demands placed by 
different tests of everyday ToM. If, on the one hand, we need our ToM to be fast and 
efficient, then we might expect such a system to have certain kinds of cognitive 
features (perhaps similar to those of Leslie’s ToMM). On the other hand if ToM needs 
to be flexible, accurate and controlled, we should expect it to have a whole other set 
of features (perhaps similar to Perner’s explicit ToM; Clements & Perner, 1993, or the 
domain general ability to metarepresent, Leekam et al., 2009; Perner, 1991). One way 
of solving this apparent contradiction is by suggesting that these distinct processes are 
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completed by entirely separate systems. This is a solution which has been used to 
solve similar problems in other areas of cognition, such as number cognition 
(Feigenson et al., 2004) and general reasoning (Evans, 2003). In number cognition 
multiple systems allow for success in different numerical problems (Feigenson et al., 
2004). On the one hand, fast and efficient systems, which are present in infancy and in 
some non-human animals, allow for computation of precise small numerosities and 
large ratios. On the other hand, a system of reasoning gained through experience and 
formal instruction allows for computation of problems involving complex concepts 
and processes such as imaginary numbers, vector spaces and infinite sets with finite 
sums. Apperly and Butterfill (2009) draw a comparison with the competing demands 




In number cognition, signature limits provide crucial converging evidence for the 
presence of multiple systems (Feigenson et al., 2004; Spelke, 1991; Spelke & Kinzler 
2007). Signature limits are specific constraints on the information a system can 
process. For example, infants, some non-human animals and adults under time 
pressure are thought to use a low-level system for calculating numerosity, but in all 
cases this system cannot calculate numbers greater than 4. In other words, the number 
4, whilst only differing from other numbers in an arbitrary manner, defines a limit on 
this system. That this is the case across different participant groups in very different 
tasks, suggests that this is a single system prevalent across these different groups. 
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Apperly and Butterfill (2009) suggest that identification of signature limits is 
something we should expect if ToM is really achieved by multiple systems. Different 
performance under different conditions does not necessitate the involvement of 
distinct systems, as a single system could perform differently in different 
circumstances (or at different stages of development). Evidence of consistent, and 
seemingly arbitrary, limits at different stages of development (either ontogenetic or 
phylogenetic) does suggest evidence for a specific, bounded, system. If this system is 
limited it also implies another, more flexible system. A flexible system for ToM 
should primarily be limited by the demands it places on general processing resources, 
and by the fact that sometimes individuals do not have all the information they need 
to make accurate ToM judgements. It should also, of course, be limited in what it can 
achieve in a given time limit, or under dual task conditions. An efficient system on the 
other hand need not necessarily be limited by time pressure or dual task conditions. 
However, we should expect such a system to have strict limits to the flexibility of its 
performance. An efficient system for ToM should be efficient through some form of 
encapsulation, so should only operate on very specific information under very specific 
constraints. Thus signature limits are the central piece of evidence for just such a 
system. In the current thesis, chapters 3 and 4 examine whether the Level-1/Level-2 
distinction on visual perspective-taking may be a limit on efficient ToM. I will 
propose that evidence that this is the case suggests that a low-level, but strictly 
limited, system may be responsible for success of infants and non-human adults in 








How to resolve the competing demands for efficiency and flexibility on cognitive 
systems for ToM must be addressed in any comprehensive theory of ToM. It should 
hopefully be apparent that different cognitive systems for ToM may reflect features of 
more than one of the theories proposed in this section. That infants and non-human 
animals can achieve success on tasks traditionally assumed to involve imputing 
mental states highlights that such tasks can be passed successfully with efficient 
processing. The key to explaining such processing involves explaining how such 
efficient processing can be achieved. I have suggested that behavioural rules and 
distinct, encapsulated, but limited systems (or modules) may be plausible solutions to 
this. In the earlier discussion (Section 1.2) I also suggested the possibility of 
automatisation as a route by which processes could become efficient. I wholly 
endorse (and consider no contradiction in) the possibility that all of these options may 
be in part responsible. The experiments in Chapters 2-4 provide relevant information 
to how we should address this question. By looking at efficient perspective-taking in 
children and adults these experiments examine the plausibility, and scope, of a low-
level, and distinct system that may be responsible for some aspects of ToM. Chapter 6 
on the other hand, investigates a specific, yet related, aspect of cognition, that of 
spatial perspective-taking. To highlight the link to this perspective, it is first of all 
important to define what we mean by a perspective at all. 
 
1.4 Different kinds of perspective-taking; representational format and requisite 
cues  
In Chapter 3 of this thesis, I consider two dimensions along which perspectives can be 
distinguished: the nature of the types of content involved (Sparse vs. Rich) and the 
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nature of the association required between a perspective and an individual (Subject-
dependent vs. Subject-independent). A subject-dependent perspective may require a 
specific history or belief: for example in a false belief task, Maxi only believes the 
cupboard to be empty because of his past experience, not because of his current, 
perceptual position in the world. A subject-independent perspective, on the other 
hand, may only require an individual to be in a specific place at a specific time: for 
example it may be that from where you are stood you can see object A, but not object 
B, but this would also be the case for any other person with normal vision. In Chapter 
3 I suggest that such dimensions upon which representational format can be 
distinguished may prove informative in describing absolute, signature limits to 
efficient processing. There is also the quite separate issue of what the everyday cues 
to such processing are. Some kinds of perspective-taking do not necessarily require a 
subject at all, be it dependent or independent. Spatial perspective-taking (Kessler & 
Thomson, 2009; Michelon & Zacks, 2005), normally refers to the relationship 
between agents and objects, but actually requires merely an object that is directed. In 
Chapter 6 we investigate whether perspectives generated by a social agent differ from 
perspectives generated by a fronted object. 
 
1.5 Frames of Reference and Spatial Perspective-taking 
In Chapter 6 I concentrate on the notion of a Frame of Reference, which allows for 
the direct manipulation of whether a perspective is generated by an agent or an object. 
Frames of reference provide an internal representation of space upon which a 
linguistic utterance can be mapped (Carlson-Radvansky & Irwin, 1993). Without such 
frames of reference, we cannot understand how statements refer to the relative 
positions of people and objects. Such questions have been of great interest to those 
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specifically interested in spatial cognition (Carlson-Radvansky & Irwin, 1993) and in 
the relationship between language and cognition (Levinson, 1996). Surprisingly, 
though, there has been little focus on the clear links between these kinds of judgments 
and judgments of psychological perspective. This will be discussed in greater detail in 
the chapter itself, but it is worth noting at this stage some key comparisons. Firstly, 
there is a superficial similarity in how these judgements are made. One has to identify 
features of an individual or object and use them to determine a relationship between 
this subject/object and others in the scene. Secondly, it is known that some of the 
same resources are recruited in each process, such as inhibition (Carlson-Radvansky 
& Jiang, 1999; Qureshi, Samson & Apperly., 2010). Also, and perhaps most 
importantly, both psychological and spatial perspective-taking judgements require 
resolving a potential conflict between the position of self and other within a scene. 
 
The other reason for being particularly interested in the case of frame of reference 
judgements which involve psychological perspectives is as a case study of how 
effortful, controlled processing and involuntary or efficient processing of an 
individual’s perspective interact. Specifically, in everyday calculation of such 
decisions, is a subject with a perspective treated in any way differently from an object 
with merely a frame of reference?  
 
1.6 Summary 
There is no doubt that recent findings showing success in ToM by infants (Onishi & 
Baillargeon, 2005) and non-human animals (Clayton & Emery, 2003) have provided a 
key new empirical foundation which must be explained in any theory of ToM. I am 
equally confident that recent findings from adults (Apperly et al., in press; Keysar et 
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al., 2003; Samson et al., 2010) should also be considered in any comprehensive 
account of ToM. The empirical investigations on which this thesis is founded are 
organised with both these beliefs in mind. I am not naive enough to believe that the 
following chapters will bring a complete picture of the role of controlled and efficient 
processing of ToM, but propose that each of the experiments detailed begins to 
address some of the problems posed by apparent contradictions between findings 
from infants, children, non-human animals and adults. All of the experiments detailed 
herein have participant groups aged between 6-years and adulthood. Even prior to 
testing, I broadly assumed that all the participants I have tested would be able to pass 
all the tests I have administered, given enough time and information. Whilst this 
might seem an unusual approach to developmental psychology, I hope, in the end, it 
will be shown to be a critical and necessary one. At several points in the upcoming 
chapters I will appeal to the notion of convergence; that is that findings across 
numerous tasks, age-groups and species will in the end provide us with something 
approaching a complete picture of ToM. There is, of course, something rather 
unsatisfactory about this. It is certainly counter-intuitive to explain infants’ success 
through studying the performance of adults, particularly when we know infants fail 
tasks that adults pass. I believe, though, in many ways that solutions gained in this 
way are necessary, for it is only with a complete picture of what ToM is that we can 
explain its development, in ontogeny and phylogeny. Conversely, I also believe that 
findings from infants and non-human animals will help structure our beliefs of what a 
mature ToM should look like. In particular, evidence that ToM can be achieved 
efficiently surely impacts on what we should expect to see in adults’ performance.  
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Samson et al. (2010) found adults to compute perspectives in a somewhat automatic 
way. Chapter 2 investigates whether the findings from Samson et al. (2010) generalise 
to children. The three experiments in Chapters 3 and 4 focus on whether the Level-
1/Level-2 distinction provides a limit to efficient ToM. This really hopes to answer 
two questions. Whether there are limits to efficient ToM, and if so, what are they? If 
there are limits to efficient ToM this suggests that at least one mechanism for efficient 
ToM is of the type of core cognition suggested by Carey and colleagues (or low-level 
system proposed by Apperly & Butterfill; 2008). Precisely what this limit is, whilst 
providing clarity and comprehensiveness, remains relatively theory neutral. Chapter 5 
investigates links between executive functions and a range of ToM abilities in middle 
childhood. I propose that if we are to investigate a ToM that improves from infancy to 
adulthood, we must also investigate what underlies this improvement. Chapter 6 
investigates perspective processing in the light of different cues, specifically through 
looking at the impact of psychological perspective on judgements of spatial relations. 
As part of this overall thesis, I suggest that we must clarify and broaden our notion of 
perspective as there seem to be clear similarities between perspectives generated by 






















Egocentrism and automatic perspective-taking in children and adults 
 
This chapter, largely in its current form, has been accepted for publication as the 
article:  
Surtees, A. D. R. & Apperly, I.A. (in press), Egocentrism and automatic perspective-














Children (aged 6-10) and adults completed a novel visual perspective-taking task that 
allowed quantitative comparisons across age groups. All age groups found it harder to 
judge the other person’s perspective when it differed from their own. This egocentric 
interference did not decrease with age, even though, overall, performance improved. 
In addition, it was more difficult to judge one’s own perspective when it differed from 
that of the other person, suggesting that the other’s perspective was processed even 
though it interfered with self perspective judgments. In a logically equivalent, non-
social task, the same degree of interference was not observed. These findings are 




Piaget and Inhelder (1956) suggested that children as old as 7 years found it difficult 
to judge how a 3-dimensional model of three mountains would appear to someone 
who viewed it from a different angle. Since this classic work there has been a steady 
downward trend in the age at which children have been shown to have such abilities. 
Researchers in the 1980s found success on conceptually similar problems in children 
aged 4 to 5 years (Flavell, Everett, Croft & Flavell, 1981; Light & Nix, 1983). 
Recently, success has been reported on very simple tasks in children as young as 2 
years (Moll & Tomasello, 2006), and perhaps even younger infants (Sodian, 
Thoermer & Metz, 2007; Song & Baillargeon, 2008). In contrast, we know little about 
development once children first pass these tasks. This oversight leaves us ignorant 
about the cognitive characteristics of perspective-taking, and whether these change as 
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children gain practice and cognitive resources. We developed a novel task to examine 
simple perspective-taking in children aged from 6 to 10 years and adults. 
 
2.1.1 Egocentrism (interference from self-perspective)  
A recurrent characteristic in young children’s explicit perspective-taking judgments is 
egocentrism: children’s errors show a systematic bias towards the child’s own point of 
view (Fishbein, Lewis, & Keiffer, 1972; Flavell et al., 1981; Liben, 1978; Piaget & 
Inhelder, 1956). Egocentric interference from self-perspective is also observed when 
older children and adults perform perspective-taking tasks that are more complex, or 
that require judgments of certainty about what someone else will do or think, with 
some evidence suggesting that this egocentrism decreases with age (e.g., Bernstein, 
Atance, Loftus, & Meltzoff, 2004; Birch & Bloom, 2007; Epley et al., 2004; Keysar, 
Lin & Barr, 2003; Nickerson, 1999; Royzman, Cassidy & Baron, 2003). However, 
although at a general level “egocentrism” may be a recurrent feature of perspective-
taking, no study has demonstrated egocentrism in older children and adults on tasks 
equivalent to those used with young children. Thus, in the current work we tested the 
degree of egocentrism in children and adults on a “Level-1” perspective-taking task 
that required judgments that are logically equivalent to those required in tests used 
with children aged 2 and younger (e.g., Flavell et al., 1981). 
 
2.1.2 A visual-perspective-taking task for adults 
Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews & Bodley-Scott (2010; Wang, Apperly, 
Samson & Braithwaite, under revision) used a computer-based task in which adult 
participants made time-pressured judgments about the number of dots seen by a 
cartoon character on the walls of a room. Sometimes the cartoon character saw 
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exactly the same number of dots as the participant, and sometimes s/he saw fewer. 
This is a Level-1 perspective-taking task because it requires judgments about what 
someone sees, whereas a Level-2 perspective-taking task requires judgments about 
the particular way in which they see something (Flavell et al. 1981). When they 
judged the character’s perspective, participants were slower and more error-prone if 
they saw more dots than the character. This is evidence of egocentric bias because it 
shows that participants’ own discrepant perspective interfered with judgments of the 
character’s perspective. We adapted this task in order to compare the size of the 




Although Samson et al. (2010) found that participants’ own perspective interfered 
with their explicit judgments about the character’s perspective, the same series of 
experiments provided evidence that the character’s perspective itself was being 
calculated in a relatively automatic manner. One signature of an automatic process is 
that it may be executed even when this interferes with successful performance on 
some other task (Dijkerman & Smit, 2007; Kilner, Paulignon & Blakemore, 2003; 
Lefevre, Bisanz & Mrkonjic, 1988). To test for this, Samson et al’s experiments also 
included “self” trials where participants judged how many dots they themselves could 
see on the wall of the room. The important finding was that these self-perspective 
judgments were slower and more error-prone when the character saw fewer dots than 
the participant. This effect indicated that even though the character’s perspective was 
irrelevant and, in principle, could be ignored on Self-perspective trials, in fact the 
character’s perspective was processed, and the content of this resulted in interference 
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when participants had to judge their own perspective. A further experiment in Samson 
et al.’s study found that this effect persisted even when participants only ever made 
judgments about their own perspective for the entire experiment. That is to say, 
participants appeared to be processing the character’s perspective even when it is 
wholly irrelevant to the task at hand, and this interfered with participants’ judgments 
about their own perspective when their own perspective was different from that of the 
character. To this extent, these data show evidence of automatic Level-1 perspective 
processing in adults. 
 
2.1.4 Routes to automaticity 
There are at least two ways in which adults might come to calculate other people’s 
perspectives in an automatic manner. One possibility is that Level-1 perspective-
taking is not initially automatic in children, but by adulthood repeated practice has 
resulted in automatization. If so then, on Samson et al.’s task, younger children should 
not process the character’s perspective automatically and so should suffer less or even 
no interference from the character’s perspective when they judge their own, self-
perspective. Another possibility is that the automaticity observed in adults reflects the 
operation of a cognitively efficient process for simple perspective-taking that has been 
present since infancy. This possibility is consistent with evidence that infants and 
young children may show precocious sensitivity to the perspectives of others when 
tested indirectly (via looking times or eye movements) rather than when required to 
make an explicit judgment (e.g., Clements & Perner, 1994; Onishi & Baillargeon, 
2006; Sodian et al., 2007; Song & Baillargeon, 2008; Southgate, Senju & Csibra, 
2006). Such “original automaticity” predicts that the interference effects observed in 
adults by Samson et al. (2010) will be observed in children of all ages, if only 
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appropriate methods could be found to test for these effects. In the current study we 
sought to make some progress on this question in Experiment 1A by testing children 
as young as 6 years on a paradigm very similar to that used by Samson et al. In 
Experiment 1B we tested the whether similar effects would be observed in an 
analogous task that did not require perspective-taking. 
 




2.2.1.1  Overview 
On every trial participants heard instructions and viewed a cartoon avatar standing in 
a cartoon room with dots on the wall (See Figure 2.1). On “Self” trials, participants 
judged the number of circles they could see on the walls of a room. On “Other” trials, 
participants judged how many circles could be seen by the cartoon avatar in the 
picture. On “Consistent” trials the avatar could see the same number of circles as the 
participant. On “Inconsistent” trials the avatar’s position in the room meant that s/he 
saw fewer circles. Although it would have been interesting to create a situation in 
which it was the avatar that saw the greater number of circles, the current paradigm 
would not permit such a scenario. 
 




Figure 2.1. Schematic event sequence of experimental trials. Participants were cued as 
to the perspective they were to take and the number to verify. Following this they 
were presented with a picture stimulus. For Experiment 1B. “She sees N” was 
replaced by “Yellow-side N”. 
 
2.2.1.2  Participants 
Four groups of participants were tested: Undergraduates (N=11), mean age: 19.1 
(range 18-23), 10 female; 10-year-olds (N=24), mean age 10.1 (range = 9:6-10:5), 13 
female; 8-year-olds (N=35), mean age = age 8.3 years (range = 8:0-8:5), 18 female; 6-
year olds (N=36), mean age = 6.4 (range 6:1-6:11), 20 female. Adult participants were 
recruited for course credits, and were predominantly white British. Child participants 
were recruited from 2 schools in a working-middle class area of Wolverhampton; as 
for adults, the majority of participants were white British. 
 
2.2.1.3  Design and Procedure 
Child participants completed the experiment in a room adjacent to their normal 
classroom. Adult participants completed the task in a testing cubicle. Instructions 
included a detailed description of the procedure and an instruction to respond as 
quickly and accurately as possible. Practice trials were completed until the participant 
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had successfully answered a question for each of the four conditions (Self-Consistent, 
Self-Inconsistent, Other-Consistent, Other-Inconsistent)  
 
On each trial, participants viewed successive fixation stimuli (a smiling face (600ms) 
and a fixation cross (600ms)) followed by a 1800ms auditory stimulus (either “He 
sees N” or “You see N”, where N ranged from 1 to 3, so that the number of circles 
was within the range that could be enumerated quickly and accurately via subitization, 
Trick and Pylyshyn, 1994) and then the test picture depicting an avatar in a room with 
1-3 dots on the wall. Participants pressed one of two colored keys to indicate whether 
or not the auditory stimulus correctly described the picture (on half of the trials, the 
auditory stimulus did match the picture, and on half it did not). Response time was 
measured from the onset of the picture. Participants completed four practice trials. 
Child participants completed 48 test trials: 24 where self and other perspectives were 
consistent (12 Self, 12 Other) and 24 where self and other perspectives were 
inconsistent (12 Self, 12 Other). Adults completed two cycles of the child experiment 
(96 trials). Self and Other trials were mixed within each block of trials. The 




Examining the effect of perspective consistency on Other trials allowed us to test for 
egocentric interference from self perspective when making explicit judgments about 
the avatar’s perspective. Examining the effect of perspective consistency on Self trials 
allowed us to test whether the avatar’s perspective was processed automatically, 
leading to interference with judgments about self perspective. Self and Other trials 
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were analysed separately as we had no hypotheses about the relative size of any 
effects observed in these two conditions. Following Samson et al. (2010) only trials 
where the auditory stimulus and the picture matched were used in the analysis. Mean 
Reaction Times and Error data for both experiments 1A and 1B are presented in 
Figure 2.2. 
 
2.2.2.1  Other Trials 
Response Times (RTs). Data that were two standard deviations from the mean 
were omitted from the analysis of RTs (3.6% of the data for 6-year olds, 2.9% for 8 
year olds, 4.3% for 10-year-olds and 2.1% for adults), as were data from incorrect 
responses. Results were not affected by excluding using less strict criteria (outliers 2.5 
or 3 standard deviations from the mean). 
An ANOVA with Consistency as a within subjects factor, and Age as a 
between subjects factor revealed an effect of Age (F(3, 105) = 59.20; p < .01, ηp2 = 
.63). T-tests showed that each older age group responded more quickly than the 
adjacent younger age group (lowest t(58) = 6.16; all ps < .01). There was a main 
effect of Consistency (F(1,105) = 13.12; p < .01, ηp2 = .11; Consistent<Inconsistent), 
but no significant interaction between Age and Consistency F(3, 105) = .14; p = .94. 
Planned comparisons showed higher RTs for Inconsistent compared with Consistent 
trials for all age groups (lowest t(34) = 2.06, all ps < .05), see figure 2.2. 
 
Errors. A similar ANOVA on errors showed no effect of Age (F(3, 105) = 
.72; p = .54. There was a main effect of Consistency (F(1,105) = 7.55; p < .01, ηp2 = 
.068; Consistent<Inconsistent), but no significant interaction between Age and 
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Consistency F(3, 105) = .52; p = .24. Only 8-year-olds showed significantly more 
errors on Inconsistent trials than on Consistent trials (t(34) = 2.78, p < .01).   
 
2.2.2.2  Self Trials 
Response times (RTs). Outliers were excluded using the same criterion as in 
Other trials (1.7% of data for 6-year olds, 2.93% for 8 year olds, 3.9% for 10-year-
olds and 1.7% for adults)  
 An ANOVA with Consistency as a within subjects factor, and Age as a 
between subjects factor revealed an effect of Age F(3, 105) = 79.09, p < .01, ηp2 = 
.70. T-tests showed that each older age group responded more quickly than the 
adjacent younger age group (lowest t(34) = 5.90; all ps < .01). There was a main 
effect of Consistency (F(1, 105) = 32.45, p < .01, ηp2 = .24; Consistent<Inconsistent), 
but no significant interaction between Age and Consistency F(3, 105) = 2.34, p = .24. 
Planned comparisons showed higher RTs for Inconsistent compared with Consistent 
trials for all age groups (lowest t(23) = 2.45, all ps < .05) 
 
Errors. A similar ANOVA on errors showed a marginal effect of Age (F(3, 
105) = 2.62, p = .054), an effect of Consistency (F(1, 105) = 7.28, p < .01, ηp2 = .066; 
Consistent<Inconsistent) and a significant interaction between Age and Consistency 
(F(3, 105) = 4.81, p < .01, ηp2 = .12). 6-year olds, 8-year olds, and adults showed 
significantly more errors on Inconsistent trials than on Consistent trials (lowest t(34) 
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2.2.3 Summary of Experiment 1A 
Experiment 1A clearly showed that participants were processing both perspectives, 
even when it was not necessary for the task and, in cases where perspectives were 
inconsistent, when it actively hindered performance. However, using a mixed-block 
design, it is possible that the interference caused was due to executive demands on 
task-switching, or due to participants adopting a strategy that took into account both 
possible options for each trial. Experiment 1B addressed this with a task that matched 
the one used in Experiment 1A in terms of the possibility of task switching costs or 
the adoption of strategies, but which did not entail perspective-taking.  
 
 




Figure 2.2. Mean Response Times and Error Proportions for children and adults in 
experiments 1A and 1B (Bars indicate standard error of the mean). 
 
2.3 EXPERIMENT 1B 
 
To test the specificity of the effects found in Experiment 1A to the social 
domain, we tested a further sample of 8-year-old children using non-social stimuli. 
Only one age group was tested as all age groups had shown qualitatively similar 
performance in Experiment 1A. Eight year olds were selected as they formed the mid-

























































Fig. 2. Mean Response Times and Error Proportions of children and adults in experiments 
1A and 1B (Bars indicate standard errors). 
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In Experiment 1B 30 participants (Mean age = 8.2; Range 8:0-8:5, 18 female) were 
tested. Participants were recruited from a school in a working-middle class area of 
Wolverhampton; the majority of participants were white British. 
 
2.3.1.2 Design and Procedure 
Experiment 1B was identical to Experiment 1A except that a bi-color stick replaced 
the cartoon child, and the verbal cue “yellow side N” replaced the verbal cue “s/he 
sees N”. Participants judged whether the number, N, was correct for the number of 
circles on the yellow side of the stick. Thus, the task was structurally similar to that in 
Experiment 1A, but had no social stimulus. 
 
2.3.2 Results 
For each analysis we conducted a t-test to compare Consistent and Inconsistent trials 
for Experiment 1B, followed by a 2(Consistency) by 2(Experiment) ANOVA to 
compare results from Experiment 1B with results from the 8-year-olds in Experiment 
1A. The t-tests evaluate the effects found specifically in Experiment 1B, whilst the 
ANOVAs test whether the patterns observed in Experiment 1A with social stimuli 
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2.3.2.1 Stick / Other trials 
Response times. Outliers (3.2% of the data set) were removed using the same 
criterion as in Experiment 1A. The trend for an effect of Consistency in Experiment 
1B was not significant, (t(1, 29) = .80, p = .43). However, the results of Experiment 
1B and 1A did not differ statistically: the ANOVA showed no effect of Experiment 
(F(1, 66) = 2.54, p = .17, a main effect of Consistency (F(1, 66) = 4.21, p < .05, ηp2 = 
.062) and no interaction between Experiment and Consistency: F(1, 66) = 1.04, p = 
.63. 
 
Errors. In Experiment 1B there were more errors on Inconsistent than 
Consistent trials (t(1, 30) = 3.01, p < .01). The results of Experiment 1B and 1A did 
not differ statistically: the ANOVA showed no main effect of Experiment (F(1, 64) = 
2.28, p = .14) a main effect of Consistency (F(1, 64) = 15.78, p < .01, ηp2 = .20), and 
no significant interaction between Experiment and Consistency F(1, 64) = .11, p = 
.78. 
 
2.3.2.2 Self Trials 
Response times. 3.3% of the data points were removed as outliers. Within 
Experiment 1B, there was no significant effect of Consistency on RT (t(29) = 1.09, p 
= .28). Importantly, this pattern differed significantly from that observed in 
Experiment 1A. The ANOVA revealed no effect of Experiment (F(1, 64) = .12, p = 
.74), an effect of Consistency  (F(1, 64) = 18.73, p < .01, ηp2 = .23), and a significant 
interaction between Experiment and Consistency (F(1, 64) = 7.09 ,  p  < .01, ηp2 = 
.10), reflecting the significant effect of Consistency in Experiment 1A, and the 
absence of this effect in Experiment 1B. 
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Errors. Within Experiment 1B responses on Consistent trials were more 
accurate than on inconsistent trials (t(29) = 2.17, p < .05). Results from Experiment 
1A and 1B did not differ statistically. The ANOVA showed no effect of Experiment 
(F(1, 64) = 1.58, p = .21) an effect of Consistency (F(1, 64) = 14.25, p < .01, ηp2 = 
.18), and no interaction between Experiment and Consistency (F(1, 64) = 1.10, p = 
.30), though the numerical trend was for a larger effect of Consistency in Experiment 
1A. 
 
2.3.2.3 Summary of Experiment 1B 
In summary, children’s judgments about the number of circles on the yellow side of 
the stick in Experiment 1B did not differ in speed or accuracy from their judgments 
about the number of circles seen by the cartoon child in Experiment 1A. This is 
consistent with other observations that egocentric effects in social perspective-taking 
are also apparent in well-matched non-social tasks (e.g., Perner & Leekam, 2008). It 
seems as if merely having your own perspective is enough to interfere with a range of 
tasks that require this perspective to be set aside, regardless of whether they require 
perspective-taking. Critically, however, the speed of children’s judgments about the 
number of circles they saw differed across the two experiments. In Experiment 1A 
children were slower to judge how many circles they saw when the cartoon child saw 
fewer than them, whereas in Experiment 1B the same judgments were not slowed by 
the presence of fewer circles on the yellow side of the stick. This difference makes it 
unlikely that participants’ slow judgments about Self perspective on Inconsistent trials 
in Experiment 1A were due to unintended features of the task or stimuli. For example, 
unintended causes of the effect observed in Experiment 1A might have come from the 
fact that children were required to switch between self judgments on some trials and 
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other judgments on other trials, or that in Self-Inconsistent trials the group of dots that 
children had to judge was disrupted by the presence of the avatar. However, 
Experiment 1B also required task switching, and the group of dots that children had to 
judge on Self-Inconsistent trials was disrupted by the stick, yet the pattern observed 
on Self trials was different in Experiments 1A and 1B. Following Samson et al. 
(2010), who also compared similar avatar and stick conditions, we suppose that this 
difference is due to participants automatically processing the avatar’s perspective in 
Experiment 1A, which results in interference when they must judge their own 
perspective. In contrast they did not automatically process the number of dots on the 
yellow side of the stick in Experiment 1B. 
 
As a control condition, this still leaves open questions about the operation of 
automatic perspective-taking. The stick stimulus matched the avatar in terms of its 
overall dimensions and its placement in the room, but it remains an interesting 
question for future work what features of the avatar drive the automatic processing of 
its perspective. For example, it might be that these effects are dependent on the 
visibility of the eyes, or that they are equally strong when participants can only see the 
orientation of the avatar’s body but not their eyes. Likewise, although we have 
evidence that simple perspective-taking is rather resistant to opportunities for top-
down control it would be interesting to know whether any kind of top-down control 
was possible. For example, Teufel, Alexis, Todd, Lawrance-Owen, Clayton and Davis 
(2009) have recently shown that apparently automatic following of eye gaze can be 
moderated if participants believe that the person whose eye gaze they observe cannot 
actually see. It is possible that the current phenomenon of “automatic” perspective-
taking might be influenced by such socially relevant knowledge. But neither finding 
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would undermine the basic conclusions from the current study, that there is a 
relatively automatic process of perspective-taking (observed in the Self condition of 
Experiment 1A) that is not an artefact of the task that we used. 
 
2.4 Discussion 
We measured the speed and accuracy of self- and other-perspective-taking of adults 
and children on a very simple visual perspective-taking task logically equivalent to 
those passed by children aged 2-years or younger. At all ages we found evidence of 
egocentrism, and of the opposite effect of interference from the other’s perspective 
when judging self-perspective. 
 
2.4.1 Egocentrism 
Egocentric errors – by which we mean errors that show an influence of one’s own 
privileged perspective – are common when young children perform simple 
perspective-taking tasks, and egocentric bias is common when adults complete more 
complex tasks (Bernstein et al., 2004). The current study is the first to show that the 
egocentrism observed in young children’s errors on the very simplest (Level-1) visual 
perspective-taking tasks is also apparent in errors and response times throughout 
development into adulthood. This suggests that egocentrism in adults does not merely 
resemble egocentric phenomena observed in children but, for simple perspective-
taking at least, reflects the same underlying cognitive processes: we cannot help 
having our own perspective and this interferes with judgments about the perspective 
of others. Interestingly, although there was age-related improvement in general speed 
and accuracy of perspective-taking, there was no reduction in the size of the 
egocentric effect, as demonstrated by the absence of an interaction between age and 
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perspective-consistency. This suggests that age-related increases in general processing 
resources such as inhibitory control may improve the efficiency of perspective-taking, 
but not by reducing egocentrism. We remain relatively neutral as to the nature of the 
egocentrism operating here. On the one hand it is clear that this interference is from a 
self-view, but in all our trials the self-view of the scene may also be considered (in 
Light and Nix’s, 1983, terms) a “good view”. There is potential for further 
investigation of this by degrading self-perspective, and so generating a self-view that 
is not a “good view”. 
 
2.4.2 Automatization or original automaticity?  
Consistent with Samson et al. (2010) we found that participants’ judgments about 
their own perspective were slower and more error-prone when the character in the 
room had a different perspective. Importantly, the same degree of interference was not 
observed in Experiment 1B, where children performed a structurally similar task with 
non-social stimuli. These effects can be explained if we suppose that in Experiment 
1A children and adults calculated the number of dots that the character could see even 
when they were not told to, but did not perform the equivalent calculation of the 
number of discs on the yellow side of the stick in Experiment 1B. That is to say, the 
data indicate a relatively automatic process of Level-1 perspective calculation in 
children as well as in adults.  
 
The absence of an age-related change in the size of the interference effect from the 
character’s perspective suggests that automatic perspective-taking is not altered by 
increasing practice or availability of cognitive resources, at least in children over the 
age of 6. That is to say, the current study found no evidence that adults’ automatic 
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perspective calculation is the result of automatization. However, we cannot rule out 
the possibility that children have already fully automatized the calculation of simple 
visual perspectives by the age of 6. It is quite possible that children have had enough 
exposure to social stimuli to have automatised the process of perspective-taking. Pilot 
work suggested that the current methods were unsuitable for younger children, but 
testing for similar interference effects between self and other in younger children’s 
self-perspective-taking is an important avenue for future investigation. 
 
Although the current data do not rule out automatization, they are clearly compatible 
with the alternative “original automaticity” hypothesis, whereby children and adults 
have a cognitively efficient ability for simple perspective-taking that is already 
present in infants. This view gains plausibility from the growing body of evidence that 
infants and young children show sensitivity to simple perspectives when these 
abilities are tested indirectly via looking times, eye movements or spontaneous actions 
(e.g., Clements & Perner, 1994; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2006; Sodian et al., 2007; 
Song & Baillargeon, 2008; Southgate et al. 2006). And indeed, the current findings 
may give insight into why infants and young children fail on more traditional explicit 
tests of the same abilities. Our findings suggest that information about what an agent 
sees may be automatically calculated (resulting in Self-Other interference on Self 
trials) but that making explicit judgments about what the agent sees opens the door to 
egocentric interference (resulting in Self-Other interference on Other trials). We 
suggest that adults and older children have the executive resources necessary to resist 
such egocentric interference, and so their explicit judgments are merely slower when 
self and other perspectives are in conflict. Infants and young children may lack such 
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executive resources, and so their explicit judgments are dominated by their own 
perspective (see e.g., Leslie, 1987; 2005; Friedman & Leslie, 2005).  
 
This clearly raises the question of why explicit judgments require additional cognitive 
resources, and what purpose such explicit judgments might serve if information about 
other people’s perspectives is already being calculated automatically. One hypothesis 
is proposed by Apperly and Butterfill (2009) who suppose that any capacities for 
automatic processing of visual perspective (or, for that matter, other mental states 
such as beliefs) will be limited to relatively simple cases. As one example of such a 
limitation Apperly and Butterfill (2009) suggest that Level-1 perspective taking may 
be automatic whereas Level-2 perspective taking may not be. On this account, explicit 
judgments recruit more general reasoning processes, which carry the cost of demands 
on memory and executive control, but bring the benefit of more flexible perspective-
taking. Whether or not this particular hypothesis is correct, it is a priority for future 
work to investigate the role and scope of automatic versus controlled processes in 
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2.5 Summary and link to Chapter 3 
In Chapter 2, we showed that efficient visual perspective-taking was not limited to 
highly practiced adult perspective-takers. We suggested two alternatives as to what 
these findings mean. Firstly, that visual perspective-taking may be originally 
automatic: that is to say that efficient perspective-taking of this kind may be in place 
innately and allow for success by infants in such tasks (Luo & Baillargeon, 2007). 
The other alternative we proposed was that perspective-taking may be automatised, 
even by the age of six. One reason to think that this was not the case was the lack of 
developmental trend after the age of six: one might expect this automatic process to 
become more ingrained even after it first becomes automatic, or expect adults to be 
more successful at ignoring it when taking their own perspective. 
 
The two explanations for the automaticity of perspective-taking in 6-year olds lead to 
very different predictions. If perspective-taking is originally automatic, one would 
predict it to have the same constraints in both infants and adults. If perspective-taking 
is automatised, one would expect any similar process to become automatic with 
equivalent experience. Chapter 3 evaluates both of these predictions by testing Level-
2 perspective-taking in both children and adults. As yet there is no proof that children 
under the age of four can succeed on Level-2 perspective-taking tasks. If Level-1 
perspective-taking is originally automatic, we should predict that Level-2 perspective-
taking will not be automatic, even in adults. If Level-1 perspective-taking were 
automatised by the age of 6, we should expect Level-2 perspective-taking to be 
automatic, at least by adulthood.  













Direct and indirect measures of Level-2 perspective-taking in children and adults 
 
This chapter, largely in its current form, has been submitted as the article 
 
Surtees, A. D. R., Butterfill, S. & Apperly I., A. (submitted): Direct and Indirect 














Studies with infants show divergence between performance on theory of mind tasks 
depending on whether direct or indirect measures are used. It has been suggested that 
direct measures assess a flexible but cognitively demanding ability to reason about the 
minds of others, whereas indirect measures assess distinct processes which afford 
more efficient but less flexible theory of mind abilities (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009). 
This leads to the prediction that performance on indirect measures should be subject 
to signature limits. The current study tested whether the Level-1/Level-2 distinction 
might constitute one such limit.  The study adapted a task that has shown evidence of 
Level-1 perspective-taking on both direct and indirect measures (Samson et al., 2010).  
The aim was to test Level-2 perspective-taking in a sample of 6- to 11-year-olds 
(N=80) and adults (N=20). Participants were able to make Level-2 judgements on the 
direct measure, but did show egocentric interference. In contrast with the findings 
from Level-1 perspective-taking, there was no evidence of automatic processing of 
Level-2 perspectives on the indirect measure. This finding is consistent with the view 
that theory of mind abilities assessed by indirect measures are subject to inflexible 
limits. The Level-1/Level-2 distinction, suitably refined, marks one way in which 
efficient but inflexible theory of mind abilities are limited. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Perspective-taking most commonly refers to being sensitive to another’s mental 
states. These mental states can be beliefs, desires, intentions or perceptions. Another’s 
non-mental states, such being to the left or right of an object, are also sometimes 
considered within the notion.  
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Perspective-taking can enable successful social interactions, but effective 
participation in rapidly changing social situations often demands that perspective-
taking is efficient, as well as accurate.  Equally, keeping up with the complexity of 
some interactions calls for flexible perspective-taking.  It is therefore pertinent to ask 
how competing demands for efficiency and flexibility are reconciled.  In this paper we 
investigate one hypothesis: human adults and older children have multiple 
perspective-taking systems. One type of system is flexible but cognitively demanding. 
The other type trades flexibility for efficiency, and some of these efficient but less 
flexible systems (and only these) are also shared with infants, where they enable 
success on a variety of theory of mind tasks (see Apperly & Butterfill, 2009).  If this 
hypothesis is correct it should be possible to find signature limits in efficient 
perspective-taking abilities in much the way that, in the case of numerical cognition, a 
four-item limit is a signature of a capacity for efficient tracking of numerosity (e.g., 
Feigenson, Dehane & Spelke, 2004). Note that this signature is observable both in 
infants and in adults. Here we examine whether the distinction between Level-1 and 
Level-2 perspective-taking is a signature limit on theory of mind. If so, we would 
expect to find that Level-1, but not Level-2, perspective-taking can be accomplished 
efficiently in older children and adults, and that Level-1 perspective-taking is an early 
development in infancy rather than being the product of later automatization. 
 
While we suspect that the distinction between Level-1 and Level-2 perspective-taking 
may ultimately be too crude to fully isolate tasks that trade flexibility for efficiency 
(see discussion below), this is a well-established distinction which we can use as a 
first approximation to our view. The distinction between Level-1 and Level-2 
perspective-taking has long been suggested by developmental researchers (Flavell, 
Chapter 3 Direct and indirect measures 
62 
 
Everret, Croft & Flavell, 1981; Flavell, Flavell, Green, Wilcox 1981; Lempers, 
Flavell, & Flavell, 1977; Masangkay, McCluskey, McIntyre, Sims-Knight, Vaughn & 
Flavell 1974). Level-1 perspective-taking requires the ability to understand that 
objects visible to oneself are not necessarily visible to another person (Flavell et al., 
1981a). Flavell and colleagues defined Level-2 perspective-taking as understanding 
that “an object simultaneously visible to both the self and the other person may 
nonetheless give rise to different visual impressions or experiences in the two if their 
viewing circumstances differ” (Flavell et al. 1981a, p1).  
 
There is now little debate that the Level-1/Level-2 distinction makes sense from a 
developmentalist’s perspective: it provides a satisfactory distinction between a set of 
tasks that seem to be passed prior to the age of four (Moll and Tomasello, 2005, 
Flavell et al., 1981a), characterised as Level-1, and those tasks which children 
younger than the age of four consistently seem to fail (Flavell et al., 1981a; 
Masangkay et al., 1974). Notably, while recent research has suggested that infants as 
young as 12.5 months may show evidence of Level-1 perspective-taking on indirect 
measures such as looking time (Sodian, Thoermer & Metz, 2007; Luo & Baillargeon, 
2007), no such evidence has so far been forthcoming for Level-2 perspective-taking.  
Surprisingly though, there has been little effort to investigate why it might be that 
Level-2 tasks are more difficult than Level-1 tasks, or whether indirect measures of 
perspective-taking are anything other than more sensitive counterparts to traditional 
measures that ask for direct, explicit judgements. We next describe recent research on 
perspective-taking in adults, before going on to explore how such methods can be 
adapted to address these questions. 
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Two recent studies have examined adults’ Level-1 perspective-taking using both 
direct and indirect measures. Samson et al. (Qureshi, Apperly & Samson, 2010; 
Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews & Bodley-Scott, 2010) had adults complete a 
computerised task in which they viewed stimuli showing an avatar in a room. A 
number of red circles were located within the room, each of which was either visible 
to the avatar or not. On some trials (“Other” trials) participants were required to make 
a direct judgement about the avatar’s perspective.  Findings from this, direct, measure 
of perspective-taking converged with longstanding evidence of egocentric 
interference on perspective-taking found in children (Flavell et al., 1981a; Piaget & 
Inhelder, 1956): participants found it harder to judge another’s perspective when it 
differed from their own. Moreover, this egocentric interference was increased when 
participants simultaneously performed a task that taxed executive function (Qureshi et 
al., 2010). These findings are consistent with the view that adopting others’ 
perspectives remains cognitively effortful, even for adults (Epley, Keysar, Van Boven 
& Gilovich, 2004; Epley, Morewedge & Keysar, 2004). 
 
The indirect test of perspective-taking came from “Self” trials, on which participants 
simply reported their own perspective in the presence of an avatar. On these trials, 
adults were slower and more error-prone in judging their own perspective when the 
avatar happened to have a different perspective than when his perspective was the 
same as theirs. This was an indirect measure of perspective-taking because there was 
no requirement that the participant should take the avatar’s perspective, yet 
interference from the avatar’s perspective when participants judged their own “Self” 
perspective suggests that they were processing his perspective nevertheless. Evidence 
from this indirect measure suggests that Level-1 perspectives are processed 
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automatically, in the sense that this processing occurred even when it was 
unnecessary and even when it hindered performance on participants’ main task. 
Moreover, in contrast to findings from the direct measure, Qureshi et al. (2010) found 
that this automatic processing of Level-1 perspectives was not disrupted when adults 
simultaneously performed a task that taxed executive function, suggesting that this 
processing was cognitively efficient. 
 
These findings show that adults’ performance on Level-1 perspective problems has 
quite different cognitive characteristics depending on whether it is assessed via direct 
or indirect measures. However, on its own this does not secure the conclusion that 
adults have two systems for perspective-taking, for it remains possible that direct and 
indirect measures simply vary in the incidental processing demands that they place 
while they access the same underlying perspective-taking ability. It is also the case 
that evidence of an automatic and cognitively efficient capacity for perspective-taking 
in adults does not guarantee that the same capacity will be present in children. We 
address these points in turn. 
 
One possibility is that direct and indirect measures of perspective-taking are tapping 
into distinct cognitive systems that make complementary trade-offs between 
flexibility and efficiency (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009). Importantly, on this account, 
the flexible system should be capable, in principle, of any form of perspective-taking 
(though of course, more complex problems may in practice exceed a participant’s 
general processing capacity). In contrast, the efficient system gains efficiency at the 
expense of flexibility, and so should be systematically limited to process only certain 
kinds of problem. Apperly and Butterfill (2009) conjecture that the Level-1/Level-2 
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distinction may mark one such limit on efficient processing. This leads to the 
prediction of an asymmetry between the results obtained from direct and indirect 
measures on Samson et al.’s paradigm if it were posed as a Level-2 rather than a 
Level-1 problem: Adults should of course be capable of making Level-2 judgements 
when directly asked to do so, and these judgements should be subject to egocentric 
interference in the same way as their explicit Level-1 judgements; in contrast adults 
should not show evidence of Level-2 perspective-taking when assessed on indirect 
measures, because the automatic and cognitively efficient process tapped by these 
measures does not support Level-2 perspectives. This prediction was tested in the 
current experiment. 
 
What of the developmental origins of automatic processing of perspectives? Surtees 
and Apperly (in press, Chapter 2) replicated the findings of Samson et al. (2010) and 
extended them by using the same paradigm with children from the age of 6-11. The 
effect of automatic perspective-taking was observed in children of all age groups, and 
to a statistically similar degree. Surtees and Apperly (in press, Chapter 2) suggested 
that there were two plausible alternatives as to the origins of this process. First, 
perspective-taking of this kind may be originally automatic. That is, even in infancy, 
processing of Level-1 perspectives may in certain situations be an efficient and 
automatic process, and so the mechanism identified through an indirect measure by 
Samson et al (2010) is the same mechanism identified with indirect measures in 
studies of infants (Luo & Baillargeon, 2007; Sodian et al., 2007). If this were the case, 
it would help explain how infants succeed on such perspective-taking tasks despite 
lacking the memory and executive processes that are typically necessary for “theory 
of mind” reasoning. Alternatively, perspective-taking may not be originally 
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automatic, but instead might be automatised. That is to say, perspective-taking may 
always be effortful when infants or children first begin to show these abilities, but it 
may become automatic with repeated, long-term, practice.  
 
The most direct way of testing between these two hypotheses of original automaticity 
and automatisation would be to test for the automaticity of perspective-taking in even 
younger children. Pilot work suggested that this is not possible using the current 
paradigm. An alternative is to investigate the plausibility that automatisation of 
Level-1 perspective-taking has already occurred by the age of 6 in children.  This can 
be tested indirectly, for if children gain enough experience with Level-1 perspective-
taking for it to be automatised by the age of six, there is reason to expect that children 
will have gained enough experience with Level-2 perspective-taking for it to be 
automatised, at the very latest, by the time they are older children or adults. 
Accordingly, if we have grounds for thinking that Level-2 perspective-taking is not 
automatic in adults (suggesting that it is neither originally automatic, nor 
automatised), then it is less likely that automatic processing of Level-1 perspectives is 
the result of automatisation. 
 
To recap, we wanted to investigate the cognitive characteristics of Level-2 
perspective-taking in children and adults in order to answer two questions. First, do 
direct versus indirect measures of perspective-taking tap into different cognitive 
processes or are the distinct findings from these measures just a reflection of different 
task demands? Second, is automatic perspective-taking originally automatic or a 
consequence of automatisation?  
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We tested children and adults on a Level-2 perspective-taking task adapting the 
paradigm initially used by Samson et al (2010). Participants made judgements about 
either their own perspective or that of a cartoon avatar. In Flavell’s classic Level-2 
perspective-taking experiment (Flavel et al., 1981) children had to report whether a 
turtle was “the right way up” or “upside down”. Instead of using abstract terms such 
as these, we used numerals; specifically the numbers 6 and 9 which appear as each 
other when viewed upside down and the numbers 0 and 8 each of whose appearance 
is unaltered when viewed upside down.  
 
This task yields both a direct and an indirect measure of perspective-taking. On the 
direct measure, when participants explicitly judged what the cartoon avatar saw, we 
expected younger children to be slower and more error prone than older children or 
adults, and we expected to observe egocentric interference (worse performance when 
the avatar’s perspective was different from the participants’) at all ages. On the 
indirect measure, when participants explicitly judged their own perspective, we 
expected younger children to be slower and more error prone overall, but unlike 
previous findings with a Level-1 version of the task (Qureshi et al., 2010; Samson et 
al., 2010; Surtees & Apperly, in press, Chapter 2), we did not expect automatic Level-
2 perspective-taking, and so we did not expect to see any difference in performance 
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3.2 Experiment 2 
 
3.2.1 Method 
On every trial participants viewed a cartoon picture of an avatar standing on the other 
side of a table (See Figure 3.1). A single numeral (0, 6, 8 or 9) was placed either on 
the wall, or on the table. On “Self” trials, participants judged the numeral as it 
appeared to themselves. On “Other” trials, participants judged how the numeral 
appeared to the avatar in the scene. On Stimulus-Ambiguous trials, the numeral used 
was a 6 or a 9 (numerals that look different if inverted.) On Stimulus-Unambiguous 
trials, the numeral used was a 0 or an 8 (numerals that looked the same if inverted). 
On Location-Wall trials the numeral was placed on the wall (so that it always 
appeared the same to the participant and the cartoon avatar). On Location-Table trials 
the numeral was placed on the table so that the avatar’s position in the room meant 
that he saw Ambiguous stimuli as a different number (but Unambiguous stimuli as the 
same). Involuntary taking of an irrelevant perspective would be evidenced by an 
interaction between Stimulus and Location: any effect of Location should be greater 
when the stimulus is Ambiguous (as this is the only time perspectives diverge). 
 




Figure 3.1. Examples of stimuli used. Ambiguous stimuli appear different if inverted, 
Unambiguous stimuli appear the same. Wall stimuli appear the same to Self and 
Other, Table Stimuli are viewed inverted. Only on Ambiguous-Table trials are Self 
and Other perspective content different. 
 
3.2.1.1 Participants 
Adult participants were Undergraduates and Postgraduates from the University of 
Birmingham (N = 20, mean age = 20.4, 18 female). Child participants attended a 
school in a lower-middle class area of Wolverhampton. Children between the ages of 
6 and 11 were tested (mean age = 9.67, N = 80, 41 female). A median split based on 
Age was performed to create a group of younger children (Age range: 6.6-9.2 Years, 
Mean Age = 8.38 years, 24 female) and a group of older children (Age range = 9.2-
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3.2.1.2 Design and Procedure 
Child participants completed the experiment in a room adjacent to their normal 
classroom. Adult participants used a testing cubicle. Instructions included a detailed 
description of the procedure and an instruction to respond as quickly and accurately as 
possible. Practice trials were completed on paper until the participant had successfully 
answered examples from each condition. 
 
On each trial, participants viewed successive fixation stimuli (a smiling face (600ms) 
and a fixation cross (600ms)) followed by a 1800ms auditory stimulus (either “He 
sees a Y” or “You see a Y”, where Y was either 0, 6, 8 or 9) and then the test picture. 
Participants pressed one of two coloured keys to indicate whether or not the auditory 
stimulus correctly described the picture. Response time was measured from the onset 
of the picture. Child participants completed 4 practice trials, followed by 60 test trials 
(split evenly between Self and Other and presented in pseudo-random order). Adults 
completed 120 trials organised to the same criteria. The experiment was presented 
using E-prime 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools, Inc.) on a laptop computer. 
 
3.2.2 Results 
Self and Other judgements measured very different perspective-taking effects. Other 
perspective-taking provided a “Direct” measure of voluntary perspective-taking. Self 
perspective-taking provided an “Indirect” measure of any involuntary perspective-
taking which may have taken place. Data from these Direct and Indirect measures 
were analysed separately as we had no hypotheses relating to their comparison. Main 
effects of Stimulus examined whether there was any extra difficulty in processing 
Ambiguous stimuli (Containing 6s or 9s) rather than Unambiguous stimuli 
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(Containing 8s or 0s). Main effects of Location examined whether presentation of the 
digit on the wall or table affected performance, whether or not this location resulted in 
a perspective difference between self and other. The critical effect for our hypotheses 
concerned the interaction between Stimulus and Location. This investigated 
interference between contents of Self and Other perspectives, because only in 
Ambiguous-Table trials does the perspective content of the character differ from that 
of the participant. For Other perspective trials (i.e., our direct measure) an interaction 
between Ambiguity and Location would be the result of egocentric interference from 
self on to other. For Self trials (i.e., our indirect measure), an equivalent Ambiguity by 
Location interaction would provide evidence for interference from the perspective of 
other when making judgements about the self. 
 
3.2.2.1 Direct measure of Perspective-taking 
Children’s and adults’ data were analysed separately as adults completed a greater 
number of trials. 
  
3.2.2.1.1Children 
Response Times (RTs). Data that were two and a half standard deviations from 
the mean were omitted from the analysis of RTs (accounting for between 1% and 3% 
of data for each age group) as were data from incorrect responses.  
 
An ANOVA with Stimulus and Location as within subjects factors, and Age as a 
between subjects factor revealed a main effect of Age (F(1, 79) = 31.46, p < .001, ηp2 
= .29, Older < Younger). There was a main effect of Location (F(1, 79) = 86.77; p < 
.001, ηp2 = .53; Wall < Table) and a main effect of Stimulus (F(1, 79) = 82.73, p < 
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.001, ηp2 = .52; Unambiguous < Ambiguous). There was a significant interaction 
between Location and Stimulus (F(1, 79) = 15.30,  p < .001, ηp2 = .17). The effect of 
Location was significant for Unambiguous (t(79) = 4.31, p < .001) trials, but was 
greater for Ambiguous trials (t(79) = 8.92, p < .001.) There were no other significant 
interactions. (F(1, 77) ≤ 1.50, p ≥ .23, ηp2 ≤ .019) 
 
Errors. A similar ANOVA on errors revealed a main effect of Location (F(1, 
79) = 7.62, p = .007, ηp2 = .089; Wall < Table). There was no main effect of Age 
(F(1, 79) = .096, p = .76, ηp2 = .001) and no main effect of Stimulus (F(1, 79) < .001, 
p = .99, ηp2 < .001). There were no significant interactions (Fs ≤ 1.70, ps ≥ .20).  
 
3.2.2.1.2 Adults 
 Response Times. An ANOVA with Stimulus and Location as within subjects 
factors revealed a main effect of Location (F(1, 19) = 83.76; p < .001, ηp2 = .82; Wall 
< Table) and a main effect of Stimulus (F(1, 19) = 33.50, p < .001, ηp2 = .64; 
Unambiguous < Ambiguous). There was a significant interaction between Location 
and Stimulus (F(1, 19) = 8.50, p = .009, ηp2 = .009). The effect of Location was 
significant for Unambiguous (t(19) = 2.74, p = .013) trials, but was greater for 
Ambiguous trials (t(19) = 6.62, p < .001).  
 
Errors. An ANOVA with Stimulus and Location as within subjects factors 
revealed no main effect of Location (F(1, 19) = .79; p = .39, ηp2 = .005), no main 
effect of Stimulus (F(1, 19) = .79, p = .39, ηp2 = .04; Unambiguous < Ambiguous) 
and no significant interaction between Location and Stimulus (F(1, 19) = .099, p = 
.76, ηp2 = .005).  




3.2.2.2 Self Trials 
3.2.2.2.1 Children 
Response times. An ANOVA with Stimulus and Location as within subjects 
factors, and Age as a between subjects factor revealed a main effect of Age (F(1, 79) 
= 30.09, p < .001, ηp2 = .28, Older < Younger). There was a main effect of Location 
(F(1, 79) = 59.03; p < .001, ηp2 = .43; Wall < Table) and a main effect of Stimulus 
(F(1, 79) = 29.90, p < .001, ηp2 = .28; Unambiguous < Ambiguous). There was a 
significant interaction between Age and Stimulus (F(1, 79) = 4.08; p = .047, ηp2 = 
.050). Older children (t(40) = 4.45, p < .001) showed a stronger effect of stimulus 
than younger children (t(40) = 4.10, p < .001), but the effect was significant for both. 
The critical interaction between Location and Stimulus was not significant (F(1, 79) = 
.94, p = .33, ηp2 = .01), nor were any other interactions ((F(1, 79) ≤ 1.35, p ≥ .25, ηp2 
≤ .017).  
 
Accuracy. A similar ANOVA on errors revealed main effects of Location 
(F(1,79) = .029, p = .049, ηp2 = .049) and Stimulus (F(1, 79) = 12.34, p = .001, ηp2 = 
.14; Wall < Table), but no main effect of Age (F(1, 79) = .018, p = .89, ηp2 < .001). 
There were no significant interactions (Fs ≤ 2.67, p ≥ .11, ηp2 ≤ .033), with the critical 
interaction between Stimulus and Location not significant (F(1, 79) = 1.39, p = .24, 
ηp2 = .018). 
 
3.2.2.2.2 Adults 
Response Times. An ANOVA with Stimulus and Location as within subjects 
factors revealed a main effect of Location (F(1, 19) = 10.42; p < .001, ηp2 = .35; Wall 
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< Table) and a main effect of Stimulus (F(1, 19) = 20.19, p < .001, ηp2 = .52; 
Unambiguous < Ambiguous). There was a significant interaction between Location 
and Stimulus (F(1, 19) = 7.76, p = .012, ηp2 = .29). The effect of Location was 
significant for Ambiguous trials (t(19) = 5.41, p < .001), but not for unambiguous 
trials (t(19) = .89, p = .38).  
 
 Accuracy. An ANOVA with Stimulus and Location as within subjects factors 
revealed a main effect of Stimulus (F(1, 19) = 8.28, p = .010, ηp2 = .30; Unambiguous 
< Ambiguous), but no main effect of Location (F(1, 19) = 2.84; p = .11, ηp2 = .13). 
There was also no significant interaction between Location and Stimulus (F(1, 19) = 
1.07, p = .32, ηp2 = .053).  
 
 
Figure 3.2. Response Times and Accuracy of all age groups in Experiment 2. 
 
 




Results from adults differed critically from those of children for self perspective-
taking response times. An interaction between Stimulus and Location when judging 
their own perspective suggested adults were automatically taking the avatar’s 
perspective. We considered two possible explanations for this. Firstly, given their 
longer experience, adults may have automatised perspective-taking, whereas the 
children in our study have not yet had sufficient time or experience for 
automatisation. Secondly, adults may have automatised some element of the current 
task within the experimental session; recall they completed twice as many trials as 
children. To resolve this we re-analysed the adult data, but with the experiment split 
into two halves: if some form of automatisation had occurred during the session, 
interference should increase with time.  
 
3.2.2.4 First Half of Experiment 
Initially we analysed the first half of the experiment so as to match the number of 
trials the child participants had received. 
 
  3.2.2.4.1 Other perspective-taking 
Response times. An ANOVA with Stimulus and Location as within subjects 
factors revealed a main effect of Location (F(1, 19) = 34.79; p < .001, ηp2 = .65; Wall 
< Table) and a main effect of Stimulus (F(1, 19) = 11.713, p < .001, ηp2 = .38; 
Unambiguous < Ambiguous). There was a significant interaction between Location 
and Stimulus (F(1, 19) = 6.57, p = .019, ηp2 = .26). The effect of Location was 
significant for Ambiguous trials (t(19) = 5.23, p < .001), but not for Unambiguous 
trials (t(19) = 1.71, p = .10). 
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 Errors. A similar ANOVA on errors revealed a main effect of Stimulus (F(1, 
19) = 7.29; p = .014, ηp2 = .28; Unambiguous< Ambiguous), but no main effect of 
Location (F(1, 19) = .42, p = .53, ηp2 = .022), and no significant interaction (F(1, 19) 
= .42, p = .53, ηp2 = .022). 
  
  3.2.2.4.2 Self Perspective-taking 
 Response times. An ANOVA with Stimulus and Location as within subjects 
factors revealed a main effect of Location (F(1, 19) = 8.31; p = .010, ηp2 = .30; Wall 
< Table) and a main effect of Stimulus (F(1, 19) = 6.27, p = .022, ηp2 = .25; 
Unambiguous < Ambiguous). There was no significant interaction between Location 
and Stimulus (F(1, 19) = .45, p = .51, ηp2 = .023). 
  
Errors. A similar ANOVA on errors revealed a trend towards a main effect of 
Stimulus (F(1, 19) = 3.18; p = .091, ηp2 = .14; Unambiguous< Ambiguous), but no 
main effect of Location (F(1, 19) = .15, p = .71, ηp2 = .008), and importantly no 
significant interaction (F(1, 19) = .15, p = .71, ηp2 = .008) 
 
3.2.2.5 Second Half of Experiment 
  3.2.2.5.1 Other perspective-taking 
 Response times. An ANOVA with Stimulus and Location as within subjects 
factors revealed a main effect of Location (F(1, 19) = 35.63; p < .001, ηp2 = .66; Wall 
< Table) and a main effect of Stimulus (F(1, 19) = 12.61, p = .002, ηp2 = .66; 
Unambiguous < Ambiguous). There was a significant interaction between Location 
and Stimulus (F(1, 19) = 7.57, p = .013, ηp2 = .30). The effect of Location was 
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significant for Ambiguous trials (t(19) = 6.22, p < .001), but not for Unambiguous 
trials (t(19) = 1.11, p = .28). 
 
 Errors. A similar ANOVA on errors revealed no main effect of Stimulus (F(1, 
19) = 1.00; p = .33, ηp2 = .050), no main effect of Location (F(1, 19) = .015, p = .91, 
ηp2 = .001), and no significant interaction (F(1, 19) = .13, p = .72, ηp2 = .007). 
 
 3.2.2.5.2 Self Perspective-taking 
 Response times. An ANOVA with Stimulus and Location as within subjects 
factors revealed a main effect of Location (F(1, 19) = 6.21; p = .022, ηp2 = .25; Wall 
< Table) and a main effect of Stimulus (F(1, 19) = 12.33, p = .002, ηp2 = .39; 
Unambiguous < Ambiguous). There was a significant interaction between Location 
and Stimulus (F(1, 19) = 5.88, p = .025, ηp2 = .24). The effect of Location was 
significant for Ambiguous trials (t(19) = 3.68, p = .002), but not for Unambiguous 
trials (t(19) = .015, p = .99). 
 
Errors. A similar ANOVA on errors revealed a main effect of Stimulus (F(1, 
19) = 4.40; p = .050, ηp2 = .19; Unambiguous< Ambiguous) and a main effect of 
Location (F(1, 19) = 4.40, p = .050, ηp2 = .19, Wall < Table), but no significant 
interaction (F(1, 19) = 1.41, p = .25, ηp2 = .069). 
 
 




Figure 3.3. Response Times and Accuracy of adults in Experiment 2, organised by 
half of experiment. 
 
Adults only showed interference from the perspective of other in the second half of 
the experiment, whereas interference from self perspective was always evident. This 
suggests that repeated experience with the task did not enable adults to overcome their 
tendency for egocentric interference when making direct perspective judgements, but 
repeated experience did result in some kind of automatisation as evidenced on the 
indirect measure. We discuss the likely nature of this automatisation below. 
 
3.3 Discussion 
Participants found taking another’s perspective more difficult when the target 
character viewed a numeral upside down (in Table trials), and also when the numeral 
viewed could look different if seen from a different angle (in Ambiguous trials). 
Importantly for our hypotheses, there was also an interaction between these factors. 
On “Other” trials, directly judging another’s perspective was particularly difficult in 
trials when one’s own perspective content and that of another actually differed, 
suggesting interference from one’s own perspective when judging that of another. On 
Self trials (our indirect measure of perspective-taking), we again observed that 
judgements were more difficult if another viewed a stimulus upside down and also 
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when the numeral viewed could look different if seen from another angle. In children 
we did not, however, observe an interaction between these factors. Those trials where 
the target’s perspective content was different from the participant’s own were 
processed with no extra difficulty, over and above the independent contribution of the 
location and the type of the stimulus. There is no evidence, then, that child 
participants were calculating the perspective of another except when the instructions 
for the trial meant that this was necessary. Adults, on the other hand did show 
evidence of an interaction between location and stimulus type, however this was only 
evidenced in the second half of the experiment, suggesting that within the experiment 
itself they had automatised a process that originally required cognitive effort. 
  
3.3.1 Egocentrism in direct perspective judgements 
Egocentrism – the interference from one’s own perspective when taking that of 
another – is a feature of perspective-taking in young children (Flavell et al., 1981a; 
Light & Nix, 1983; Piaget & Inhelder, 1956): when young children make errors on 
perspective-taking tasks, they most commonly make errors in line with their own 
perspective, not at random. More recently, evidence from adults has suggested that it 
is not only children who suffer egocentric effects (Bernstein, Atance, Loftus, & 
Meltzoff, 2004; Birch & Bloom, 2007; Epley et al., 2004a; Keysar, Lin and Barr, 
2003; Nickerson, 1999; Royzman, Cassidy & Baron, 2003). Adults rarely make 
egocentric errors in optimal conditions, but when they have to make estimates 
(Bernstein et al., 2004) or perform tasks quickly (Samson et al., 2010: Keysar et al., 
2003), they do show egocentric biases. One interpretation of this is that children’s 
egocentric errors and adults’ egocentric biases are largely unrelated: tasks with adults 
often involve much more complex information and reasoning, and there is often no 
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certainty as to whether a normatively correct response is indeed appropriate. 
Alternatively these effects may in fact be symptoms of the very same problem: it may 
be more difficult to process perspectives of others if they differ from one’s own and 
this processing cost may lead to errors in young children, but merely biases in older 
children and adults who have more cognitive resources available.  
 
One way to distinguish between these two interpretations is to test older children and 
adults on the very same tasks that young children fail. Our results suggest that 
egocentric errors in young children’s Level-2 perspective-taking are the result of the 
very same processing problem that affects older children and adults. In our Level-2 
perspective-taking task, children from the age of 6 showed egocentric interference 
effects very similar to those of adults. It is always difficult to ignore how one sees an 
object, and this may cause young children to make mistakes, and adults to perform 
more slowly, or less accurately under time pressure.  
 
What our results do not address is whether this egocentrism is the result of anchoring 
and effortful adjustment (Epley et al., 2004a, 2004b) or of it being difficult to inhibit a 
strong self representation when creating an entirely separate perspective for another. 
An anchoring and adjustment interpretation would suggest that when we explicitly 
take others’ perspectives, egocentrism is the result of participants first having to 
calculate their own perspective and then, for trials involving incompatible 
perspectives, having to adjust away from this. Alternatively, putting one’s own 
perspective aside when calculating the perspective of another may be what causes 
difficulties. Future investigation could address this question through independently 
manipulating the need for adjustment and the salience of one’s own perspective. 
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3.3.2 Automatisation versus original automaticity: evidence from the indirect 
measure of perspective-taking 
Using an indirect measure, Samson et al. (2010) found adults to automatically take the 
Level-1 perspectives of other people, and Apperly and Butterfill (2010) conjectured 
that such effects might be limited to Level-1 perspective-taking. Surtees and Apperly 
(in press, Chapter 2) replicated evidence of automatic Level-1 perspective-taking in 
adults, and showed a statistically equivalent degree of interference from another’s 
perspective in children as young as six. This prior work, although suggestive of 
originally automaticity, left open the possibility that Level-1 perspective-taking is 
automatised over extended developmental time. This is potentially important because 
only originally automatic perspective-taking could help to explain infants’ success on 
some theory of mind tasks in spite of absent or reduced language and executive 
function. Automatisation could not, as this would require earlier effortful processing. 
 
We reasoned that if the true origin of automatic Level-1 perspective-taking was 
automatisation then, given sufficient experience, children should also automatise 
Level-2 perspective-taking. Even allowing for the possibility that humans engage in 
Level-2 perspective-taking somewhat less frequently than Level-1 perspective-taking, 
we supposed that if automatisation is possible then it should have occurred by 
adulthood. In fact, children in our study showed no evidence that they were 
automatically processing the Level-2 perspectives of another, and nor did adults over 
the same number of experimental trials. Nonetheless, it was the case that in the second 
half of the experiment, adult participants were slower at judging their own perspective 
when the avatar’s perspective was different, suggesting that some form of 
automatisation had occurred. The critical question is, what had been automatised? 
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One possibility is that adult participants actually automatised Level-2 perspective-
taking, suggesting that the problem of processing Level-2 perspectives is 
automatisable, at least in principle. We do not favour this interpretation since we think 
that if adults could achieve such automatisation in a few minutes of a laboratory 
experiment, then their entire lifetime of prior experience with perspective-taking 
ought to have led them to have already automatised a long time before they became 
participants in our study. A second possibility is that adults automatised something 
very specific about the task. For example, during the task numerals “6” and “9” were 
both repeatedly interpreted as both 6 and 9 depending on their location of presentation 
and the perspective that participants were asked to judge. It seems plausible that this 
repeated experience led participants presented with “6” in the stimulus to activate 
responses for both 6 and 9. The important point is that this would yield the 
interference effect that we observed on the indirect perspective-taking measure, not 
because participants had automatised Level-2 perspective-taking, but because 
participants had formed highly task-specific stimulus-response associations. Such 
associations would, of course, not generalise to any other Level-2 perspective-taking 
task. 
 
In sum, we think that the most important finding is that naive adults, who have only 
limited experience on the task, show no evidence of automatic processing of the 
avatar’s Level-2 perspective, and nor do either group of children in this study. We 
suggest that the fact that even adults have not automatised Level-2 perspective-taking 
makes it unlikely that children have automatised Level-1 perspective-taking by the 
age of 6.  
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3.3.3 Limits on efficient, automatic perspective-taking 
Exciting and controversial recent research suggests that human infants and some non-
human species may be capable of perspective-taking and that these abilities are most 
likely to be observed on indirect measures, such as looking time or spontaneous 
behaviour (e.g., Call & Tomasello, 2008; Emery & Clayton, 2004; Onishi & 
Baillargeon, 2006; Santos, Nissen & Ferrugia, 2006; Sodian et al., 2007; Song & 
Baillargeon, 2008; Southgate, Senju & Csibra, 2006; but note that there is also some 
evidence of perspective taking on more direct measures, e.g. Buttelman, Carpenter & 
Tomasello, 2009). It is striking that when children are directly asked about what 
another person sees, knows or believes, they generally perform significantly less well 
(e.g., Flavell et al., 1981; Wellman, Cross & Watson, 2001), and indeed, it is possible 
for the very same individual to be simultaneously “incorrect” and “correct”, 
depending on whether their ability is measured directly or indirectly (e.g., Clements & 
Perner, 1994). Samson et al. (2010) likewise used both direct and indirect measures to 
assess Level-1 perspective-taking in older children and adults (see further Qureshi, 
Apperly & Samson, 2010; Surtees & Apperly, in press, Chapter 2). Findings from the 
direct measure fit with a large literature suggesting that explicit perspective 
judgements are relatively effortful and prone to egocentric interference. Findings from 
the indirect measure suggested that Level-1 perspectives can be processed relatively 
automatically and with little cognitive effort. However, one problem with interpreting 
these findings – and the reason why the findings from infants and non-human animals 
have proved so controversial – is that it is just not clear whether direct and indirect 
measures are simply alternative ways of assessing the same underlying ability or 
whether they are in fact tapping quite different cognitive processes. 
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Apperly and Butterfill (2009) propose that one way of explaining the pattern of results 
is to suppose that humans have multiple systems for theory of mind, some of which 
trade flexibility to gain efficiency and others which do the reverse. The efficient 
systems might be common to adults, infants, and perhaps also some non-human 
animals, and might not necessarily be available for explicit report on direct measures. 
Importantly, this provides a theoretically motivated prediction that can assist with 
interpreting the findings from direct and indirect tests: if it is the case that indirect 
measures are tapping a cognitive process that has gained efficiency at the expense of 
flexibility, then there really must be limits to the problems that it can handle. Apperly 
& Butterfill (2009) offered the Level-1/Level-2 distinction as a candidate for one such 
signature limit.  
 
The current findings support this prediction, by showing that older children and 
adults, who can, clearly, succeed on direct tests of Level-2 perspective-taking, show 
no evidence of Level-2 perspective-taking on our indirect measure. Absence of 
evidence does not, of course, constitute evidence of absence, but we should be 
interested when absence of evidence repeatedly converges on the same conclusion 
across multiple studies and multiple participant groups. This is the case in the 
literature on number cognition, where there is evidence that human adults, human 
infants and non-human animals are all capable of precise enumeration, and 
convergence on the conclusion that this ability is limited to sets of no more than 3 or 4 
items (e.g., Feigenson, Dehane & Spelke, 2004). It is noteworthy, therefore, that in 
addition to the absence of evidence from adults reported here, there is no evidence 
that either infants or non-human animals are capable of Level-2 perspective-taking. 
We suggest that this convergence should make us take seriously the proposition that 
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indirect measures are tapping a cognitively efficient capacity for perspective-taking 
that is limited to process Level-1 perspective problems. 
 
3.3.4 Problems with the distinction between Level-1 and Level-2 perspective-taking 
We have appealed to the distinction between Level-1 and Level-2 perspective-taking 
in formulating a hypothesis about signature limits of efficient perspective-taking.  
This distinction, although useful, suffers from several defects when considered as a 
signature limit.  In one canonical formulation, Level-1 perspective-taking involves 
being able to infer “what another person does and does not see” whereas Level-2 
perspective-taking involves knowing that “an object simultaneously visible to both the 
self and the other person may nonetheless give rise to different visual impressions or 
experiences” (Flavell, Everett, Croft & Flavell, 1981, p. 1).  A first defect with this 
formulation for our purposes (although not for Flavell and colleagues’) is that it is 
specific to vision.  For our purposes a more general distinction would be better, one 
that not only applies to multiple perceptual modalities but can also be applied to 
cognitive as well as experiential states.  And there is no theoretical reason to stipulate 
that Level-2 perspective-taking concerns objects visible to all (this may be an 
operational requirement).  Second, Level-2 perspective-taking requires understanding 
that objects give rise to experiences.  However, standard tests for Level-2 perspective-
taking, including Flavell et al.’s (1981), do not test this requirement.  To see why not, 
consider Flavell et al.’s stimulus: a rabbit that appears yellow when viewed from one 
angle and green when viewed from another.  These appearances are not properties of 
any particular subject; in general they can be enjoyed by any observer with normal 
colour vision who is appropriately located and oriented.  In principle, then, 
participants could succeed on this Level-2 task by representing appearance properties 
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of objects rather than experiential properties of subjects (Nudds, 2010).  The same 
applies to recent studies of adults that equate Level-2 perspective-taking with the 
ability to rotate oneself into the physical position of another (e.g., Kessler & 
Thomson, 2010; Michelon & Zacks, 2005). Understanding that objects give rise to 
experiences is not in principle necessary for success on these tasks: understanding that 
objects have appearance properties accessible from different points of view would be 
sufficient.  A more direct test of Level-2 perspective-taking as defined above would 
involve properties like blurriness which are not tracked by any of an object’s subject-
independent appearances (Smith, 2007).  In short, then, the above canonical definition 
of Level-2 perspective-taking concerns an experiential, subject-dependent notion of 
perspective whereas actual tests may well measure abilities to compute a non-
experiential, subject-independent notion of perspective.  Lack of fit between the 
canonical definitions and standard tests can lead to conflating these two notions of 
perspective (and in some places Level-2 perspective taking is defined in terms of 
appearance properties of objects (Masangkay et al., 1974, p. 360; Flavell, 2000, p. 
19), potentially adding to the confusion). The difference between these two notions of 
perspective may be relevant to identifying signature limits of efficient perspective-
taking.   
 
It is possible to overcome these deficiencies while retaining the substance of the 
conclusions we have drawn.  A perspective is a collection of objects, properties, 
states, facts and events associated with a particular individual.  There are two 
dimensions along which perspectives can be distinguished: we can distinguish them 
according to the sorts of thing they contain, and we can distinguish them according to 
the nature of the association that has to obtain between a perspective and an individual 
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in order for the perspective to be her perspective.  We consider each dimension in 
turn.  First, perspectives can be sparse or rich.  A sparse perspective might include 
only objects and their locations in a frame of reference centred on the associated 
individual.  A richer perspective might include properties such as the shapes and 
colours of objects; and a still richer perspective might include facts about how the 
objects appear from the location or state occupied by the associated individual.  In the 
Level-1 perspective-taking tasks discussed here, only sparse perspectives are needed.  
One possibility consistent with our findings is that the signature limits of efficient 
perspective-taking involve degrees of sparseness: only where perspective-taking 
involves relatively sparse perspectives can it be efficient.  (This leaves open the 
question of just how sparse the perspectives involved in efficient perspective-taking 
need to be.)   
 
So far we have been considering distinguishing perspectives with respect to how 
sparse their contents are.  We can also distinguish perspectives along a second 
dimension: the nature of the association that must hold between the perspective and 
an individual if the perspective is to be the perspective of that individual.  For 
instance, we can distinguish subject-independent perspectives which exist 
independently of any particular individual and can become the perspective of an 
individual just in virtue of their being suitably equipped, located in the right place at 
the right time, and appropriately oriented.  In everyday life people sometimes talk 
about going somewhere to see the view, where the view is something that can be 
enjoyed by multiple individuals on different occasions; such views are examples of 
subject-independent perspectives.  In all the experiments we have discussed, both 
Level-1 and Level-2, subjects could in principle have succeeded by representing 
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subject-independent perspectives only.  (Whether this is possible in practice is as yet 
unknown: participants may have solved our Level-2 tasks by representing visual 
experiences.)  Other kinds of perspective cannot be the perspective of an individual 
without her having a particular history, emotion, perceptual experience, registration, 
belief or intention.  This kind of perspective is invoked when someone who falsely 
believes that the chocolate is in the cupboard is said to have an incorrect, or out of 
date, perspective on the world (not the sort of thing one can enjoy by visiting a 
viewpoint).  Signature limits on efficient perspective-taking may concern both 
dimensions: efficient perspective-taking may be efficient only because there are limits 
on the richness of the contents of perspectives that can be computed and also only 
because there are limits on the complexity of the association between individuals and 
perspectives that can be computed.   
 
The distinction between Level-1 and Level-2 perspective-taking is a useful shorthand 
for the conjecture that efficient perspective-taking is limited with respect to one or 
both of these dimensions in some way that is yet to be specified more precisely.  The 
distinction between Level-1 and Level-2 as we have been using it is not supposed to 
imply more than this. In particular, we are not committed to the claim that 
perspective-taking involving perceptual experiences cannot be efficient. 
 
The conclusion we are led to, by our data and the foregoing considerations, is that 
there are two routes to calculating some kinds of sparse or subject-independent 
perspectives (‘Level-1’ perspectives): one automatic, but inflexible and the other 
flexible, yet consuming of cognitive resources. Perspective-taking involving richer 
perspectives or those which are not subject-dependent (‘Level-2’ perspectives), on the 
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other hand, generally, seems to require effortful processing, which comes with the 
bonus of flexibility: this probably explains why infants are yet to demonstrate this 
ability. The fact that Level-1 perspective-taking seems to be originally automatic also 
supports the notion that two systems may be involved in perspective-taking: it is not 
the case that extra practice improves speed at the cost of flexibility: fast, efficient 
processing seems to be developmentally primary, with flexible processing coming 
with the acquisition of cognitive resources.  
 
Future work should focus on attempting to find whether the Level-1/Level-2 
distinction really does roughly approximate a signature limit on the abilities of 
infants’, non-human animals’ and adults’ involuntary processing. This may be 
relevant not only to understanding processes underpinning, and limits on, visual 
perspective-taking but also to understanding processes underpinning, and limits on, 
theory of mind abilities more generally. As outlined above, it is possible to generalise 
a Level-1/Level-2 distinction so that it applies not only to visual perspective-taking 
but also to the representation of mental states such as knowledge and belief. The fact 
that Level-1 perspective-taking may be underpinned by automatic processes indicates 
the possibility that other Level-1-type problems can be solved by processes that are 
cognitively efficient. The importance of this is that it may provide some explanation 
for limited but foundational theory of mind abilities in infants (and perhaps other 
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3.4 Summary and Links to Chapter 4 
In Chapter 3 we suggested that the Level-1/Level-2 distinction may be a limit on 
efficient ToM, or at least on efficient visual perspective-taking. It was made clear that 
the Level-1/Level-2 distinction lacked in several respects for it to be considered a 
signature limit, but that currently this approximation provided a strong starting point. 
 
Whilst it was clear in Chapter-2 that the perspective of the avatar was being computed 
efficiently, in Chapter-3 this was not the case. It was suggested that the type of 
information represented as a perspective in Chapter-2, for example two objects, was 
calculated by a route to perspective-taking that was not available for the type of 
information represented as a perspective in Chapter-3, for example the number 9. 
There were, however, differences other than the content of the perspective between 
the paradigms presented in Chapters 2 and 3. In particular, in Chapter 2 the avatar’s 
viewpoint was perpendicular to that of the participant (See Figure 2.1), whilst in 
Chapter 3 the avatar looked almost directly towards the participant (Figure 3.1). 
Could it be the case that participants did not automatically encode his perspective 
because this avatar did not cue perspective-taking as strongly? Also, the stimuli in 
Chapters 2 and 3 differed in the brightness of the perspective content. Could it be that 
automatic perspective-taking could not occur in Chapter 3 because the content was 
harder to determine? I find both of these suggestions unlikely, but Chapter 4 
investigates these possibilities, and others like them, by testing adults’ Level-1 and 
Level-2 perspective-taking using the very same stimuli. In this chapter, we also 
introduced a control task to investigate further whether there was any degree of 
automatic perspective-taking in our Level-2 task. Recall that in Chapter 1 we 
suggested comparisons to non-social tasks were vital for clear conclusions. 













Does the Level-1/Level-2 distinction provide a limit to adults' efficient perspective 
processing? 
 
This chapter, largely in its current form, has been submitted as the article: Surtees, A. 
D. R. & Apperly I., A. (submitted), Does the Level-1/Level-2 distinction provide a 














Recent evidence has suggested that there are two routes to Level-1 perspective 
judgements about what people can or cannot see: one which is relatively automatic 
and the other requiring cognitive control (Samson et al., 2010). A two-part experiment 
tested directly whether both these routes were available for Level-2 perspective-
taking, which requires an understanding that single objects can be represented 
differently by different people. Experiment 3A (N=50) extended previous findings 
about Level-1 perspective taking, showing a role for both automaticity and control in 
perspective-taking when compared to a control condition in which participants made 
self-projections. Experiment 3B (N=50) used the very same stimuli and found no 
evidence of an automatic route to Level-2 perspective-taking: participants found it no 
more difficult to ignore an incongruent Level-2 perspective than to ignore an 
alternative self-projection task. We suggest then, that the only route available to 




In order to predict and explain the behaviour of others in even simple social 
environments it is often necessary to take into account their perspective on the world. 
People’s actions are dictated by their goals and intentions, which in turn are dictated 
by beliefs and desires, any of which may diverge from our own. Cooperating and 
competing with others regularly requires representation of these perspectives of 
others. One case where such situations arise is in taking visual perspectives. 
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The traditional method for testing perspective-taking involves asking participants 
(often children) to directly assess the perspectives of others and either report this 
perspective or make judgements about what a character will do given that they hold a 
given perspective. For example, Piaget and Inhelder (1956) asked children to report 
how an array of three mountains would appear to an experimenter and Flavell, 
Everett, Croft and Flavell (1981) asked children to judge whether someone sat 
opposite them would see a picture of a turtle as being the right way up, or upside 
down. Using these measures, perspective-taking seems to be effortful, and beyond the 
capacities of young children. Interestingly, children do not make errors at random, but 
errors that match their own perspective (Piaget & Inhelder, 1956; Flavell et al., 1981). 
Overcoming such egocentrism is thought to be crucial in the development of 
perspective-taking (Piaget & Inhelder, 1956). 
 
Whilst most perspective-taking research has been carried out with young children, 
methods more sensitive to adults’ abilities have begun to be developed (Epley, 
Morewedge & Keysar, 2004; Kessler & Thomson, 2010; Keysar et al., 2003; 
Michelen & Zachs, 2006; Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews & Bodley-Scott, 
2010), allowing for investigation of mature processing. What is perhaps surprising is 
that these studies have suggested that when adults have to make explicit perspective-
taking judgements this requires considerable cognitive resources. All of these 
measures have identified egocentric interference (Epley et al., 2004, Keysar et al., 
2003; Nickerson, 1999), suggesting that adults have to exercise cognitive control to 
ignore their own perspective. One suggestion as to why cognitive control is required 
for perspective-taking is that perspective-taking is achieved through egocentric 
anchoring and adjustment/correction (Epley et al., 2004). The process of anchoring 
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and adjustment is achieved through first calculating one’s own perspective and then 
making a series of incremental adjustments until a plausible alternative for other 
perspective is reached. There is good evidence to suggest that some perspective-
taking is achieved via incremental adjustment: a greater distance between one’s own 
perspective and that of another seems to come at greater processing cost (Michelon & 
Zacks, 2005). Michelon and Zacks (2005) found evidence of a perspective-taking 
mechanism that requires deliberate adjustment to another’s position in the form of 
mental rotation. Interestingly though, they also identified another mechanism for 
perspective-taking which did not appear to take the participant’s egocentric 
perspective as its starting point; rather it was parametrically related to the distance 
between the target and an object. What is clear, though, is that whether explicit 
perspective-taking requires anchoring and adjustment or not, it tends to require 
deliberate cognitive effort in adults. 
 
Recent research in infant (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Sodian, Theormer & Metz, 
2007; Southgate, Senju & Csibra, 2007; Surian, Caldi & Sperber, 2007) and 
comparative (Clayton & Emery, 2004; Hare, Call & Tomasello, 2001, Santos, Nissan 
& Feruggia, 2006) psychology has suggested that, in fact, perspective-taking might 
not be so difficult after all. Indirect measures, largely monitoring infants’ eye gaze, 
but also other spontaneous behaviours, seem to show that participants with only very 
limited cognitive resources can track perspectives. One interpretation of such results 
is that researchers have finally been able to find measures sensitive enough to show 
how easy perspective-taking really is (Baillargeon, Scott & He, 2010; Onishi & 
Baillargeon, 2005). Others are more sceptical about whether such evidence counts as 
genuine perspective-taking or “theory of mind” (Perner & Ruffman, 2005; Ruffman & 
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Perner, 2005). In contrast to these rather polarised positions, it will be our working 
hypothesis that direct and indirect measures of perspective-taking can both reveal 
interesting features about the cognitive profile of perspective-taking.  
 
Samson et al. (2010) identified both a direct and an indirect measure of perspective-
taking using a single paradigm where adults judged the number of dots that could be 
seen on the walls of a cartoon room. On separate trials, adults took either their own 
perspective (Self trials) or the perspective of a cartoon avatar that was present in the 
room (Other trials). On Other trials participants had to ignore their own perspective to 
judge what the avatar saw. On this direct measure of perspective-taking participants 
were slower and more error-prone at judging the avatar’s perspective when their own 
perspective was different. That is to say, adults showed egocentric interference, 
analogous to the errors made by very young children on analogous perspective-taking 
tasks, and consistent with the view that adults were making effortful, incremental 
adjustments to the avatar’s perspective. In contrast, on Self trials, participants had no 
reason to process the avatar’s perspective, since their only task was to judge what they 
themselves could see in the room. Nonetheless, participants were slower and more 
error prone at judging their own perspective when the irrelevant perspective of the 
avatar happened to be different from their own. The authors suggested that this 
interference might reflect the operation of a relatively automatic process for 
calculating the visual perspective of the avatar that operated even when it was 
unnecessary for the task of judging Self perspective, and indeed, when it actively 
impeded performance of this task. For current purposes we take this evidence of 
interference from the irrelevant perspective of another person when judging one’s 
own perspective as an indirect measure of perspective-taking, and we take these 
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findings as consistent with the view that perspective-taking can be cognitively 
efficient, and even automatic, at least in some circumstances. Our key question in the 
current work is whether direct and indirect measures are assessing the same 
underlying perspective-taking ability, or whether there might be differences between 
the abilities tapped by these measures.  
 
There are two reasons for supposing that there might be differences between the 
abilities that adults can display on direct versus indirect measures of perspective-
taking. Firstly, if the abilities demonstrated on indirect measures reflect a cognitively 
efficient process for perspective-taking, which operates in a relatively automatic 
manner, then there are strong theoretical reasons for supposing that this efficiency 
will come at the cost of inflexibility about the kinds of perspectives that can be 
processed (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009). Just as human infants and adults have 
cognitively efficient processes for number cognition, which have distinctive signature 
limits (Feigenson, Dehane & Spelke, 2004), so we should expect cognitively efficient 
processes for perspective-taking to be limited in their scope. In contrast, when adults 
are required to reason explicitly about perspectives we should expect their abilities to 
be limited only by limits on their general capacity for complex, effortful thought.  
 
Secondly, there are good empirical reasons for supposing that some kinds of 
perspective-taking are significantly more demanding than others. Flavell and 
colleagues suggested that there were at least two developmental levels to visual 
perspective-taking (Lempers, Flavell, & Flavell, 1977; Masangkay, McCluskey, 
McIntyre, Sims-Knight, Vaughn & Flavell 1974; Flavell, Everret, Croft & Flavell, 
1981; Flavell, Flavell, Green & Wilcox 1981). In particular, they characterised Level-
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1 perspective-taking as being the ability to interpret whether someone else can or 
cannot see a given object and Level-2 perspective-taking as understanding that “an 
object simultaneously visible to both the self and the other person may nonetheless 
give rise to different visual impressions or experiences in the two if their viewing 
circumstances differ” (Flavell, Everett, Croft and Flavell, 1981, p1). On traditional, 
direct measures of visual perspective-taking children pass Level-1 tasks around the 
age of 2-years (Moll & Tomasello, 2006), but do not pass similar Level-2 tasks till 
around the age of 4 or 5 (Flavell, Everett et al., 1981, Masangkay et al., 1974).  
Recent, indirect, measures have shown precocious perspective-taking abilities in 
infants (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Sodian et al., 2007; Southgate al., 2007; Surian 
et al., 2007) and non-human animals (Clayton & Emery, 2004; Hare, Call & 
Tomasello, 2001; Santos, Nissan & Feruggia, 2006). Interestingly, the Level-1/Level-
2 distinction also describes these precocious abilities: many of these new tasks imply 
Level-1 perspective-taking, but as yet there is no positive evidence of the equivalent 
Level-2 ability. 
 
In spite of the Level-1/Level-2 distinction forming a key part of our understanding of 
how children’s perspective-taking abilities develop, Level-2 perspective-taking has 
received little attention in the literature on adults; although an interesting parallel 
literature on spatial perspective-taking has been fruitful (Kessler & Thomon, 2009; 
Michelon & Zacks, 2006). We therefore adapted Samson et al.’s (2010) task so that 
we could elicit Level-2, as well as Level-1 judgements, using the very same stimuli. 
Given the existing literature there was a clear prediction that when directly required to 
judge perspectives adults would show egocentrism for Level-1 and Level-2 
judgements. Of equal interest was adults’ performance on the indirect measure of 
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perspective-taking. Recall that Samson et al. (2010) found that when adults made 
Level-1 judgements about their own visual perspective they suffered interference 
from the irrelevant, incongruent perspective of the avatar in the scene. Samson et al. 
suggested that this interference provided an indirect measure of participants’ tendency 
to compute the avatar’s perspective automatically. The present studies investigated 
whether a similar effect would be apparent for Level-2 judgements. 
 
Evaluating this indirect measure of perspective-taking requires care, because there are 
other reasons why adults might be slower and more error prone to judge their own 
perspective, and these need to be eliminated before it is possible to conclude that such 
interference results from automatic perspective-taking. Most obviously, unnecessary 
processing of the avatar’s perspective during Self trials (where participants judged 
their own perspective) could simply be the result of carry-over effects from Other 
trials (where they were directly required to judge the avatar’s perspective). Such 
carry-over effects would be evidence of involuntary, unnecessary processing of the 
avatar’s perspective, but this would be a consequence of the task design, rather than 
evidence of automatic processing driven by the presence of the avatar stimulus (see 
e.g., Samson et al., 2010, for a discussion).  
 
To provide a baseline against which findings from the perspective-taking conditions 
could be judged, separate groups of participants completed “self-projection” 
conditions. In these conditions participants viewed stimuli in which the avatar was 
replaced by a striped oblong block, but which were otherwise identical to the stimuli 
in the perspective-taking conditions (see Table 4.1). On “Self” trials, participants 
judged their own, current, perspective on the stimulus. These judgements were 
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identical to the ones participants made in the Self trials of the perspective-taking task, 
with the only condition difference being that the stimulus for judgement included an 
oblong block rather than an avatar. On “Other” trials, participants judged what their 
own perspective would be if they were positioned in the scene depicted in the 
stimulus, facing outwards, with their back against the oblong block. The contents of 
these judgements were identical to those in the Other trials of the perspective-taking 
tasks, but the agent to which they were ascribed was the imagined self (“I would see 
X”) rather than the avatar (“He sees X”). Altogether, the Level-1 and Level-2 self-
projection conditions were highly analogous to the corresponding perspective-taking 
conditions, with the critical difference being that the presented stimuli did not contain 
an avatar that might cue automatic perspective-taking. 
 
This design led to the following predictions. First, for both Level-1 and Level-2 
judgements, and for both perspective-taking and self-projection conditions, the mere 
fact that participants made both Self and Other judgements might lead to interference 
effects, whereby judgement on any given trial might suffer interference from 
unintended computation of the alternative perspective. Moreover, if the only reason 
for such interference was carry-over effects between Self and Other judgements, then 
we would not expect any difference between the interference observed in perspective-
taking conditions compared with self-projection conditions. However, if the presence 
of the avatar in the scene acts as a cue for automatic perspective-taking, then we have 
a second distinctive prediction: we should observe more interference in perspective-
taking conditions, compared with the baseline of the self-projection conditions. Third, 
if automatic perspective-taking cued by the presence of the avatar only calculates 
Level-1 perspectives (as suggested by Apperly & Butterfill, 2009), then we should 
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observe more interference in the Level-1 perspective-taking condition compared with 
the Level-1 self-projection condition, but no difference between the interference 
observed in the two Level-2 conditions. 
 




In Experiment 3A, separate groups of participants made Level-1 judgements, either in 
the perspective-taking condition or in the self-projection condition. Participants made 
judgements about the number of letters seen in a given stimulus (see Table 4.1). For 
“Other” trials they judged how many letters could be seen by the cartoon avatar (in 
the perspective-taking condition) or how many letters they would see if they were 
standing against a striped block (in the self projection condition). For “Self” trials, 
participants in both the perspective-taking and the self projection conditions judged 
how many letters they could see. On Consistent trials, self and other perspective 
content was equivalent (all letters were in front of the avatar/block). For Inconsistent 
trials self perspective content was one greater than other perspective content: one of 
the letters was located behind the avatar/block. Previous studies using this paradigm 
have shown that interference effects are observed when the participant’s privileged 









Participants were 50 undergraduate or postgraduate students from the University of 
Birmingham (average age: 19.9 Years, 44 female) who participated for course credits 
or a small honorarium.  
 
4.2.1.2 Design and Procedure 
Participants were pseudo-randomly assigned to one of two conditions: perspective-
taking or self projection. Participants completed the experiment in a testing cubicle. 
Instructions included detailed descriptions of the procedure and an instruction to 
respond as quickly and accurately as possible. Practice trials were completed until the 
participant had successfully answered a question for each of the four conditions (Self-
Consistent, Self-Inconsistent, Other-Consistent and Other-Inconsistent).  
 
On each trial, participants viewed successive fixation stimuli (a smiling face (600ms) 
and a fixation cross (600ms)) followed by a 1800ms auditory stimulus and then the 
test picture depicting an avatar in a room with 1-3 letters on the wall. For participants 
in the perspective-taking version of the task, this auditory stimulus was either “He 
sees X” or “You see X”, whereas for participants in the self-projection version of the 
task the auditory stimulus was either “From block X”, or “From here X”. X was either 
“one”, “two” or “three”. Participants pressed one of two keys to indicate whether or 
not the auditory stimulus correctly described the picture. Response time was measured 
from the onset of the picture. Participants completed 288 test trials. These consisted of 
144 experimental trials, and 144 trials used as filler trials to match the demands of a 
planned further experiment (Experiment 3B). Experimental trials used the letters p, r, 
u, n, m and w; filler trials s, z, o and x. In half of trials self and other perspectives 
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were consistent (36 Self, 36 Other) and in the others they were inconsistent (36 Self, 
36 Other). In half of the trials the letters appeared on the side wall of the room, and in 
the rest they appeared on the floor. The experiment was presented on a computer 
using E-prime 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools, Inc.). 
 
 
Table 4.1. Examples of trials forming the key contrasts in Experiment 3A. Note that 
the very same stimuli were used in both experiments. Letter stimuli were equally 
often on the wall and on the floor, with equal numbers of Consistent and Inconsistent 
trials in each case.  






















































Self and Other trials were analysed separately, as we had no hypotheses about the 
relative size of any effects observed in these two conditions. Experimental and filler 
trials were entirely equivalent from a Level-1 perspective, and so filler trials could, in 
principle, have been analysed here. However, we excluded filler trials in order to have 
equivalent statistical power in Experiments 3A and 3B. Importantly, the patterns of 
performance on experimental and filler trials did not differ, and the effects shown here 
are replicated in an analysis of the complete data set. 
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4.2.2.1 Direct Measure of Perspective-taking 
Examining the effect of perspective consistency on Other trials allowed us to test for 
egocentric interference using a direct measure. In calculating average response times, 
data points that were more than 2.5 standard deviations from the mean were excluded 
(3.1% for the perspective-taking condition and 8.7% for the self projection condition), 
as were data from incorrect responses. Excluding data using more (2 standard 
deviations) or less (3 standard deviations) strict criteria did not change any of the 
significant findings reported. To gain a single indication of participants’ performance, 
processing cost was calculated by dividing each participant’s average response time 
for each condition by the proportion of correct answers made by that participant in 
that condition (such a measure incorporates any speed/accuracy trade off made by 
individual participants). Appendix 1 shows Response Times and Accuracy data 
independently. 
 
An ANOVA with Consistency (Consistent, Inconsistent) as a within subjects factor, 
and Condition (Perspective, Projection) as a between subjects factor revealed an effect 
of Consistency (F(1, 49) = 36.53, p < .001, ηp2 = .43, Inconsistent > Consistent) and 
an effect of Condition (F(1, 49) = 4.18, p = .046, ηp2 = .080, Projection > 
Perspective). The interaction between Consistency and Condition was not significant 
(F(1, 49) = .48, p = .49, ηp2 = .010). 
 
On this direct measure of perspective-taking there was clear evidence of egocentric 
interference. Although participants responded significantly more quickly to 
perspective-taking than self projection trials, the egocentric interference did not differ 
in the two conditions.  
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4.2.2.2 Indirect Measure of Perspective-taking 
Examining the effect of perspective consistency on Self trials allowed us to indirectly 
test whether the avatar’s perspective was processed automatically in the perspective-
taking condition, leading to interference with judgements about Self perspective. 
Outliers were excluded on the same basis as in the direct perspective-taking trials 
(1.6% of data considered an outlier in the perspective-taking condition and also 1.6% 
in the projection condition). 
 
An ANOVA with Consistency (Consistent, Inconsistent) as a within subjects factor, 
and Condition (Perspective, Projection) as a between subjects factor revealed an effect 
of Consistency (F(1, 49) = 89.88, p < .001, ηp2 = .65, Inconsistent > Consistent). 
There was no main effect of Condition (F(1, 49) = .11, p = .74, ηp2 = .002). The 
interaction between Consistency and Condition was found to be significant (F(1, 49) 
= 4.12, p = .048, ηp2 = .079). Post-hoc t-tests showed the effect of Consistency to be 
significant for both Perspective-taking (t(24) = 6.94, p < .001, Inconsistent > 
Consistent) and Self Projection (t(24) = 6.68, p < .001, Inconsistent > Consistent), but 
critically, the effect of Consistency was greater for the Perspective-taking condition.  
 
Consistent with Samson et al. (2010) our indirect measure identified interference from 
the other task when making Self judgements, reflected in a main effect of 
Consistency. Importantly, however, the interaction between Condition and 
Consistency was also significant. That is to say, participants suffered more 
interference from irrelevant calculation of the avatar’s perspective than from 
irrelevant calculation of what they themselves would see if they projected themselves 
into the position of the block in the scene.  





Figure 4.1. Mean processing costs for Experiment 3A. Error bars represent the 
standard error of the mean. 
 




Participants were 50 undergraduate or postgraduate students from the University of 
Birmingham (average age: 20.3 Years; 46 female) who participated for course credits 
or a small honorarium.  
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4.3.1.2 Stimuli and procedure 
The method for Experiment 3B was equivalent to that used in Experiment 3A except 
that judgements were made about the nature of the letters that could be seen, rather 
than just the number that were visible. Self judgements always required the 
participant to judge which letter(s) they could see. For the “Other” condition 
participants either judged which letter the avatar could see or which letter they would 
see if they, themselves, were stood against the block. The crucial design feature of the 
stimuli was that in experimental trials, the letters were rotational pairs ({m, w}, {n, u} 
and {p, d}). In stimuli with letters on the wall of the room (Consistent trials), they 
appear as the same letter to self and “other”; in stimuli with the letter(s) on the floor 
of the room (Inconsistent trials), they present as different letters to self and “other”. 
To test for any confounding effect of location of the letter, participants also viewed 
control stimuli which appeared equivalent in both locations (s, o, z, x). Participants 
completed 144 experimental trials (36 Self-Consistent, 36 Self-Inconsistent, 36 Other-
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Table 4.2. Examples of trials forming the key contrasts from Experiment 3B. All trials 
displayed here are “Consistent” for Level-1 perspective judgements, but since the 
entire stimulus set was the same as that used for Experiment 3A, an equal number of 
stimuli were “Inconsistent” from a Level-1 perspective. 





















































4.3.3.1 Direct Measure of Perspective-taking 
4.3.3.1.1 Experimental trials 
Response time outliers were excluded in the same way as for Experiment 3A (3.9% of 
data for perspective-taking and 4.8% for self projection), as were data from incorrect 
responses. Again the dependent variable used was a measure of processing cost, 
corresponding to mean response time divided by proportion correct for each condition 
for each participant. 
 
An ANOVA with Consistency (Consistent, Inconsistent) as a within subjects factor 
and Condition (Perspective, Projection) as a between subjects factor revealed an effect 
of Consistency (F(1, 49) = 11.51, p = .001, ηp2 = .193, Inconsistent > Consistent) and 
an effect of Condition (F(1, 49) = 9.46, p = .003, ηp2 = .17, Projection > Perspective). 
The interaction between Consistency and Condition was not significant (F(1, 49) = 
.14, p = .71, ηp2 = .003). 
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4.3.3.1.2 Control trials 
A similar ANOVA on control trials with Stimulus Location (Wall, Floor) as a within 
subjects factor and Condition (Perspective, Projection) was completed. Note that the 
factor “Stimulus Location” manipulates the location of the letters in just the same way 
as the factor “Consistency” in experimental trials, but it has no effect on perspective 
consistency since the letters in control trials appeared the same in both wall and floor 
locations. Therefore, control trials allowed us to check whether the mere location of 
the letter stimuli had a significant effect on participants’ performance. There was an 
effect of Condition (F(1, 49) = 5.33, p = .025, ηp2 = .10, Projection > Perspective), 
but no main effect of Stimulus Location (F(1, 49) = 2.65, p = .11, ηp2 = .052), and no 
interaction (F(1, 49) = 2.07, p = .16, ηp2 = .018). This confirmed that the location of 
the stimulus items on the floor or the wall did not itself have any effect on 
participant’s performance, suggesting that the effect of Consistency observed on 
Experimental trials was genuinely due to whether or not self and other perspectives 
were consistent. 
 
4.3.3.2 Indirect Measure of Perspective-taking 
4.3.3.2.1 Experimental trials 
In calculating average response times, data were excluded in the same way as for 
Other trials (3.9% of data for perspective-taking and 4.8% for self projection), as were 
data from incorrect responses.  
 
An ANOVA with Consistency (Consistent, Inconsistent) as a within subjects factor 
and Condition (Perspective, Projection) as a between subjects factor revealed an effect 
of Consistency (F(1, 49) = 40.00, p < .001, ηp2 = .46, Inconsistent > Consistent) and a 
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trend towards an effect of Condition (F(1, 49) = 3.28, p = .076, ηp2 = .064, Projection 
> Perspective). The interaction between Consistency and Condition was not 
significant (F(1, 49) < 0.001, p > .99, ηp2 < .001). The absence of this interaction 
indicates that the effect of Consistency was no greater for the Perspective condition 
than for the Projection condition. 
 
4.3.3.2.2 Control trials 
A similar ANOVA on control trials revealed no main effect of Stimulus Location 
(F(1, 49) = .004, p = .95, ηp2 < .001), again a trend towards an effect of Condition 
(F(1, 49) = 3.45, p = .070, ηp2 = . 067, Projection > Perspective) and no interaction 
(F(1, 49) = 2.07, p = .16, ηp2 = .041). 
 
For the Level-2 tasks, there was an effect of the consistency of stimuli for 
experimental trials (there was a cost in making judgements about stimuli which could 
be viewed differently from the alternative perspective). As with Experiment 3A, 
directly taking the perspective of another was easier than projecting oneself into an 
imaginary position in space. However, in contrast to Experiment 3A, there was no 
interaction between Condition and Consistency. That is to say, participants in 
Experiment 3B suffered no more interference from irrelevant calculation of the 
avatar’s perspective than from irrelevant calculation of what they themselves would 
see if they projected themselves into the position of the block in the scene.  
 
Chapter 4 Limits to adults’ efficient perspective processing 
112 
 
Figure 4.2. Mean processing costs for Experiment 3B. Error bars represent the 
standard error of the mean. 
 
4.4 Discussion 
In two experiments we investigated the processing costs incurred when adults make 
different kinds of perspective-taking judgements, either judging an alternative 
perspective or their own self-perspective. There were three main findings. First, when 
participants were directly asked to adopt an alternative perspective they showed 
significantly greater processing costs when the alternative perspective was their own 
projected self rather than an avatar that was physically present in the stimulus. 
Second, all direct judgements of an alternative perspective incurred a higher 
processing cost when the alternative perspective was inconsistent with the 
participant’s own, current self-perspective. Third, when participants judged their own, 
current self-perspective they showed higher processing costs when the irrelevant 
alternative perspective was inconsistent, and this effect was particularly marked when 
participants made Level-1 self-perspective judgements with the avatar physically 
present in the stimulus. We discuss each of these effects in more detail below. 
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4.4.1 Directly assessing the perspective of others: An effortful process 
Effects of perspective consistency when participants made direct judgements about an 
alternative perspective fit with previous reports that adult participants show egocentric 
biases (Keysar et al., 2003; Epley et al.; 2004, Michelon & Zacks, 2006; Samson et 
al., 2010) and add to evidence that such bias is pervasive across different kinds of 
perspective judgement. Importantly, though, egocentric biases are consistent with at 
least two perspective-taking strategies. Firstly, participants could be using a strategy 
of egocentric anchoring and adjustment (Epley et al., 2004), initially representing a 
self-perspective and making a series of adjustments away from this. Specifically 
relating to our paradigm, an egocentrism and adjustment hypothesis would suggest 
that Consistent trials are processed more efficiently because self perspective already 
represents an appropriate estimate of other-perspective, and so effortful adjustments 
are not required. However, anchoring and adjustment is not the only strategy available 
for working out what someone else may see. For example, to make a Level-1 
judgement about the avatar’s perspective in the stimulus in the top right hand panel of 
Table 4.1, participants could employ a strategy of judging how many items appear in 
front of the avatar, rather than beginning with the thought that “He sees 2” based on 
their own self-perspective and adjusting away from this on the basis of what the 
avatar cannot see. Participants may nonetheless show egocentric effects because their 
self-perspective is a salient distracter, with the potential for interference being greater 
when self-perspective is inconsistent with the other perspective to be judged. It is not 
possible to distinguish between these alternative accounts for the current data, but 
evidence that insufficient adjustment away from an egocentric anchor is not the only 
source of such effects comes from a study by Apperly, Back, Samson and France 
(2008) who found interference between self and other perspectives even when 
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participants did not need to infer someone else’s perspective because they were 
simply told what the other person thought. 
 
Our self-projection condition, included for comparison with direct other perspective-
taking, showed two interesting effects. Firstly, egocentric interference here was as 
strong as in the perspective-taking conditions, showing that explicitly social 
paradigms are not required to illustrate egocentric-type effects (Gopnik & Astington, 
1988; Perner & Leekam, 2008; Surtees & Apperly, in press, Chapter 2). Secondly, 
imagining an alternative self perspective was more difficult than simply taking 
another’s perspective. Whilst taking another’s perspective is effortful, and possibly 
requires rotating one’s own perspective (Kessler & Thomson, 2010; Kozhevnikov & 
Hegarty, 2001; Michelon & Zacks, 2006), it seems to be easier than imagining oneself 
into a different spatial position. A potential explanation for this effect comes from 
Kessler and Thomson (2010), who found that participants were better at judging the 
spatial perspectives of others when their own posture matched the posture of the 
other. Given these findings, one interpretation of our results would be that the lack of 
a bodily form to project into in our self-projection condition makes these judgements 
more difficult than the perspective-taking condition.  
 
4.4.2 Automatic Level-1 perspective taking 
Not all perspective-taking is effortful. The indirect measure of perspective-taking in 
the current study provides converging evidence to Samson et al’s claim that Level-1 
perspectives may be calculated automatically, and extends the evidence base for this 
effect. Firstly, in the original method employed by Samson et al. (2010) (also, Surtees 
& Apperly, in press, Chapter 2), participants always viewed the avatar side-on, 
Chapter 4 Limits to adults’ efficient perspective processing 
115 
 
meaning that the avatar’s direction of view was perpendicular to the participant’s. In 
the current method, participants always viewed the avatar head-on. This suggests that 
automatic processing of the avatar’s perspective is not specific to the stimuli used by 
Samson et al., and can be cued by a variety of views of the avatar. Secondly, the 
baseline condition we used was unique. Samson et al. (2010) found that participants 
who judged their own perspective experienced interference from the irrelevant 
perspective of the avatar, but experienced no such interference in a baseline condition 
in which the avatar was replaced with a featureless oblong stick. The current study 
found that even when Level-1 perspective-taking is compared with a closely-matched 
self-projection condition, participants experienced significantly greater interference 
when judging their own perspective in the perspective-taking condition. This indicates 
that, over and above interference due to carry-over between self and other judgements 
made between trials (which was present in both perspective-taking and self-projection 
conditions), the presence of an avatar in the perspective-taking condition generated 
further interference. Following Samson et al. (2010) we suggest that this interference 
arose from automatic computation of the avatar’s perspective.  
 
4.4.3 The Level-1/ Level-2 distinction as a limit on efficient Theory of Mind 
In contrast to the findings with Level-1 perspective-taking, in Experiment 3B Level-2 
perspective-taking did not show greater interference on participants’ judgements of 
their own perspective than our self projection condition. If we suppose that the 
interference effects on self judgements observed by Samson et al. (2010) and in 
Experiment 3A are due to automatic calculation of the avatar’s perspective, then 
Experiment 3B suggests that this automatic process may only support Level-1 
perspectives, and not Level-2 perspectives. Clearly, this does not preclude the 
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possibility that under other circumstances Level-2 perspectives can be computed 
automatically, but to date there is no evidence from adults to suggest that this is 
possible.  
 
The potential importance of the Level-1/Level-2 distinction as a “signature limit” to 
efficient perspective-taking is that it helps explain converging evidence from very 
different participant groups on very different paradigms, which indicates that 
participants with limited cognitive resources may be able to take Level-1 perspectives, 
but not Level-2 perspectives. Tasks using preferential looking or violation of 
expectation paradigms have demonstrated Level-1 abilities in infancy, but so far there 
is no evidence of Level-2 abilities (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005, Sodian et al., 2007, 
Southgate et al., 2007, Surian et al., 2007). Children from 2-years of age, but not 18 
months, have made explicit solutions requiring Level-1 perspective-taking (Moll & 
Tomasello, 2006), but again there is no evidence of such success in a Level-2 
paradigm until around the age of four (Flavell et al., 1981). On similar tasks to those 
employed by Moll and Tomasello (2005), non-human animals have also shown 
precocious abilities for Level-1 perspectives (Clayton & Emery, 2004; Hare et al., 
2001, Santos et al., 2006), but not for Level-2 perspectives. We thus follow Apperly 
and Butterfill (2009) in suggesting that there is strong evidence to suggest that as a 
general rule Level-2 perspective-taking tends to require controlled processing, which 
comes at a cost to efficiency. 
 
4.4.4 Conclusion 
We propose then, that there are two qualitatively distinct routes to perspective-taking: 
one route requires deliberate and effortful adjustments to the perspective of other. 
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This is the route identified by traditional methods of testing perspective-taking 
abilities. Effortful and controlled processing affords flexibility, and for this reason this 
route supports both Level-1 and Level-2 judgements, and we suggest that there is 
currently no evidence that Level-2 perspective-taking can be achieved in any other 
way. Whilst affording flexibility, this comes at a cost to processing efficiency, due at 
least in part to interference from one’s own perspective. One open question is whether 
this cost is the result of participants using their own perspective in obtaining starting 
conditions for a representation of the perspective of other (in line with egocentric 
anchoring and adjustment; Epley et al., 2004), or if the cost comes from the need to 
inhibit a self-perspective in order to calculate or select another perspective. A second 
route to perspective-taking is automatic in the sense it operates outside of cognitive 
control and relatively effortless in the sense that it is not disrupted by a secondary 
executive task (Qureshi, Apperly & Samson, 2010). Such a route has only been 
identified through indirect measures. Whilst this route is efficient, it does not afford 
flexibility, and limits, such as the Level-1/Level-2 distinction constrain the 
performance of this route. So far there is no evidence that this route supports explicit 
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4.5 Summary and Links to Chapter 5 
Chapters 2-4 have investigated visual perspective-taking in children and adults using 
both direct and indirect measures. Much of the focus has been on the indirect 
measures gained from this study: concluding in the suggestion that an efficient route 
to perspective-taking exists for both children and adults, but that it is limited by a 
signature limit that can be approximated to the Level-1/Level-2 distinction. 
 
When looking at the results from the direct measures of perspective-taking used, 
every measure, at every age group, has identified egocentric interference. It seems 
clear that when older children and adults complete even simple tasks, those passable 
by young children from the age of 2-4, they suffer a cost to ignoring their own 
perspective on the world. What seems crucial in being a successful perspective-taker 
is the ability to put one’s own perspective to one side. In the past individual 
differences in the emergence of ToM have been related to the executive functions. 
New paradigms allow for the investigation of whether further developments in ToM 
are related to the executive functions (Dumontheil et al., 2010; Apperly et al., in 
press). The following chapter investigates whether individual differences in 
egocentrism, an ability so crucial in interpreting the minds of others, is also related to 
the executive functions in children aged 5-7. 













The role of executive functions in theory of mind in middle childhood 
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The relationship between Theory of Mind (ToM) and executive function is well 
established. The vast majority of research on this relationship, however, has focussed 
on one specific age group (pre-school children) and one specific measure of ToM (the 
false belief task). ToM is thought to undergo a protracted development and 
encompass a range of different abilities. It is, therefore, important to identify whether 
executive abilities underpin development in ToM after the age of 4 and also whether 
executive abilities predict performance in a range of different ToM tasks. The current 
study addressed both of these issues, testing children aged 5-7 (N=57) on a range of 
ToM and executive function measures. Children’s egocentrism in visual perspective-
taking was predicted by a measure of inhibition and a measure of task switching. 
Children’s ability to reason about false beliefs was correlated to a measure of less 
complex inhibition and to their memory span, though these relationships with false 
belief were not substantiated in a regression analysis. We suggest that executive 
function and ToM do continue to be related once initial concepts of belief, desire and 
perspective are in place, but that in different age groups distinct executive abilities 
may prescribe individual difference in separate ToM tasks. 
5.1 Introduction 
Taking the perspectives of other people is an important part of everyday social 
interaction. Three very different forms of perspective-taking involve Visual 
Perspective-taking, Referential Communication and Belief-Desire reasoning. Such 
varied forms of social cognition are thought to form part of the broader concept of 
Theory of Mind (ToM). The vast majority of research on ToM has focussed on the 
performance of young children, who fail seemingly simple problems up till at least the 
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age of four (Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Wellman, Cross & Watson, 2001). Across all 
these tasks young children commonly make egocentric errors: errors made do not 
reflect a random approach to responding, but rather one in line with an over-
application of self perspective (Piaget & Inhelder, 1956; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). 
Success in these tasks is commonly found to be linked to individual differences in 
executive functions (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Hughes & Ensor, 2007). 
 
Within this narrow age group, the investigation of false beliefs has received the 
majority of attention (Bloom & German, 2000), but there is also good evidence about 
the abilities of young children in simple perspective-taking (Flavell, Everett, Croft & 
Flavell, 1981; Moll & Tomasello, 2006) and referential communication (Nadig & 
Sedivy, 2002).  Whilst such processes are often thought to make similar demands, and 
some of these develop at similar times (Masangkay, McCluskey, McIntyre, Sims-
Knight, Vaughn & Flavell, 1974; Nilsen & Graham, 2009; Wellman et al., 2001), 
there is little evidence that those who are fluent in one of these abilities are 
necessarily more fluent in other such abilities. In separate studies, different aspects of 
ToM have been linked to executive functions in different age groups. Most 
commonly, studies have looked at correlations between individual differences in 
belief-reasoning and executive functions in childhood (Carlson & Moses, 2001; 
Hughes & Ensor, 2007). This link is not restricted to belief reasoning: Nilsen and 
Graham (2009) found young children’s executive abilities to also correlate with 
performance on a referential communication task that required them to take account 
of the speaker’s visual perspective. This link between ToM and executive function is 
also not restricted to childhood: there is good evidence that older adults’ executive 
abilities predict performance deficits in ToM tasks (German & Hehman, 2006) and 
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that young adults perform poorly under dual task conditions (Bull, Phillips & 
Conway, 2008). The distinctive features of the current study are that it examines the 
relationship between several ToM tasks, as well as the relationship between these 
tasks and tests of executive function, and it does so in a sample of 5- to7-year-old 
children who pass many standard assessments of ToM.  
 
When adults are presented with tasks where they have to make estimates of others’ 
judgements, a range of studies have found them to suffer from egocentric biases 
(Bernstein et al., 2004; Nickerson, 1999; Royzman et al., 2003). More recently, new 
paradigms have also shown that adults have limits to their ToM, suffering egocentric 
costs on belief reasoning (Apperly, Warren, Andrews, Grant & Todd, in press), 
referential communication (Keysar, Lin & Barr, 2003) and Level-1 perspective-taking 
tasks (Samson, Apperly, Andrews & Bodley-Scott, 2010). These studies suggest that 
for both children and adults ToM tasks where participants make explicit responses 
require effortful processing to overcome egocentric biases. Studies using similar 
paradigms have shown significant advancements in performance in middle childhood 
(Dumontheil, Apperly & Blakemore, 2009; Surtees & Apperly, in press, Chapter 2). 
As children get older they become more efficient at this effortful processing, but there 
has, as yet, been no direct investigation of what underpins this development. The 
current paper explores the hypothesis that these developments in ToM are 
underpinned by developments in executive function. 
 
The executive functions are a set of diverse cognitive abilities often found to recruit 
areas of frontal cortex (Collette et al., 2005; Hwang, Velanova & Luna, 2010; Luria, 
1973; Miller & Cohen, 2001). They allow for the planning, coordinating and 
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implementation of complex thinking and behaviour. In particular, the executive 
functions allow us to enact complex cognition on the basis of abstract rules and to 
flexibly switch between such rules. Whilst there has been debate about how to 
structure the different aspects of executive function, some agreement supports 
splitting executive functions into three related, but distinct components: Inhibition, 
Task Switching and Working Memory (Collette et al., 2005; Diamond, 2006; Fisk & 
Sharp, 2004; Miyake et al., 2000). Inhibition constitutes the ability to ignore a pre-
potent response in favour of enacting a rule-based response, task switching the ability 
to flexibly switch between two abstract rules and working memory the ability to hold 
in mind and update information when carrying out a task.  
 
Like ToM, much of the focus of developmental psychologists on the executive 
functions has been on very young children. Typically pre-school children find it very 
difficult to inhibit pre-potent responses (Kochanska et al., 1996), to switch between 
different abstract rules (Espy, 1997; Kirkham, Cruess & Diamond, 2001) and have 
very limited abilities in working memory (Diamond & Goldman-Rakic, 1989). 
Interestingly though, like ToM, recent evidence has shown that the Executive 
Functions continue to develop into middle childhood (Cepeda, Kramer & de Sather, 
2001; Davidson, Amso, Anderson & Diamond, 2006; Gathercole, 1999; Gathercole, 
Pickering, Ambridge & Wearing, 2004).  
 
Studies with young children have tested the relationship between ToM and the 
executive functions by investigating links between individual differences in each of 
these constructs (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Carlson, Moses, & Breton, 2002; Carlson, 
Moses, & Claxton, 2004; Hughes 1998a, 1998b; Hughes & Ensor, 2007; Moses, 
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2001; Perner & Lang, 1999; Rakoczy, 2010). As well as showing consistent 
correlations between ToM and both inhibition and working memory, longitudinal 
studies have shown that earlier executive abilities predict later ToM performance, but 
that the reverse is not the case (Carlson et al., 2004; Hughes & Ensor, 2007). In fact, 
Carlson et al (2004) showed that executive abilities tested at an earlier age (2 years) 
showed a stronger correlation with ToM at the age of four than executive abilities 
tested at the very same time. 
 
Whilst both working memory and inhibition have been found to be related to 
performance on false belief tasks, it is widely believed that it is inhibition that has the 
most important relationship. The correlation between inhibition and belief reasoning 
survives controlling for working memory (Carlson et al., 2004), as well as a whole 
host of other factors that could be thought to account for the relationship, whilst 
working memory no longer significantly correlates with inhibition if inhibition is 
controlled for. Interestingly, though, the best predictor of performance on ToM tasks 
seems to be performance on conflict inhibition tasks, which are thought to implicate a 
joint inhibitory and working memory load (Moses, 2001). 
 
In spite of the fact that the relationship between the executive functions and ToM in 
young children is strongly established and well-defined, it is limited. Specifically, it is 
limited to describing the relationship at a given point in development. This is not such 
a severe limitation if ToM and Executive Function are fully established during this 
period. There is, however, clear evidence that both performance in ToM (Apperly et 
al., in press; Dumontheil et al., 2009; Surtees & Apperly, in press, Chapter 2) and 
Executive Functions (Burns, Riggs & Beck, submitted; Davidson et al., 2006; 
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Simpson & Riggs, 2005) undergo significant developments after the age at which all 
this evidence has been collected. There is no a priori reason to assume that those 
aspects of executive function that provide the limiting factors in the ToM abilities of a 
four year old will necessarily be the same limiting factors on the performance of older 
children. The current study is the first to test whether this is the case across a broad 
range of ToM tasks. We introduce each of these tasks below. 
 
5.1.1 Belief-Desire Reasoning 
Belief-Desire reasoning is by far the most studied subset of reasoning about mental 
states (Friedman & Leslie, 2004; Wellman et al., 2001; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). In 
particular the paradigmatic case of false beliefs is an area well examined by 
developmental psychologists. In classic false belief tasks children must put aside their 
own knowledge of the world to judge what an ill-informed third person will do. 
Typically, children are not able to make correct responses to these tasks until around 
the age of four (Wellman et al., 2001; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). This effect survives 
many variations in presentation format and across cultures (Wellman et al., 2001). 
Reasoning about True Beliefs and conflicting desires develops somewhat earlier 
(Friedman & Leslie, 2004). Correlations between false belief performance and 
executive function measures are very clear in the extent that they show a relationship 
between the two factors (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Carlson et al., 2002; Carlson et al., 
2004; Hughes 1998a, 1998b; Hughes & Ensor, 2007; Moses, 2001; Perner & Lang, 
1999; Rakoczy, 2010). Correlations are commonly found between False Belief 
performance and both Inhibition and Working Memory (Carlson & Moses, 2001; 
Carlson et al., 2002; Carlson, et al., 2004; Hughes 1998a, 1998b; Hughes & Ensor, 
2007; Moses, 2001; Perner & Lang, 1999). Such correlations between ToM and 
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executive functions are not limited to young children: German & Hehman (2006) 
found adults’ belief reasoning to be predicted by measures of processing speed and 
inhibition. In particular, decline in belief-reasoning in adults was attributed to a 
decline in executive abilities. 
 
Whilst varying the veracity of a target’s belief has received more attention in the 
literature, it is also possible to vary the nature of an individual’s desire for a given 
object. If a person holds an approach desire, they wish to select a location in which a 
specified item is found. If they hold an avoidance desire they wish to avoid this 
location (Leslie & Polizzi, 1998). Neither avoidance desires nor approach desires 
conflict necessarily with reality, but children are generally found to successfully 
reason about approach desires before avoidance desires (Leslie, German & Polizzi, 
2004; Leslie & Polizzi, 1998). Leslie et al. propose that tasks that combine false 
beliefs with avoidance desires are particularly difficult as they place additive demands 
on inhibitory resources. 
 
For the current study we used a measure of Belief Desire reasoning developed by 
Apperly et al. (in press). In this task, children make multiple judgements under time 
pressure about the actions of a character who explicitly tells them of his beliefs and 
desires. Apperly et al. (in press) found evidence of egocentrism persisting beyond 
early childhood, with adult participants responding more slowly and less accurately 
when a character’s belief was incorrect. As well as this, a similar effect was found in 
desire reasoning: participants were slower and less accurate when reasoning about 
avoidance desires than approach desires.  
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5.1.2 Referential Communication 
When communicating with other people our view of the world does not necessarily 
match that of the person we are trying to communicate with. Normative 
communication should reflect this with speakers varying the content of their speech to 
suit the perspective of the listener, and listeners interpreting content on the basis of 
their knowledge as to the perspective of the speaker (Sperber & Wilson, 1986). 
Referential communication tasks (Horton & Keysar, 1996; Keysar et al., 2003) 
measure this ability through creating a perspective difference between the participants 
and someone who they are communicating with. Such tasks have found that 
interpreting communication in terms of a speaker’s knowledge comes at a cost 
(Keysar et al., 2003).  
 
Early studies of this ability in children suggested that children younger than 6 or 7 fail 
to successfully take into account the perspectives of others (Deutsch & Pechman, 
1982; Lloyd, Mann & Peers, 1998). More recently, though, evidence has suggested 
that children as young as two years of age do show some evidence of tailoring their 
communication towards the perspectives of others and interpreting others in this way 
(O’Neill & Topolovec, 2001). What is clear, though, is that children are far from 
achieving fully accurate performance: Dumontheil et al. (2009) show children up to 
the age of 9 making errors on 70% of trials requiring them to take into account the 
perspective of another. When task demands are reduced by using a very small set of 
objects there is some evidence of improved performance, but children are still far 
from perfect (Nadig & Sedivy, 2002). A correlational study has shown this kind of 
ToM is also related to executive functioning (Nilsen & Graham, 2009). In particular, 
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as with belief reasoning, referential communication was related to inhibition (and in 
particular conflict inhibition) over and above working memory. 
 
For our current study our test of referential communication was a computerised 
version of the task originally used by Keysar et al. (2003) and adapted by Dumontheil 
et al. (2010) and Apperly et al. (2010). In this task participants have to respond to the 
instructions of a director in a way that takes into account that the director cannot see 
all of an array. All studies using this paradigm have shown both children and adults to 
suffer egocentric interference from their own perspective, with the result that items 
only visible to the participant were often considered possible referents. 
 
5.1.3 Level-1 Visual Perspective-taking 
Level-1 visual perspective-taking (VPT) is defined by Flavell and colleagues to be the 
ability to non-egocentrically interpret whether or not someone else can see a given 
object (Flavell et al., 1981). It differs from Level-2 perspective-taking in not requiring 
the ability to represent how someone sees a given object/objects. Level-1 VPT tasks 
contain all the basic requirements of ToM: the requirement to assume the viewpoint 
of another, the ability to put one’s own perspective to one side and the ability to 
respond in a way that reflects this. There is good reason, however, to think that Level-
1 perspective-taking may not be so demanding of executive resources. Children pass 
these tasks around 2-years of age (Moll & Tomasello, 2006), a full two years before 
most explicit measures find evidence of ToM abilities (Wellman et al., 2001), 
including well-matched Level-2 VPT tasks (Masangkay et al., 1974).  
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For this study we adapted the task used by Samson et al. (2010; Qureshi, Samson & 
Apperly, 2010; Surtees & Apperly, in press, Chapter 2). In this paradigm, participants 
judge the perspective of another when it is either congruent or incongruent with their 
own.  
 
5.1.4 The current study 
We tested 5-7 year old children on a battery of executive function measures and a 
battery of ToM measures. In particular we tested children’s abilities in Belief-Desire 
reasoning, Referential Communication and Level-1 Visual Perspective-Taking, 
alongside measures of Inhibition, Task Switching and Working Memory. Each ToM 
measure provided a measure of egocentrism, whilst belief-desire reasoning also 
provided a measure of avoidance desire reasoning.  
 
If individual differences in ToM and the executive functions maintain a similar 
relationship as has been shown in young children, in our experiment, egocentrism 
should be related across the different ToM taks, and they should all be related to 
inhibition. In particular, those complex forms of inhibition most likely to recruit task 
switching and working memory as well as inhibition should be most strongly 
correlated with ToM. Also, one might predict our measure of belief-desire reasoning 
to correlate with working memory as has also been shown in young children in the 
past. However, were the relationship between executive functions and ToM to 
accurately mirror that found in younger children, we should expect memory to no 
longer predict egocentrism if inhibition were controlled for. 
 
 








Participants were fifty seven 5-7 year-olds from a school in Birmingham (average 
age: 6 years and 8 months, 32 female). These included 29 children from a year 1 class 
(second formal year of schooling) (M = 6;4 years, SD = 3.3 months) and 28 children 
from a year 2 class (third year of formal schooling) (M = 7;3 years, SD = 3.5 months). 
The participants came from a variety of ethnic backgrounds; however, the majority 
(74%) were white Caucasian.  Performance on the British Picture Vocabulary Scale 




Children were tested in two sessions by two experimenters. In the first session, 
participants completed a battery of Executive Functions (EF) tasks (Burns et al., 
submitted). On a following day participants completed a battery of ToM measures. 
 
The EF tasks were completed in a fixed order: Working Memory (a counting recall 
task based on Alloway, Gathercole, Willis & Adams, 2004; Burns et al., submitted), a 
task of Inhibition (complex) and Task Switching (Davidson et al., 2006), Inhibition 
(simple) and finally Memory span (Davidson et al., 2006).  
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The ToM tasks were also completed in a fixed order: Level-1 Visual Perspective-
Taking (Samson et al., 2010; Surtees & Apperly, in press, Chapter 2), Referential 
Communication (Dumontheil et al., 2009; Keysar et al., 2003) and finally Belief-
Desire reasoning (Apperly et al., in press). 
 
5.2.1.3 Materials and Procedure 
5.2.1.3.1 EF measures 
Executive function tasks were the same as those used in another study (Burns, Beck & 
Riggs, submitted). All of the EF measures were presented on a laptop computer using 
E-prime 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools, Inc.). In three of the tasks (Eyes, Pictures, 
Span) participants responded using two custom built button boxes, in Counting Recall 
responses were verbal. The button boxes were made of plastic and had a surface area 
of 12 x 14 cm and a depth of 3.5 cm at the back sloping to 2.5 cm at the front. A 
circular plastic button with a 2.5 cm diameter button was situated in the upper middle 
of the box. For every task children were given specific instructions and a set of 
practice trials with success criteria.  
 
Counting Recall. Counting Recall is a measure of Verbal Working Memory 
(Alloway et al., 2004). This task involved participants counting red circles in an array 
comprising these, and distracter blue squares. Children had to relay to the 
experimenter the number of circles they had seen on a series of such slides. For 
example, seeing a slide with 6 red circles, followed by one with 7, followed by one 
with 5, a correct answer would be 6, 7, and 5. Trials were presented in blocks of six. 
In the first block, children simply counted and remembered the number of red circles 
on a single slide. Subsequent blocks increased difficulty by requiring children to 
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remember the number of circles on a greater number of slides. Children progressed to 
subsequent blocks provided they responded correctly to four out of 6 trials. Scores for 
working memory are the total number of correct answers given by each child. The test 
retest reliability of counting recall is .74 among 5 to 8-year-olds (Alloway et al., 
2004). 
 
Pictures. The pictures task measures inhibition (Davidson et al., 2006; Burns 
et al., submitted). Children pressed response buttons on viewing picture stimuli on a 
screen. Pictures were of either a cartoon monkey, or a cartoon cat. Response buttons 
were labelled with the same cat and monkey pictures, with participants’ task being to 
press the “cat-button” if they saw the cat and the “monkey-button” if they saw the 
monkey. Importantly, the cat and the monkey can appear in either spatially 
compatible or spatially incompatible locations. This task, then, measures a Simon type 
effect (Lu & Proctor, 1995; Simon, 1981). We have considered this to measure 
“simple inhibition”, as it places only minimal demands on other executive functions. 
The task has been shown to not contain any element of Task switching (Davidson et 
al., 2006): spatially compatible and incompatible responses seem to be integrated into 
one rule. As response buttons are labelled this task is thought to contain relatively 
little in the way of working memory demands. Children completed 20 trials, equally 
split between spatially-compatible and spatially-incompatible trials.  
A measure of Inhibition (simple) was calculated by subtracting the Processing 
Cost (Mean Response Time/ Proportion Correct) on Spatially Congruent trials from 
the Processing Cost on Spatially Incongruent trials. 
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Eyes Task. The Eyes task used (Burns et al., submitted) was an adaptation of 
the arrows task used by Davidson et al. (2006). On different trials, this task is thought 
to tax inhibitory demands and also demands on task switching. Children saw stimuli 
of schematic faces which either looked straight down, or at an angle of 45 degrees 
across the screen. Children were told to press the button the eyes were looking at. It is 
thought that in this task participants have to coordinate two arbitrary rules on viewing 
the schematic face sketches. Specifically when they see a head with eyes looking 
down they should press the button on the same side as the stimulus, yet when they see 
a head with eyes looking across they should press the button on the opposite side. It is 
possible to combine these rules into a single rule to “press the button the eyes are 
facing”, but interestingly, local switch costs on tasks such as these suggest that 
children do not do this (Burns et al., submitted). Children completed 20 trials of the 
eyes task evenly split between compatible and incompatible responses and between 
switch and non-switch trials. We have considered this task to measure “complex” 
inhibition as the task places demands on task switching and also greater demands on 
working memory (as response buttons are not labelled) than the pictures task.  
 
Two measures were taken from this task. Firstly, a measure of Inhibition (complex) 
was calculated by subtracting the Processing Cost on Spatially Congruent trials from 
the Processing Cost on Spatially Incongruent trials. Secondly a measure of Task 
Switching was calculated by subtracting the Processing Cost on Non-Switch trials 
from the Processing Cost on Switch trials. 
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Memory span task. In the memory span task used (Burns et al., submitted; 
Davidson et al., 2006) children must remember an assoication between a series of 
arbitrary picture stimuli and one of two response buttons (which were not labelled). 
Pictures appeared in the centre of the screen and children had to press the appropriate 
button. Initially participants had to associate merely two stimuli (a football and an 
umbrella). Participants completed a practice set at this phase and 20 experimental 
trials. Following this a further two pictures were added (a telephone and a hammer) 
and children practiced specifically with these two new pictures before completing 20 
experimental trials including all four pictures. Finally, two more pictures were added 
(a flower and some bananas), again followed by a practice set comprising only these 
stimuli. The last testing phase included 20 experimental trials using all six pictures. 
Children were not asked to respond quickly on this task, so the measure used is solely 
based on accuracy across the whole experiment. 
 
5.2.1.3.2 ToM measures 
Level-1 Visual Perspective-Taking. Children completed a Level-1 perspective-
taking task. The task, first developed by Samson et al. (2010), and adapted for 
children by Surtees and Apperly (in press, Chapter 2), required children to take the 
perspective of a cartoon avatar on a series of trials. We also included an equal number 
of filler trials in which participants judged their own perspective. On each trial, 
participants viewed successive fixation stimuli (a smiling face (600ms) and a fixation 
cross (600ms)) followed by a 1800ms auditory stimulus (either “He sees N” or “You 
see N”, where N ranged from 1 to 3, so that the number of circles was within the 
range that could be enumerated quickly and accurately via subitization, Trick and 
Pylyshyn, 1994), and then the test picture depicting an avatar in a room with 1-3 dots 
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on the wall (see Figure 5.1). Participants pressed one of two colored keys to indicate 
whether or not the auditory stimulus correctly described the picture (on half of the 
trials, the auditory stimulus did match the picture, and on half it did not). Importantly, 
stimuli were either Consistent (so the Self and Other perspectives match) or 
Inconsistent (so that Other sees more than Self). Children completed 48 test trials: 24 
where self and other perspectives were consistent (12 experimental, 12 filler) and 24 
where self and other perspectives were inconsistent (12 experimental, 12 filler). Our 
dependent variable on this task was a measure of Egocentrism; calculated by 




Figure 5.1. Example stimuli from the Visual Perspective-taking task. In a Consistent 
stimulus (left), participant and avatar share a perspective. In an Inconsistent stimulus 
(right), the participant views an additional circle. 
 
Referential Communication. A computer-based task (adapted from real life 
versions, Epley, Morewedge & Keysar, 2004; Keysar et al., 2003) first used with 
adults (Apperly et al., 2010) and adapted for children by Dumontheil et al. (2010) 
required children to respond to the instructions of a director placed behind a grid. The 
director gave instructions for the participant to click on certain items within the grid. 
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Importantly, certain items were in common ground (they could be seen by both the 
director and the participant), whilst others were in the privileged ground of the 
participant (the director could not see them as on those items the grid had a solid 
background). Critically, on some trials objects in the grid had a scalar relationship (for 
example there was a large ball, a medium sized ball and a small ball). Keysar et al. 
(2003) found adult participants to show a cost when ignoring a seemingly relevant 
referent that could not be being referred to as it was in privileged ground. For example 
in Figure 5.2 if instructed to “click on the large jar” they may click on the jar 
containing mushrooms even though it is in privileged ground, whilst if we take the 
perspective of director, the jar with the cherries is the correct response. Children have 
been shown to be able to successfully complete this task, but errors do decrease with 
age (Dumontheil et al., 2010). The measure taken from this task was the number of 
egocentric errors (clicking on a response linked to one’s own viewpoint) made in 
comparison to equivalent errors on control trials. On this task, errors were used rather 
than processing costs as participants were not instructed to make responses quickly, 
and because previous studies using this paradigm had found effects to be manifest 
primarily in errors (e.g., Dumontheil et al., 2010). 
 
 




Figure 5.2. Example Stimulus from the referential communication task. Clicking on 
the largest jar would constitute an “egocentric error” as this is not in the view of the 
director.  
 
Belief-Desire Reasoning. Participants completed a belief-desire reasoning task 
adapted from Apperly et al. (in press). In this task participants have to make 
judgements about where an avatar will look based on his beliefs and desires; he is 
opening boxes that may or may not contain food. Importantly his belief may be true or 
false (he does not always know where the food is) and his desire may be to approach 
the food (if he likes it) or avoid the food (if he hates it).  
 
Children completed 16 trials with equal numbers of True and False belief trials paired 
with Approach and Avoidance desires.  On each trial, first of all a voice stated the real 
location of the food; this was followed by the boy stating where he thought the food 
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was and whether he liked or hated it. Following this, children had to respond as to 
which box he would open.  
 
Apperly et al. (in press), had found that children and adults make more errors on trials 
where the protagonist’s belief was false and where their desire was to avoid the target. 
Thus we took two measures from this paradigm. A Belief-cost measure that was equal 
to the number of errors made on True Belief trials subtracted from the number of 
errors made on False Belief trials. A Desire-Cost measure was equal to the number of 
errors made on Approach-Desire trials subtracted from the number of errors on 
Avoidance-Desire trials. The advantage of using this composite variable, in 
comparison to the pure performance- as has been used in most developmental studies 
of ToM and executive functions, is that it controls for incidental performance in the 
task. The only difference between, for example, True-Belief Approach-Desire trials 
and False-Belief Approach-Desire trials is the need to interpret false beliefs. On this 
task, errors were used rather than processing costs. Error rates were high in this task, 
meaning for many participants some conditions yielded no correct responses from 
which to calculate response times. 
 
5.2.2 Results 
Results are divided into three sections. Firstly, we report descriptive data. Following 
this, we separately examine the profile of performance on the EF and ToM tasks, 
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Table 5.1. Descriptive data of all measures and control variables. 
 Mean (Standard Deviation)  








True - Approach 
True- Avoid 
False - Approach 
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5.2.2.1 Executive Function Measures 
Data from executive function measures are a subset of data also presented in another 
study (Burns et al., submitted). 
 
Pictures Task. Consistent with the reported literature, participants performed 
more accurately (t(56) = 10.26, p < .001) and more quickly (t(56) = 5.74, p < .001) on 
Congruent as compared to Incongruent trials. 
Eyes Task. As with the pictures task, Congruency had an effect on both the 
speed (t(56) = 2.09, p = .042, Congruent < Incongruent) and the Accuracy (t(56) = 
4.99, p < .001, Incongruent < Congruent) of responses. Additionally an effect of 
switching was found: Switch trials were performed more slowly (t(56) = 5.05, p < 
.001) and with less accuracy (t(56) = 4.74, p < .001) than Non-Switch trials. 
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5.2.2.2 ToM measures 
Level-1 Visual Perspective-Taking. A paired-samples t-test revealed an effect 
of Consistency on Accuracy (t(56) = 2.36, p = .022; Consistent > Inconsistent). This 
demonstrates the predicted effect of egocentrism. An equivalent t-test on Response 
Times revealed no significant effect of Consistency on Response Times (t(56) = .19, p 
= .85; Inconsistent > Consistent). Response Times did not demonstrate the effect of 
Consistency, as had been shown in a similar age group by Surtees and Apperly (in 
press; Chapter 2), but it remains likely that these data did reflect valid individual 
differences, and so they were combined with error data to give a single index of 
processing cost.  
 
Referential Communication. The critical error type on experimental trials of 
the referential communication task was for participants to select a referent that the 
director could not see, but which fit with his instruction (e.g., In Figure 5.2 the error 
would be to select the largest of the three jars in response to the instruction to “Click 
on the large jar....”). Control trials supplied the baseline for comparison with this 
failure of ToM-use, which was the rate at which participants selected an item that the 
director could not see from the same spatial position on the grid, when this item did 
not fit with his instruction. These two error types formed the basis for our analysis. 
Participants could also make errors by selecting items that did not fit with the 
director’s instructions from other spatial positions on the grid. This error rate is 
reported in Table 5.1 but these errors cannot be interpreted as a failure of perspective-
taking, and following Apperly et al., 2010) they were not analysed further. 
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In fact participants never made errors on the baseline control trials. This meant that 
parametric tests could not be used to compare the baseline with the error rate on 
experimental trials. A Wilcoxon test was carried out to investigate performance, and 
revealed that significantly more errors were made on experimental trials than control 
errors (z = 6.18, p < .001).  
 
Following Keysar et al. (2003), Apperly et al. (2010), Dumontheil et al. (2010) we 
found evidence of participants making errors of ToM use. Participants in the current 
study failed to take into account the perspective of the director on almost half of all 
trials where this could be shown to make a difference; participants never made 
equivalent errors on control trials, therefore these errors appear due to the perspective-
taking demands of the task, rather than more general performance demands. 
 
Belief Desire Reasoning. A 2x2 ANOVA on proportion of correct responses 
with Belief (True, False) and Desire (Approach, Avoid) as independent within-
subjects factors revealed a main effect of Belief (F(1, 56) = 25.74, p < .001, ηp2 = .32; 
True > False), a main effect of Desire F(1, 56) = 9.75, p = .003, ηp2 = .15; Approach > 
Avoid) and an interaction between Belief and Desire (F(1, 56) = 13.34, p = .001, ηp2 
= .19). Paired samples t-tests revealed that the effect of Desire was significant for 
True beliefs (t(56) = 4.92, p < .001; Approach > Avoid), but not for False Beliefs 
(t(56) = .910, p = .37). 
 
5.2.2.3 Individual Differences 
We first examined the correlations within the sets of ToM and Executive Function 
tasks. 
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5.2.2.3.1 Theory of Mind 
Table 5.2. Correlations between Theory of Mind measures (Partial correlations 















 1.00 (1.00) -.044 (-.059) .017 (.019) 
Belief Reasoning   1.00 (1.00) .125 (.183) 
Desire Reasoning    1.00 (1.00) 
 
There were no significant correlations between any of our measures obtained from the 
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5.2.2.3.2 Executive Functions 
Table 5.3. Correlations between Executive Functions (Partial correlations controlling 

































   1.00 (1.00) .215 
(.236+) 
Memory Span     1.00 
(1.00) 
+p < .1, *p < .05 
 
 When Age and BPVS were partialled out, the only significant correlation was 
between our measure of Memory span and Inhibition (low memory demand). There 
were also trends for a relationship between Memory Span and Working Memory, 
Memory Span and Inhibition (high memory demand) and between Inhibition (low 
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5.2.2.3.3 Theory of Mind and Executive Functions 
Table 5.4. Correlations between Executive Function and Theory of Mind (Partial 












.064(.093) .153 (.112) .091 (.140) 
Inhibition 
(Simple) 
-.146 (-.133) .082 (.040) .205 (.306*) -.144 (-.182) 
Task Switching .381** (.295*) -.163 (-.134) .044 (.109) -.243 (-.137) 
Working 
Memory 
-.151(-.04) .191 (.139) .122 (-.098) -.145 (-.256) 
Memory Span -.115. (.121) .124 (.106) -.225  
(-.357*) 
.075 (.072) 
*p < .05, **p < .01 
 
Exploratory correlations between our measures of Theory of Mind and Executive 
Function were carried out. There was a strong positive correlation between 
Egocentrism on the perspective-taking task and Inhibition (complex). Participants 
who suffered most egocentric interference were also those who had most trouble 
ignoring a pre-potent response, even when Age and Vocabulary ability were 
controlled for. There was also a strong positive correlation between Egocentrism on 
the perspective-taking task and Task Switching. Participants who suffered most 
egocentric interference were also those who had most trouble switching between 
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rules, even when Age and Vocabulary ability were controlled for. When effects of 
Age and Verbal ability were partialled out, Belief Cost correlated negatively with 
Memory Span and positively with Inhibition (simple): children with a greater memory 
span and a smaller inhibitory cost suffered a smaller cost of reasoning about false 
beliefs. Our measures of Desire Cost and Referential Egocentrism did not correlate 
with individual differences in executive functions.  
 
5.2.2.3.4 Regression Analyses 
In order to identify the specific contributions made by individual executive 
components when other components and our control variables were accounted for, a 
series of hierarchical linear multiple regressions were carried out. As our ToM 
variables were unrelated to one another, we did not combine them in any way. 
 
5.2.2.3.4.1 Visual Perspective-taking. Age and Vocabulary ability were 
entered in the first block. Neither Age (β = -.12, t = -.87, p = .39) nor Vocabulary (β = 
-.26, t = -1.87, p = .067) was a significant predictor of egocentrism. From previous 
findings in the area, and consistent with our partial correlations, we entered Inhibition 
(complex) in the second block of our regression, finding it to be a significant predictor 
(β = .36, t = 2.63, p = .012). Following this our other executive measures were 
entered: Task switching, Inhibition (simple), Memory span, Working Memory. Only 
Task Switching made a significant further contribution to the model. The final 
regression model significantly predicted Egocentric Interference (adjusted R² = .28, p 
<0.05). Inhibition (complex) (β = .45, t = 3.38, p = .002) and Task Switching (β = .42, 
t = 2.96, p = .005) significantly predicted unique variance in this model. Table 5.5 
illustrates the final model. 
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In a second regression, we reversed the order of entry; this time other measures of 
executive function were entered before Inhibition (complex), and at this stage, only 
Task Switching (β = .687, t = 2.106, p = .041) significantly predicted Egocentrism. 
When Inhibition (complex) was subsequently added, it made a significant further 
contribution to the model.  The final regression model significantly predicted 
Egocentric interference (adjusted R² = .28, p <0.05), with both Task Switching (β = 
.42, t = 2.96, p = .005) and Inhibition (complex) (β = .45, t = 3.38, p = .002) being 
significant predictors of Egocentrism (β = .47, t = 3.58, p = .001). Taken together with 
the results from the first regression analysis, this pattern suggests that both Inhibition 
(complex) and Task Switching make independent contributions to explaining variance 
in Egocentrism on the perspective-taking task. 
 
5.2.2.3.3.2 Belief Cost. As with visual perspective-taking, we completed 
two hierarchical multiple regressions to find predictors of belief cost. When entering 
our memory measures initially, memory span approached significance (β = -.24, t = -
.17, p = .10), but none of the variables remained significant predictors in the final 
model (see Table 5.5). When entering our inhibitory measures initially, the strongest 
predictor was Inhibition (Simple), but this did not reach significance (β = .21, t = 
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Table 5.5. Final Regression coefficients predicting Egocentrism in Visual 
Perspective-taking and Belief Cost. 
Variable Β T P 
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**p < .01 
 
In sum, regression analyses confirmed Inhibition (complex) and Task Switching to be 
strong predictors of Egocentrism in visual perspective-taking, even when a whole 
range of other factors were entered. For Belief Cost, the pattern was less clear. 
Inhibition (simple) and Memory span both came close to predicting ability to reason 
about false belief, but neither variable was significant in the analyses conducted.  
 
 




There is good evidence that individual differences in ToM and Executive Functions 
are linked in pre-school children (Carlson & Moses, 2001). Specifically, Inhibitory 
ability predicts ToM performance, over and above working memory or planning 
ability (Carlson et al., 2004); this is particularly pronounced when the measures of 
inhibition themselves tax heavily on memory (Moses, 2001). The current paper found 
meaningful individual differences in both Executive Function and ToM in older 
children and investigated links between these differences.  
 
Children completed three tasks measuring discrete, yet seemingly related, forms of 
ToM (Level-1 Perspective-taking, Referential Communication and Belief-Desire 
Reasoning) and four tasks designed to measure the executive functions: specifically 
measuring Inhibition (both simple and complex), task switching, working memory 
and memory span. Each of our ToM measures provided a measure of egocentrism. 
Our belief-desire reasoning task also allowed for measurement of the related effect 
experienced when reasoning about avoidance desires rather than approach desires. 
 
Partial correlations, controlling for Age and Verbal ability, demonstrated a 
relationship between egocentrism in our visual perspective-taking task and our 
measure of complex inhibition and our measure of task switching. Follow up 
hierarchical regressions showed both of these measures to be strong predictors of 
levels of egocentrism in visual perspective-taking even when the other measure was 
entered first into the model, suggesting that both measures made unique contributions 
to explaining performance on the perspective-taking task. For the belief-desire task, 
although exploratory correlations suggested a relationship between the cost of 
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reasoning about false beliefs and both memory span and simple inhibition, a linear 
regression found neither of these variables to be significant predictors of belief 
reasoning in the final regressions models. It cannot be said, therefore, that either 
reliably predicts variance in error rates when reasoning about false beliefs in this age 
group. Error rates when reasoning about avoidance desires and avoiding self 
perspective in a referential communication task did not show any link to executive 
abilities. 
 
5.3.1 Convergence amongst ToM Measures 
Traditional studies investigating the development of ToM have shown a strong degree 
of convergence between different measures. When researchers have used batteries of 
ToM measures to gain an overall measure of children’s ToM, a good degree of 
covariance was shared between ToM measures (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Hughes and 
Ensor, 2007). In the majority of cases, however, these measures, whilst using different 
methods, have assessed reasoning about very similar concepts. For example, studies 
commonly use both unexpected contents tasks (Hogrefe, Wimmer & Perner, 1986) 
and a change of location tasks (Wimmer and Perner, 1983), which have very different 
methods, but are both thought to assess reasoning about false beliefs. The present 
study both tests older children than used in these studies, and on a much broader range 
of abilities thought to be involved in ToM. Interestingly, whilst each of our tasks 
generated effects that could be viewed as indexing egocentrism, we found that these 
independent measures were not related. 
 
That Belief reasoning does not correlate with these other forms of perspective-taking, 
is perhaps not that surprising; explicit tests of these abilities suggests that explicit 
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belief reasoning does not develop at the same time as the other abilities we tested. 
Pre-schoolers show the ability to process the Level-1 perspectives of others (Moll & 
Tomasello, 2006) and respond in a way that is referentially sensitive ( O’Neill & 
Topolovec, 2001), but these children do not give correct responses in reasoning that 
requires thinking about the false beliefs of others until around the age of four 
(Wellman et al., 2001). One possibility, then, is that this more complex belief and 
desire reasoning requires different resources from simple Level-1 perspective taking, 
thus we should not expect that children who are good at one ability to be necessarily 
good at the other. That Level-1 perspective egocentrism and referential egocentrism 
do not correlate is perhaps more surprising, given that both required the same 
underlying concept of Level-1 perspective. However, as suggested above, as well as 
by Samson and Apperly (2010), variability in performance on referential 
communication tasks may be due to factors other than the need for perspective-taking 
per se, such as variation in the ability to assimilate a large array of objects, which may 
not be tapped by any of the measures of executive function used in the current study 
(or by our Level-1 perspective-taking task). 
 
5.3.2 Inhibition and the link to perspective-taking 
Many studies have shown a strong link between ToM and inhibition; in particular, 
those children who are the first to pass False Belief tasks are those children who 
perform better on tasks testing their inhibition (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Hughes & 
Ensor, 2007; Moses, 2001). Inhibitory abilities are also found to predict False Belief 
performance even when it is tested much earlier (Carlson et al., 2005). In particular, 
conflict inhibition seems to be related to ToM (Moses, 2001; Nilsen & Graham, 
2009). Also, patients with brain injury resulting in inhibitory problems have also been 
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shown to fail false belief tasks when their own perspective is salient (Samson et al., 
2005).  
 
In the current study, we found unique new evidence regarding the link between 
inhibition and perspective-taking. Firstly, this is the first study to relate executive 
functions to a Level-1 Perspective-taking task (Moll & Tomasello, 2006). Level-1 
perspective-taking has been demonstrated as a particularly early developing ability. 
Unlike many other ToM tasks, Level-1 perspective-taking tasks have been passed by 
children as young as 2-years of age, even when explicit responses are required. 
Secondly, we tested older children with considerably more inhibitory abilities than 
those previously tested. Finally by using a task involving perspective-congruency as 
well as perspective-incongruency we were able to test the central idea of egocentrism. 
We specifically measured our participants’ ability to ignore their own perspective- 
this is normally conflated with ToM in general. Whilst one component of most ToM 
tasks is to avoid one’s own perspective, ToM has many other components. 
Subtracting performance on trials in which perspectives are congruent from those in 
which they are incongruent leaves a measure that isolates the tendency for 
egocentrism more precisely than existing measures. Our inhibition task with higher 
memory demands correlated with egocentric interference suffered by children on a 
Level-1 perspective-taking task. Previous studies have suggested that the relationship 
between conflict inhibition and ToM is due to perspective-taking tasks requiring 
participants to inhibit a salient view of the world; either a view that is specifically 
attributed to self, or one that is merely representative of a “good” view, (Light & Nix, 
1983). Inhibiting such a salient view is thought necessary to take the viewpoint of 
another (Rakozcy, 2010). Our results show that inhibition links specifically to a 
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measure of egocentrism, not just ToM in general. This suggests that the relationship 
between inhibition and ToM is truly linked to resolving perspective incongruency, 
rather than creating a representation of a non-self perspective in general. In the current 
study, it was not the case that all measures of inhibition correlated with egocentrism, 
in fact, we found that egocentrism only correlated with our measure of inhibition on 
the eyes task. We suggest the key difference between this task and the pictures task to 
be in the level of other executive demands placed by each: in the eyes task children 
have to remember two abstract rules relating to the stimuli, and switch between them, 
in the pictures task they only need to remember one, and perhaps just as importantly, 
response buttons are labelled, so matching is all that is required. We suggest that this 
fits well with previous findings from younger children. Conflict inhibition has been 
found to relate much more strongly to ToM than delay inhibition and it has been 
suggested that what facilitates this relationship is memory (Moses, 2001).  
 
5.3.3 Relationship between task switching and Visual Perspective-taking 
That children’s ability to switch between abstract rules predicts their ability to ignore 
their own perspective suggests that one of the problems involved in avoiding 
egocentrism is in switching away from one’s own perspective. It is important to 
remember that in our visual perspective-taking task, participants are informed prior to 
each trial whose perspective they are taking. The predictive relationship suggests two 
possible explanations. Firstly, the relationship may be afforded by participants first 
taking their own perspective and then adjusting this to the perspective of the avatar. 
Such a hypothesis, which, in the past, has been suggested as a way in which 
perspective-taking might be achieved, is known as egocentric anchoring and 
adjustment (Epley et al., 2004). Alternatively, the relationship may be afforded by a 
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relatively incidental element of the task: although informed prior to the trial that they 
will be not taking their own perspective, previous “self” trials may still have a 
residual effect on processing. Whilst in some ways this alternative is less interesting, 
it is certainly the case that in every day perspective-taking we often have to rapidly 
switch between our own perspective and that of another, suggesting that these 
incidental demands may actually mirror everyday demands of perspective-taking. 
Determining which of these hypotheses is correct would be relatively simple in a 
further study in which participants completed self and other perspective-taking in 
separate blocks. Egocentric anchoring and adjustment would predict an equivalent 
relationship between egocentrism and task switching to the one observed here. In 
contrast, if the relationship is predicated on the demands of judging both Self and 
Other perspectives within a single block of trials, the effect should not remain when 
Self and Other trials occur in separate blocks. 
 
5.3.4 Predicting Reasoning about False Beliefs 
Our measure of belief-desire reasoning with executive functions showed tentative 
links to memory span and inhibition with low memory demands. It has commonly 
been observed in studies of younger children that ToM, and in particular belief-
reasoning, should correlate with measures of both memory and inhibition (Carlson & 
Moses, 2001; Carlson et al., 2002; Carlson et al., 2004; Hughes 1998a, 1998b; 
Hughes & Ensor, 2007; Moses, 2001; Perner & Lang, 1999). However, in the current 
study, neither of these variables remained significant predictors in final regression 
equations, so interpretation of the partial correlations must be tentative. The need for 
caution is compounded by children’s relatively poor overall performance on this task. 
Nonetheless, given the specific nature of the task presented, one suggestion would be 
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that memory span correlated with performance as this allows for holding in mind both 
the belief of the avatar and reality. Inhibition on the other hand, may be crucial in 
avoiding a reality bias at response. It would be important for future work to test these 
hypotheses in a sample of older children who could produce reliable response time 
data as well as the error rates analysed in the current study. 
 
5.3.5 Why is Referential Communication not linked to any executive abilities? 
In our task we found referential egocentrism to show no relation to any executive 
ability. This was surprising as Nilsen and Graham (2009) had shown links to both 
working memory and inhibition in a conceptually similar task at a similar age group. 
We suggest that we may not have found these relationships due to our task using a 
much larger array (with more possible referents). Whilst performance of children in 
our task was similar to that shown in a similar age group previously (Dumontheil et 
al., 2009), it was much poorer than that shown by Nilsen and Graham (2009). We 
suggest, then, that performance in our task may have made demands on very general 
non-executive processing abilities rather than specific executive functions. Such 
general processing demands, and in particular the ability to interpret a large array of 
objects, are suggested by Samson and Apperly (2010) to potentially explain why tests 
of referential communication are effortful, in spite of seeming to only require Level-1 
perspective-taking. 
 
5.3.6 Performance and Individual Differences  
In the current study, we showed that individual differences in different measures of 
ToM did not correlate with one another. When relating ToM to the Executive 
Functions, there were also several cases in which relationships found in younger 
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children in previous studies were not replicated in their older counterparts in the 
current study. It is certainly possible that our current study is limited by the relatively 
poor performance that was observed on some of our ToM tasks. Given that ToM 
abilities are likely to continue to improve through mid to late childhood it would be 
valuable for a future study to employ similar tasks with a wider range of ages and a 
wider range of successful performance. Nonetheless a further point on the nature of 
individual differences is also worthy of consideration. Individual differences inform 
us about the limiting factors on an aspect of performance on a given task at a given 
age. To make this clear: just because individual differences in our measures of 
inhibition did not correlate with individual differences in our measure of belief 
reasoning, this does not mean that inhibition is not required when ignoring one’s own 
conflicting belief, even in the age group of children studied here. Rather what it 
means is that inhibitory control, as measured by our tasks, does not dictate whether a 
child at this age will be particularly good at the task. Of course, the same principle 
applies to findings in early childhood, in that the relative emphasis on inhibition in 
comparison with working memory or switching (Carlson & Moses, 2001) means that 
inhibition is a critical limiting factor in this age group; it does not mean that memory 
or switching are not involved in performing ToM tasks in these younger children. 
With this in mind, the lack of common variance between ToM measures in our 
sample of 6-7 year-olds suggests that even though some aspects of ToM may be 
domain specific, fluency of performance in this age group may depend on a variety of 
non-overlapping executive factors. Thus, although it seems highly likely that all 
aspects of ToM have common conceptual foundations, this really does not necessitate 
that individual differences in ToM performance at a given age will be based on an 
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individual’s conceptual capacity. Different specific or general abilities may provide 
limits to performance on seemingly similar tasks. 
 
5.3.7 Conclusions 
Studying Executive Functions and ToM has been a fruitful area of research for the 
past 15 years, mostly focussing on the performance of pre-school children. These 
studies have been informative of the cognitive correlates of young children’s 
emerging explicit understanding of the minds of others. What is less clear is what 
supports changes in performance once this conceptual apparatus is in place. New 
paradigms have demonstrated measurable individual differences in ToM well beyond 
the age of four years (Apperly et al., in press; Dumontheil et al., 2009; Surtees & 
Apperly, in press, Chapter 2). The current study found both inhibition and task 
switching to relate to children’s ability to ignore their own perspective in a Level-1 
perspective-taking task. No other executive measures significantly predicted ToM 
performance. Further information on how these two complex cognitive domains 
interact in older children and adults may provide the key to understanding what 
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5.4 Summary and links to Chapter 6 
Experiments 1-4 have investigated different aspects of perspective-taking. I have 
examined how cognitive processes for perspective-taking vary with age (Chapters 2 
and 3), how different kinds of information are represented as perspectives (Chapters 3 
and 4) and what executive abilities predict success at perspective-taking tasks in 
children (Chapter 5). What the preceding five chapters have not investigated is what 
generates a perspective. When we consider what someone else sees, it is clear that this 
requires a relationship between the individual and the object predicated on our belief 
that the individual has eyes, and potentially a mind, able to “see” things at all. 
Research in perspective-taking has not only focussed on psychological perspective-
taking, but has also considered spatial perspectives: the relationship between an 
individual and an object in space; for example a ball being to the right of a man. Such 
perspectives are remarkably similar in character to judgements using spatial frames of 
reference, which involve using either our own position or the position of an object to 
define where two objects are in relation to one another. In Chapter 6 I investigate 
spatial frames of reference in situations where objects are related to people and to 
other objects.  
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Two experiments tested 6-11 year old children’s and adults’ use of different frames of 
reference when making judgements about social and non-social scenes. In Experiment 
5A, both children and adults (N = 144) showed spontaneous sensitivity to the intrinsic 
and the relative frame of reference when making decisions about the appropriateness 
of written statements. This was the case when judging both social and non-social 
scenes. All groups older than the age of 7 showed a stronger effect of the intrinsic 
frame of reference for social stimuli. This is the first evidence of sensitivity to more 
than one frame of reference in single judgements made by children. In Experiment 
5B, we again tested children aged 6-11 and adults (N = 185). Manipulating task 
demands caused participants to lose sensitivity to the, self-based, relative frame of 
reference. This effect of “losing yourself in space” was caused by presenting 
participants repeatedly with stimuli using the same referent. Interestingly, children 
only showed this effect when the stimuli were social, suggesting that spontaneous use 
of intrinsic frames of spatial reference may develop out of sensitivity to the 
perspectives of agents. 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Many years of research into social perspective-taking, spatial perspective-taking and 
spatial frames of reference have provided evidence of the cognitive processing of the 
relationships between entities in our environment. Perspective-taking judgements and 
frame of reference judgements seem to require similar resources, such as inhibition, 
which is used in selecting between spatial frames of reference (Carlson-Radvansky & 
Jiang, 1999), used in perspective-taking/selection (Qureshi, Apperly & Samson, 2010) 
and also in the development of Theory of Mind (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Hughes, 
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1998; Hughes & Ensor, 2007). In spite of such similarities, there has been little 
research that actually compares perspective-taking and frame of reference use and 
how these abilities might interact. Also surprising has been the difference in attention 
paid to each literature by developmental psychologists: social perspective-taking 
research has been dominated by developmental findings on how children progress 
towards maturity, whilst many spatial tasks have never been attempted with young 
children. The current studies bring these rather separate strands of literature together 
to examine processing of spatial frames of reference for social agents and non-social 
objects in children and in adults. 
 
6.1.1 Frames of Reference 
Knowing and being able to communicate the relative locations of objects has clear 
adaptive advantages, for example when caching food, or avoiding competitors 
(Newcombe & Hunterlocher, 1992). In order for us to understand a speaker’s 
intention when referring to the relative positions of people and objects, one must take 
into account a given frame of reference (Levinson, 1996). That is to say, to 
understand the meaning of a linguistic utterance in light of our perceptual cues, we 
must map them onto an internal representation of space (Carlson-Radvansky & Irwin, 
1993). It is considered that there are 3 distinct ways in which we can define such 
spatial relations (Levinson, 1996; 2003). The absolute frame of reference denotes 
references related to some (usually invariable) element of the environment (for 
instance North-South relations). The relative frame of reference locates the position of 
objects relative to the viewer. The intrinsic frame of reference locates the position of 
objects with reference to the plane of one of the objects in the scene (the referent 
object). These frames of reference may be either consistent or inconsistent with each 
Chapter 6 Losing yourself in space 
163 
 
other. We illustrate this point with the relative and intrinsic frames of reference, 
because of their importance to the current work. In Figure 6.1 (Panel B), if we 
consider only the intrinsic frame of reference, the ball is in front of the boy, in virtue 
of being on a line extended from his front. If we consider only the relative frame of 
reference, the ball is now behind the boy, this time in virtue of being further from us 
than the boy is. Alternatively, they can be consistent with one another, as in Figure 
6.1 (panel D). This time it should be clear that using either reference frame, the ball is 
in front of the boy 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Stimuli for Social condition, illustrating frame of reference manipulation 
(columns indicate relation of ball to boy with regard to the intrinsic frame of reference 
and rows with regard to the relative frame of reference). Varying the rotation of the 
referent object manipulates the intrinsic frame of reference without altering the 
relative frame of reference. Varying the order of the referent and the target objects on 
the z-axis manipulates the relative frame of reference without altering the intrinsic 
frame of reference.  
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Adults spontaneously activate multiple frames of reference when making judgements 
about the positions of objects in relation to each other (Carlson & Van Deman, 2008; 
Carlson-Radvansky & Irwin, 1993; Carlson-Radvansky & Jiang, 1998). Carlson-
Radvansky and Irwin (1993) showed that when asked to rate the appropriateness of 
written statements adult participants showed sensitivity to both the intrinsic and the 
relative frames of reference. In their task, participants rated the acceptability of spatial 
relations between objects using the referent “above” and showed a strong preference 
for the relative reference frame (which also coincided with the absolute reference 
frame in this task). Nonetheless, when effects of the relative frame of reference were 
controlled for, adults also showed a preference for statements appropriate for the 
intrinsic frame of reference over those that were inappropriate on this dimension. This 
implies not only that both frames of reference provide acceptable criteria on which 
simple spatial relations such as ‘above’ can be judged, but also that adults are 
spontaneously sensitive to both of these frames of reference in the very same stimuli. 
It remains unknown whether children spontaneously activate multiple reference 
frames in similar circumstances. 
 
6.1.2 Children’s use of frames of reference 
Work on children’s frame of reference use and understanding has followed a different 
path from that with adults, focussing either on children’s use of landmarks 
(Huttenlocher & Presson, 1984; Rieser, 1979), the use of spatial terms such as front 
and back (Bialystok & Codd, 1987; Cox, 1981; Harris & Strommen, 1973) or their 
ability to use information where only one frame of reference is relevant (Nardini, 
Burgess, Breckonridge & Atkinson, 2006). To our knowledge, there are no published 
data on whether children are spontaneously sensitive to multiple frames of reference 
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when they make single judgements. This is an important gap in the literature, for two 
reasons. Firstly, in order to interpret the spatial language of mature users, children 
must learn to be able to flexibly consider more than one alternative spatial frame of 
reference. Secondly, flexibly moving between a relative and an intrinsic frame is 
analogous to flexibly moving between one’s own and another’s perspective. This 
flexible perspective taking is important in keeping an up to date view in order to 
communicate relevant information to another (Sperber & Wilson, 1986). 
 
Piaget and Inhelder (1956) portrayed children’s spatial understanding as being 
egocentric, with children being unable to generate projective spatial relations. In other 
words, they felt that children were unable to understand relations that were 
independent of their own position in the world. More recently, however, there has 
been strong evidence that this is not the case, with infants showing sensitivity to the 
intrinsic as well as relative (egocentric) frame of reference (Bremner, Bryant & 
Mareschal, 2006; Bremner, Bryant, Mareschal & Volein, 2007) and young children 
also using information from different reference frames where relevant (Nardini et al., 
2006). Investigation of children’s drawing also works against the idea of self 
perspective holding primacy, with children beginning by using object-centred 
information, before transferring to using more viewer-centred cues (Taguchi, 2004).  
Whilst infants seem to be sensitive to multiple frames of reference, it seems likely that 
explicit use and cultural specificity are conveyed through language (Levinson, 1996). 
Relevant to this, it is thought that Western children are taught intrinsic frames of 
reference first, but do not master this until the age of four (Johnston & Slobin, 1979). 
Such findings suggest either that children are more flexible than traditionally thought 
or that they are dominated by a “good view” as opposed to their “own view” (Light & 
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Nix, 1981). Light and Nix’s distinction concerns whether children have a specific 
problem with ignoring their own spatial location (suggesting that children’s default 
should always be the relative frame of reference), or a more general problem with 
flexibly selecting perspectives other than the one “good view” that strikes them as 
most immediately salient (suggesting that children’s default perspective should vary 
as a function of the task). Observing the development of use of different reference 
frames may inform us as to which of these is more likely.  
 
Although no study has addressed whether children spontaneously use more than one 
frame of reference when interpreting linguistic cues, a number of studies have 
investigated children’s preferences in single judgements. Harris and Strommen (1973) 
found children to ignore their own position in the world when making spatial 
arrangements. When asked to place an object “in front” of another object, children 
consistently used the intrinsic frame of reference to guide their judgements. Harris 
and Strommen (1973) present this as evidence that children initially fixate on rigid 
single uses of such terms. This idea of a conceptual “good view” was challenged by 
results from a similar study (Cox, 1981). Cox (1981) found children consistently used 
the intrinsic frame of reference for judgements where possible and used the relative 
frame of reference if it was not. Bialystok and Codd (1987) tested participants from 3-
years old to adulthood in a task that involved placing an item in front or on top of 
objects. Bialystok and Codd (1987) found a bias at all ages for using the object’s 
intrinsic frame of reference when asked to place objects “in front” and using the 
relative frame of reference when asked to place objects “on top”. There were no clear 
signs of developmental change in the bias. 
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Importantly, these findings suggest that children are not rigidly stuck to one reference 
frame for consistent use of a term such as “in front”. At least when considered as a 
group, children from the age of 4 years show the ability to use both the relative and 
intrinsic frames of reference. Also, it is clear that the intrinsic frame of reference takes 
precedence when children are forced to make a choice as to where is “in front”. What 
existing evidence does not show is whether children, like adults, consider more than 
one reference frame when making judgements. 
 
In the present study we adapted a method used with adults by Carlson-Radvansky and 
Irwin (1993) in order to ask both children and adults to make judgements of the 
acceptability of statements at describing pictures. This provides the first test of 
whether children spontaneously consider multiple frames of reference when judging a 
single set of stimuli. 
 
6.1.3 Social Aspects of Frame of Reference Judgements 
One reason to be interested in spatial judgements in general and in the intrinsic frame 
of reference in particular is the potential social significance of these judgements. The 
literature on frames of reference has tended to focus purely on arbitrary objects, 
without considering that for some objects (such as agents) the intrinsic frame of 
reference may be far more salient than for other objects (such as non-agents), because 
it coincides with an agent’s perspective. In particular, there has been no concerted 
effort to look at the specific case of people as fronted objects, by asking whether it is 
the same to say that “it is in front of him”, as it is to say “it is in front of that”? 
Interestingly, a rather separate body of research on spatial perspective-taking (SPT) 
has suggested that when we have to explicitly judge where an object is in relation to 
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another person, we do so by actively projecting ourselves (and rotating) into their 
position (Kessler & Thomson, 2010; Kozhevnikov, Motes, Rasch & Blajenkova, 
2006; Michelon & Zacks, 2006). Similarly, research on social perspective-taking has 
tended to suggest this to be a cognitively effortful process. Children and adults show 
egocentric biases in their judgments about the perspectives and mental states of others 
(Birch & Bloom, 2004; Epley, Morewedge & Keysar, 2004; Nickerson, 1999), and it 
has been suggested that this is because they originally take their own perspective and 
then effortfully change to a different point of view, a process termed “egocentric 
anchoring and adjustment” (Epley & Gilovich, 2001; Epley, Morewedge & Keysar,  
2004). Such evidence suggests that explicit spatial or social perspective-taking is a 
relatively demanding process, raising questions about whether it is plausible that this 
is what listeners are doing online when they take account of the frames of reference of 
objects.  
 
However, not all perspective-taking has been found to be so effortful. Tversky and 
Hard (2009) demonstrated that many participants would spontaneously represent a 
scene from the spatial perspective of another person when merely asked to describe a 
scene. For example, when participants viewed a scene with a man facing them with a 
book on the right hand side of the scene, they regularly described the position of a 
book as being “to his left” when instructed to merely describe the position of the 
book. Such behaviour was enhanced by the social engagement of the person in the 
scene with the object, suggesting that such preference for the (social) intrinsic frame 
of reference of a person serves a social function. In another demonstration of adults’ 
sensitivity to the perspectives of others Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews and 
Bodley-Scott (2010) found evidence that adults automatically took the visual 
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perspectives of others as well as their own. Such evidence suggests that adults may 
sometimes process the spatial and visual perspective of agents even when they are not 
asked to do so, and in the case of Samson et al. (2010), that they do so quickly enough 
that it disrupts judgements about their own perspective.  
 
Given this rather mixed evidence on the cognitive demands of perspective-taking in 
adults, we were interested to investigate whether the nature of a referent object – 
whether it was an agent or a fronted object – would alter participants’ spontaneous 
processing of spatial frames of reference. 
 
6.1.4 The Current Studies 
We tested children and adults on a linguistic frame of reference task in which they 
had to interpret the appropriateness of statements describing the position of two 
objects in relation to one another. We used front-back relations to allow us to test 
relatively young children and to provide the strongest association between the 
perspective of the social cues and the intrinsic frame of reference. The study extends 
current knowledge in being the first to systematically examine whether people are in 
any way special as fronted objects when participants interpret verbal descriptions of a 
scene. As such it provides a direct test of the influence of perspectives on frame of 
reference judgments. Also, by testing children aged 6-11 and adults, it provides a 
unique insight into how judgements about frames of reference develop over time. 
 
Following the existing literature we predicted that adults would show independent 
effects of the relative and intrinsic frames of reference when making judgements 
about the very same stimuli. This is consistent with their spontaneously activating 
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both frames of reference. Predictions for children were less clear. If children were 
dominated by their own position in the world, then we should expect only the relative 
frame of reference to affect their decisions. On the other hand, if children are 
influenced by whatever constitutes a “good view” for a given type of judgement, and 
if the intrinsic frame of reference is a “good view” for our stimuli, then children may 
only show an effect of the intrinsic frame of reference. Finally, existing evidence that 
children may use different frames of reference with varying probability on distinct 
decisions (Bialystok & Codd, 1987; Cox, 1981) suggest that both frames of reference 
are available in principle to children, and may in fact simultaneously influence 
decisions on our task. 
 
6.2 EXPERIMENT 5A 
 
6.2.1 Method 
We showed children and adults pictures of two objects (like those in Figure 6.1) 
placed close to one another. The pictures were paired with a written sentence 
indicating that the ball was… “…in front of…” or “… behind the…” other object. 
Participants had to judge how well the sentence described the picture. By using 
different arrangements of the ball and the referent object we were able to investigate 
the importance of different frames of reference on decision-making. Figure 6.1 shows 
how the intrinsic and relative reference frames can be separately manipulated. For 
example, if participants rated “the ball is in front of the boy” to be a good description 
of panel C (in comparison to making the same decision about panel B), then this 
would suggest they were using the relative frame of reference to help guide 
judgements.  




Child participants attended a school in a lower to middle class, predominantly white-
British, area of Wolverhampton (UK). Three age groups were tested: 6-7 year olds (N 
= 30, mean age = 7.17, 14 female), 8-9 year-olds (N = 45, mean age = 9.08, 24 
female) and 10-11 year-olds (N = 31, mean age = 11.02, 14 female). Age groups are 
referred to as 7-, 9- and 11-year-olds herein. Four-five year-olds (N = 26, mean age = 
5.01 years, 14 female) were also tested as part of a pilot study, but did not produce 
ratings of acceptability consistent with the use of either frame of reference. 
 
Adult participant were undergraduates and postgraduates from the University of 
Birmingham who participated in exchange for course credits (N = 42, mean age = 
20.93, 35 female). All were native English speakers. 
 
6.2.1.2 Stimuli  
Photographs of sixteen arrangements of two objects were taken using a digital 
camera. Photographs contained a spherical orange ball and another object (a model 
chair, a doll or a cup). A doll and a model chair were used as opposed to real objects 
to allow for creation of a room with no other distinguishing features. The chair 
provided an example of a Non-Social object with a clear front. 
 
Figure 6.1, shows four picture stimuli from the “Social” condition. Four analogous 
pictures in which the boy was replaced by a model chair made up the “Non-Social” 
condition. Stimuli showing the ball and the cup, and stimuli in which the ball was 
located relatively to the right or left of the other object were presented to check 
whether participants used the relative and intrinsic frame appropriately when the other 
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frame of reference was not suitable in decision making. These check stimuli were not 
used in the final data analysis. A full stimuli set is presented in Appendix 2 
 
A written sentence, either “the ball is in front of the X” or “the ball is behind the X”, 
where X is replaced by the relevant object name (cup, chair or boy) was displayed 
underneath the picture. Sentence picture pairs were designed so that for both Social 
and Non-Social stimuli whether the sentence was an appropriate description for the 




Adult participants completed the experiment in a testing cubicle and were shown an 
example slide of a picture and sentence. They were told that they were going to help 
an alien to learn about how to describe pictures. It was explained that the sentence 
under the picture was the attempt of the alien (present on the slide) to describe the 
picture and that their task was to rate how well the alien had done. The scale used to 
make judgements comprised five cartoon faces ranging from a very sad face to a very 
happy face (Figure 6.2). After being familiarised with the scale, it was checked that 
they understood which of the faces referred to good, poor and moderate performance. 
Participants sat in front of a lap-top computer displaying pictures and statements and 
gave responses under no time pressure. Adults completed 28 experimental trials and 4 
filler trials, recording their ratings on response sheets.  
 
The procedure for children was identical, except for the following changes. Children 
completed the experiment in a room adjacent to their usual classroom. They made 
Chapter 6 Losing yourself in space 
173 
 
their choices by pointing to one of the faces and this was recorded by the 
experimenter. Children completed 14 experimental trials, but no filler trials. These 
trials were not completed to avoid confusion and due to limited testing time. 
 
 
Figure 6.2. Event sequence as experienced by participants. At the start of the 
experiment, participants were introduced to the alien and told that he was trying to 
learn how to describe pictures. They then saw pictures paired with a sentence (as 
above). The sentence was read by the experimenter and then the participant was asked 
to rate how well the alien had done at describing the picture. 
 
6.2.2 Results 
6.2.2.1 Data Coding 
Recall that our main interest was in whether effects of both relative and intrinsic 
frames of reference would be observed across the range of ages tested here, in 
whether there were any differences between the processing of these reference frames 
for social versus non-social stimuli, and in whether such effects might themselves 
vary with age. We had no hypotheses about the interaction between frames of 
reference. Therefore, since our design was fully orthogonal, we examined relative and 
intrinsic frames of reference in separate analyses.   
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This approach meant that a participant’s rating of a given picture-sentence pair was 
analysed twice: once when the picture-sentence pair was coded in relation to the 
relative frame of reference; and once when the picture-sentence pair was coded in 
relation to the intrinsic frame of reference. For example, when the stimulus in the left 
panel of Figure 6.2 is evaluated from the intrinsic frame of reference of the boy, the 
sentence appropriately describes the relationship between the boy and the ball in the 
picture. Therefore, for analysis of the intrinsic frame of reference, this picture-
sentence stimulus would be coded as “Appropriate”. If participants are sensitive to 
this appropriateness then they should tend to rate the sentence more highly as a 
description of the picture, compared to picture-sentence pairs that are inappropriate 
when evaluated from the intrinsic frame of reference. Similarly, when the stimulus in 
the left panel of Figure 6.2 is evaluated from the relative frame of reference (i.e., the 
participant’s own point of view), the sentence inappropriately describes the 
relationship between the boy and the ball in the picture. Therefore, for analysis of the 
relative frame of reference, this same sentence-picture stimulus would be coded as 
“Inappropriate”. If participants are sensitive to this appropriateness then they should 
tend to rate the sentence lower as a description of the picture, compared to picture-
sentence pairs that are appropriate when evaluated from the intrinsic frame of 
reference. 
 
Data from adults and children were analysed separately due to the differences in 
methods and number of data points. To establish what the mature pattern of 
performance was on our task, we first analysed the data from adults. 
 
 




Intrinsic frame of reference. A 2x2 ANOVA with Intrinsic Reference Frame 
(Appropriate, Inappropriate) and Stimulus (Social, Non-Social) as within subjects 
factors revealed a significant effect of the Intrinsic Reference Frame (F(1, 42) = 
241.60, p < .001; ηp2 = .86, Appropriate > Inappropriate) and a significant interaction 
between the Intrinsic Reference Frame and Stimulus (F(1, 42) = 14.64, p < .001, ηp2 
= .26). There was no main effect of Stimulus (F(1, 42) = .41, p = .53). 
 
As can be seen from Figure 6.3, the interaction was explained by the effect of the 
Intrinsic Frame of Reference being present for both Social and Non-Social stimuli, 
but being greater when the stimulus was Social (t(42) = 15.88, p <.001) than when it 
was Non-Social (t(42) = 12.00, p < .001). 
 
Relative frame of reference. A 2x2 ANOVA with Relative Reference Frame 
(Appropriate, Inappropriate) and Stimulus (Social, Non-Social) as within subjects 
factors revealed a significant effect of the Relative Reference Frame (F(1, 42) = 
91.41, p < .001; ηp2 = .525, Appropriate > Inappropriate) and a significant interaction 
between the Relative Reference Frame and Stimulus (F(1, 42) = 30.10, p < .001, ηp2 
= .423). There was no main effect of Stimulus (F(1, 42) = .41, p = .53). 
 
As can be seen from Figure 6.3, the interaction was explained by the effect of the 
Relative Frame of Reference being present for both Social and Non-Social stimuli, 
but being greater when the stimulus was Non-Social (t(42) = 10.70, p < .01) than 
when it was Social (t(42) = 6.44, p <.01). This was the opposite pattern from that 
found with the intrinsic frame of reference. 




Intrinsic frame of reference. A 2x2x3 ANOVA with Intrinsic Reference Frame 
(Appropriate, Inappropriate) and Stimulus (Social, Non-Social) as within-subject 
factors and Age (7,9,11) as a between-subject factor revealed a main effect of the 
Intrinsic Reference Frame (F(1, 105) = 320.41, p < .001; ηp2 = .76, Appropriate > 
Inappropriate). There was a trend towards an effect of Stimulus (F(1, 105 = 3.06, p = 
.086, Non-social>Social) and a main effect of Age (F(2, 105) = 4.02, p = .021, ηp2 = 
.072; 7>9=11). There was a significant interaction between Age and Intrinsic 
Reference Frame (F(1, 106) = 30.61, p < .001; ηp2 = .37), but not between Intrinsic 
Reference Frame and Stimulus (F (1, 106) = 2.36, p = .13). The interaction between 
Intrinsic Reference Frame, Stimulus and Age (F(1, 107) = 5.13, p < .01; ηp2 = .091) 
was significant.  
 
To investigate the 3-way interaction, we conducted separate analyses for each age 
group. Three separate 2x2 ANOVAs with Intrinsic Reference Frame (Appropriate, 
Inappropriate) and Stimulus (Social, Non-Social) were carried out. Seven year olds 
did not show an interaction between Intrinsic Reference Frame and Stimulus (F(1, 30) 
= 2.197, p = .149), but this interaction was observed in 9-year olds (F(1, 45) = 5.59, p 
= .023, ηp2 = .11) and 11-year olds (F(1, 31) = 6.42, p = .017, ηp2 = .18). For both 9-
year olds and 11-year olds, the effect of the Intrinsic Reference Frame was significant 
for Social and Non-Social stimuli, and as for adults, this effect was greater when the 
stimulus was Social (9-year olds: t(45) = 12.87, p < .001; 11-year olds: t(31) = 14.92, 
p < .001) than when the stimulus was Non-Social (9-year olds: t(45) = 9.76, p < .001; 
11-year olds: t(31) = 8.25, p < .001). 
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Relative frame of reference. An 2x2x3 ANOVA with Relative Reference 
Frame (Appropriate, Inappropriate) and Stimulus (Social, Non-Social) as within 
subjects factors and Age (7, 9, 11) as a between-subjects factor revealed a main effect 
of the Relative Reference Frame (F(1, 106) = 38.09, p < .001; ηp2 = .270, Appropriate 
> Inappropriate). There was a trend towards an effect of Stimulus (F(1, 106) = 3.06, p 
= .086, Non-social>Social) and a main effect of Age (F(2, 106) = 4.02, p = .021, ηp2 
= .072. Scheffe corrected post-hoc comparisons indicated that 7-year olds (M = 3.48, 
SD = .54) gave significantly higher appropriateness ratings than 9-year olds (M = 3.14 
p = .035) and showed a trend towards higher ratings than 11 year-olds (M = 3.16, SD 
= .56, p = .072). The two older age groups did not significantly differ in their ratings 








Figure 6.3. Graphs showing performance of children and adults in Experiment 5A. 
Effect of each Frame of Reference is shown through differences between Appropriate 
and Inappropriate conditions. 
 
6.2.3 Discussion of Experiment 5A 
We identified evidence of spontaneous sensitivity to both the relative frame of 
reference and the intrinsic frame of reference. In children from the age of seven and in 
adults, both frames had a significant effect on judgements of the acceptability of 
statements, whether the referent object was a social or a non-social stimulus. Adults 
showed a greater effect of the intrinsic frame of reference for social stimuli compared 
with non-social stimuli, this was observed in older children (9- and 11-year olds), but 
was not significant in younger children. Conversely, adults showed an enhanced 
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effect of the relative frame of reference in Non-Social stimuli; this was not shown in 
children at any of the ages tested. 
 
By investigating these effects using mixed blocks of trials with both social and non-
social objects, we emulated the everyday need to make novel judgements about 
different objects in a flexible way. However, one potential consequence of such a 
design is that either one of our social or non-social stimuli may have particularly 
drawn our participants’ attention to a given reference frame (or strategy). For 
example, it is conceivable that the significant effects of the intrinsic frame of 
reference for non-social stimuli did not reflect typical, spontaneous appraisal of non-
social objects, but was, instead, a consequence of participants viewing these stimuli in 
the same block as social stimuli. For this reason, we conducted a second study in 
which participants viewed the stimuli in separate blocks, one only containing Social 
stimuli and the other only Non-Social. 
 
6.3 EXPERIMENT 5B 
 
6.3.1 Method 
Stimuli and procedure were identical to those used in Experiment 5A, except that 
social and non-social stimuli were presented in separate blocks. Half of participants 
completed the social block of trials first and the other half the non-social first. 
Preliminary analysis revealed that the order of blocks had no effect on the judgements 
made, (Fs < 1.43, ps > .23), and so the data were combined over this factor for further 
analysis. 
 




A new sample of children aged 6-11 who attended a school in a lower to middle class, 
predominantly white British area of Wolverhampton and of Birmingham students 
completed Experiment 5B. Children tested were from a different school to that used in 
Experiment 5A. Three age groups were tested (6-7-year-olds, N=51, mean age = 7.2, 
24 female; 8-9-year-olds, N = 43, mean age = 8.7, 21 female; 10-11 year-olds, N=47, 
26 female, mean age = 10.7). Adults were again undergraduate and postgraduate 
students from the University of Birmingham (N=44, Average age = 20.6, 36 female) 
 
6.3.2 Results 
Data were coded in the same way as for Experiment 5A. 
 
6.3.2.1 Adults 
Intrinsic frame of reference. A 2x2 ANOVA with Intrinsic Reference Frame 
(Appropriate, Inappropriate) and Stimulus (Social, Non-Social) as within-subjects 
factors revealed a significant effect of the Intrinsic Reference Frame (F(1, 43) = 
329.43, p < .001; ηp2 = .89; Appropriate > Inappropriate), and a significant effect of 
Stimulus (F(1, 42) = 5.98, p = .019, ηp2 = .13, Social>Non-social), but no interaction 
between the Intrinsic Reference Frame and Stimulus (F(1, 43) = 1.01, p = .32). 
  
Relative frame of reference. A 2x2 ANOVA with Relative Reference Frame 
(Appropriate, Inappropriate) and Stimulus (Social, Non-Social) as within-subjects 
factors revealed a significant effect of Stimulus (F(1, 42) = 5.98, p = .019, ηp2 = .13, 
Social>Non-social). There was no significant effect of the Relative Reference Frame 
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(F(1, 43) = .72, p = .40) and no interaction between the Relative Reference Frame and 
Stimulus (F(1, 42) = 1.01, p =.32). 
 
With the social and non-social stimuli presented in separate blocks, adults no longer 
showed an effect of the relative frame of reference. This was the case for both Social 
and Non-social stimuli. 
 
6.3.2.2 Children 
Intrinsic frame of reference. A 2x2x3 ANOVA with Intrinsic Frame of 
Reference (Appropriate, Inappropriate) and Stimulus (Social, Non-Social) as within 
subjects factors and Age (7, 9, 11) as a between subjects factor revealed a main effect 
of the Intrinsic Reference Frame (F(1, 141) = 211.80, p < .001; ηp2 = .61, Appropriate 
> Inappropriate). There was no significant effect of Stimulus (F(1, 141) = .85, p = 
.36), but there was an effect of Age (F(1, 141) = 10.20, p < .001, 7>9=11). There was 
a significant interaction between Age and Intrinsic Reference Frame (F(1, 184) = 
4.79, p = .01, ηp2= .065), but no other significant interactions (Fs(1, 141) < 1.24, ps > 
.29). 
 
All age groups independently showed the effect of the Intrinsic Reference Frame (7 
year olds: t(51) = 6.33, p < .001; 9-year-olds: t(43) = 8.26, p < .001; 11-year-olds: 
t(47) = 10.60, p < .001). The interaction between Age and the Intrinsic Reference 
Frame was the result of 7-year-olds showing a significantly smaller effect of the 
Intrinsic Reference Frame than 9-year olds (F(1, 94) = 4.38, p = .039, ηp2 = .045) and 
11-year olds (7 vs 11: F(1, 98) = 9.29, p = .003, ηp2 = .088). Nine and 11-year olds 
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showed statistically equivalent Intrinsic Reference Frame effects (F(1, 90) = .57, p = 
.45) 
 
Relative frame of reference. A 2x2x3 ANOVA with Relative Reference Frame 
(Appropriate, Inappropriate) and Stimulus (Social, Non-Social) as within subjects 
factors and Age (7, 9, 11) as a between subjects factor revealed a significant main 
effect of the Relative Reference Frame (F(1, 141) = 5.88, p = .017; ηp2 = .041, 
Appropriate > Inappropriate). There was no significant effect of Stimulus (F(1, 141) = 
.85, p = .36), but there was an effect of Age (F(1, 141) = 10.20, p < .001, 7>9=11). 
There was a significant interaction found between the Relative Reference Frame and 
Stimulus (F(1, 141) = 4.41, p = .037, ηp2= .031), but no other significant interactions  
(Fs(1, 141) < .41, ps > .67). 
 
The data were split by stimulus type to investigate the interaction between the 
Stimulus and the Relative Reference Frame. The Relative frame of reference had a 
significant effect on judgements involving Non-Social stimuli (t(141) = 3.35, p < 
.001), but not for judging those involving Social stimuli (t(141) = .68, p = .50). 
 
When participants viewed successive stimuli with the same objects, this altered the 
pattern of judgements compared with Experiment 5A. Children still showed effects of 
the Intrinsic frame of reference for both social and non-social objects. However, at all 
ages, children only showed a significant effect of the Relative frame when the 
stimulus was non-social.  




Figure 6.4. Graphs showing performance of children and adults in Experiment 5B. As 
with Experiment 5A differences between Appropriate and Inappropriate conditions 
show effects of each Frame of Reference. 
 
6.4 General Discussion 
Our results showed three main findings. Firstly, children as well as adults 
spontaneously use both intrinsic and relative frames of reference to make judgements 
about the very same stimuli within a single task. Secondly, context of presentation 
made a difference to participants’ sensitivity to the different reference frames: by 
putting stimuli into blocks we showed that it was possible to cause participants not to 
use the relative frame of reference in decision making. Finally we found differences in 
participants’ reasoning about stimuli with perspectives versus those purely involving 
objects. Fronted objects with a perspective caused judgements to be driven more 
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strongly by the intrinsic frame of reference in comparison with simple fronted objects, 
and this tendency increased with age.  
 
Experiment 5A showed that both children and adults spontaneously utilised both the 
intrinsic and relative reference frames when making judgments about the acceptability 
of verbal statements: when controlling for either reference frame, a significant effect 
of the other was identified. Importantly, this was the case independently for 4 separate 
age groups and for both social and non-social stimuli. However, there was 
developmental change in performance on social compared to non-social trials: 7-year 
olds performed as if they treated both stimulus types as equivalent, whereas for 9- and 
11-year olds, and for adults the effect of the intrinsic frame of reference was stronger 
for social stimuli than for non-social stimuli. In addition, adults also showed a 
stronger effect of the relative frame of reference for non-social stimuli than social 
stimuli.  
 
Experiment 5B investigated the effects on participants of blocking stimuli on the basis 
of the referent object around which judgements were being made. Even though the 
stimuli were otherwise identical to those in Experiment 5A, adults no longer showed 
any influence of the relative frame of reference in decision-making, whilst children 
only showed the effect of the relative frame of reference when the stimuli were non-
social. We characterise this as ‘losing yourself in space’ as participants’ judgements 
were no longer influenced by their own position, but instead only took account of the 
intrinsic frame of reference of the object/person about which they are judging.  
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6.4.1 Spontaneous multiple reference frame activation in children 
Previous evidence clearly suggests that children are able to use more than one frame 
of reference when making decisions (Bialystok & Codd, 1987; Cox, 1981; Harris & 
Strommen, 1972; Nardini et al., 2006). In particular, there seems to be converging 
evidence that children, like adults, will use the relative frame of reference more 
regularly for relations such as “above” (Bialstock & Codd, 1987) and they will more 
regularly use the intrinsic frame of reference for relationships such as “in front” 
(Bialystok & Codd, 1987; Cox, 1981; Harris & Strommen, 1972). All these studies 
have used designs with relatively few trials (usually one per condition) and have 
required children to make definitive judgements by placing an object in front/ behind/ 
near/ above another object. As such, then, they cannot make any claims as to whether 
children consider multiple frames of reference when making their decisions. Our 
experiments are the first to investigate this and in both studies we show evidence of 
children using the intrinsic and the relative frames of reference to make judgements 
about the very same stimuli. 
 
6.4.2 Losing Yourself in Space 
Our findings converge with the findings of Taylor et al. (2001), Bialystok and Codd 
(1987), and Cox (1981) in showing English speakers to generally favour the intrinsic 
frame of reference in making judgements about descriptions of in front and behind. 
Results from Experiment 5A were also similar to the results of Carlson-Radvansky 
and Irwin (1993), and Carlson-Radvansky and Jiang (1999) in showing that we 
spontaneously consider multiple frames of reference when making decisions about the 
acceptability of statements. However, our finding that participants lost sensitivity to 
the relative frame of reference when stimuli were presented in a series with a single 
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referent type seems to be without precedent. This seems to be a particularly important 
finding because it suggests that participants were no longer using their own position 
in the world to make these decisions. Inhibition is traditionally thought to be required 
in selecting frames of reference (Carlson-Radvansky & Jiang, 1999), so why is this 
more successful in Experiment 5B? We suggest two plausible alternatives for a 
mechanism involved in producing this pattern of results, both caused by repeated 
exposure of the same fronted object. Firstly, such repeated presentations may make 
inhibiting the relative frame of reference easier. Alternatively, immersing oneself in a 
repeated stimulus may stop the relative frame of reference (self perspective) from 
being activated at all. Although it may seem counterintuitive, such an alternative does 
have some correspondence with the phenomenon of out of body experiences (Blanke 
et al., 2005), and possibly in more everyday experiences of becoming immersed in the 
situations depicted in films or novels. 
 
6.4.3 His front/Its front/ My front 
Literature on spatial perspective-taking has suggested that making judgements about 
where an object lies in relation to a person is relatively effortful, relying on active self 
projection and rotation (Kessler & Thomson, 2010; Kozhevnikov & Hegarty, 2001; 
Michelon & Zacks, 2006). How then, is it that we appear to perform a similar task 
relatively easily when we make on-line uses of the intrinsic frame of reference? The 
answer may lie in social perspective-taking research which has shown examples of 
much more efficient perspective-taking, even suggesting that simple social 
perspective-taking may be performed relatively automatically (Samson et al., 2010; 
Tversky & Hard, 2009; though see Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Surtees, Butterfill & 
Apperly, submitted, Chapter 3; for possible evidence that these phenomena may be 
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limited to simple perspective-taking). It was on this basis that we predicted that 
manipulating whether a stimulus was inherently social may change how individuals 
judge the relationships between objects. The most striking evidence for differences in 
the processing of social and non-social stimuli was evident in Experiment 5B: 
Children lost their own self-perspective for social stimuli, but not for non-social 
stimuli. Experiment 5A displayed subtler distinctions between the two stimulus types, 
with children over the age of 9 and adults showing a stronger effect of the intrinsic 
frame of reference for social stimuli (and adults showing a stronger effect of the 
relative frame of reference for non-social stimuli). None of these results alter the fact 
that in all cases both children and adults seemed spontaneously to take account of the 
fronts and backs of both objects and people, but there seemed to be a greater 
sensitivity to his front than its front.  
 
This conclusion must be tentative for now because all judgements were made about 
single exemplars of a social and a non-social stimulus, meaning that we cannot 
guarantee that social stimuli as a group provide more salient fronts, as opposed to the 
front of the given ‘person’ in our scene. This concern would be addressed by further 
experimentation using a wider range of social and non-social stimuli. Despite this 
caution, we believe it is an interesting possibility that spontaneous sensitivity to the 
intrinsic frame of reference during spatial judgements about fronted objects may be a 
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Five empirical chapters have been informative to the discussion of roles for controlled 
and efficient processing of the perspectives of others. In this final chapter I will 
summarise the main findings to have come from the experiments detailed in the 
previous chapters, discuss how they relate to one another and to previous findings in 
the literature, before suggesting some limitations of the approach I have undertaken 
and how future investigation could help to address these limitations. 
 
7.1 Investigations of Controlled processing in ToM 
In Chapters 2-5 participants completed tasks in which they made explicit judgements 
about other people’s perspectives. In Chapters 2-4 this involved visual perspective-
taking. In Chapter 5, as well as visual perspective-taking, participants also completed 
a referential communication task and a task that required them to reason about 
another’s beliefs and desires. Measures from these tasks were then linked to measures 
of executive functioning. In all these cases perspective-taking can be thought to be 
controlled as participants made overt answers as to the perspectives of a target or 
predicted their behaviour on the basis of such perspectives. 
 
7.1.1 Visual Perspective-taking 
For both Level-1 and Level-2 perspective-taking I directly measured perspective-
taking ability in children from the age of 6-11 and adults. On some trials participants 
completed these tasks under circumstances when their perspective was consistent with 
that of the target avatar and on others their perspective was different. Children are 
able to take the Level-1 visual perspectives of others, even when it diverges from their 
own, by the age of two (Moll & Tomasello, 2005) and the Level-2 perspectives of 
others from the age of four (Flavell, Everret, Croft & Flavell, 1981; Flavell, Flavell, 
Chapter 7 General Discussion 
190 
 
Green, Wilcox 1981; Lempers, Flavell, & Flavell, 1977; Masangkay, McCluskey, 
McIntyre, Sims-Knight, Vaughn & Flavell 1974). These experiments were clearly, 
then, not designed to investigate whether children had the conceptual abilities to pass 
such tasks, but rather to chart the development of cognitive processes for perspective-
taking. On direct measures of perspective-taking, both Level-1 and Level-2, there was 
evidence of improvement with age. Older children and adults responded more quickly 
and more accurately than their younger counterparts. On all direct measures of 
perspective-taking children and adults suffered egocentric interference on their 
judgments. Reasoning about another’s perspective was more difficult if it differed 
from one’s own. This egocentrism was statistically equivalent across age groups.  
 
7.1.1.1 Improvements in explicit perspective-taking with age 
It is perhaps not surprising that the speed and accuracy of children’s judgements of 
the perspectives of others improve with age. Anyone who has ever had cause to speak 
to a 4-year old child will likely attest to the fact that their ability to keep up with 
everyday social situations is really not as adept as that of most adults. What is 
surprising, however, is the paucity of empirical evidence of this that actually exists. 
Whilst showing remarkably similar qualitative patterns to adults, the youngest 
children in the studies completed in Experiments 1 and 2 took twice as long to make 
their responses as adults, and still made a greater number of errors. One explanation 
of this may be that this is merely illustrating improvements in general performance. 
Whilst I did not test participants of different age groups on our non-social control 
tasks, it would surely be a prediction that these tasks would also show a 
developmental progression. This is not to say that such a conclusion would be any 
less interesting. Quantitative development even after concepts are undeniably in place, 
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as is identified in these experiments, can aid fluency, flexibility and capacity of 
processing which can surely underlie both quantitative and qualitative differences in 
everyday ToM. Other recent work has suggested that performance in tests of 
referential communication (Dumontheil, Apperly & Blakemore, 2009) and reasoning 
about beliefs and desires (Apperly, Warren, Andrews, Grant & Todd, in press) also 
develops beyond the age at which children can first pass these tasks. There is also 
emerging evidence of maturation of neural substrates responsible for ToM well 
beyond the age at which children first pass ToM tasks (Blakemore, 2008). There is, 
then, strong evidence that children’s abilities develop considerably after the age at 
which they pass standard false belief tasks. Such development may not, necessarily, 
allow them to pass new or more complicated tasks, but may be important in 
successfully negotiating complicated and rapidly developing social situations. 
 
7.1.1.2 Egocentrism 
 Egocentrism has long been linked to the errors made by young children who fail 
ToM (Birch & Bloom, 2007) and perspective-taking (Piaget & Inhelder, 1956) tasks. 
When children make errors, they do not do so at random, but rather, they answer in 
line with their own perspective on a given scene (Piaget & Inhelder, 1956; Wimmer & 
Perner, 1983). It is also the case that when adults make judgements without certain 
outcomes they show egocentric biases (Bernstein, Atance, Loftus, & Meltzoff, 2004; 
Birch & Bloom, 2007; Michell, Robinson, Isaacs & Nye, 1996; Nickerson, 1999; 
Royzman, Cassidy & Baron, 2003). As the methods of experiments with different age 
groups have differed so dramatically it is not clear if adults’ egocentric biases and 
children’s egocentric errors are related in any but the most superficial way.  
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Results from Experiments 1, 2 and 3 of this thesis suggest that egocentrism of the 
form shown by young children really is evident when older children and adults 
complete tasks similar to those failed by young children. Adults showed egocentric 
biases in their response times and error rates on tasks passed by 2-year olds (Level-1 
perspective-taking) and 4-year olds (Level-2 perspective-taking). The levels of 
egocentrism experienced by children from the age of 6 years to adulthood showed 
statistically equivalent effects. This suggests that the mechanism responsible for 
egocentric errors in unsuccessful perspective-takers is residual in successful 
perspective-takers and manifests itself as egocentric biases. That is not to say that all 
egocentrism shown in adults is necessarily linked to egocentrism in children, rather 
that at least part of it is.  
 
7.1.1.2.1 Routes to Egocentrism- Egocentric anchoring and adjustment 
One way of calculating the perspective of another is to use an appropriate heuristic to 
generate an initial candidate for what they see, think, desire or believe (Epley & 
Gilovich, 2002). Often a suitable initial candidate for this may be our own view, 
knowledge or beliefs (Epley, Keysar, Van Boven & Gilovich, 2004). Of course our 
own perspective is regularly different to that of others and we should be able to use 
our knowledge about the other person to improve our estimate; in fact this 
requirement is a crucial factor in the design of all ToM experiments. Egocentric 
anchoring and adjustment suggests that this is done through a series of mini 
adjustments until we create a plausible candidate perspective for other. Such a 
“plausible candidate” is often found closer to one’s own perspective than a truly 
normative response. Such insufficient adjustment is one explanation for the 
observation of egocentric biases.  
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Epley and colleagues (Epley et al., 2004) suggest that egocentric anchoring and 
adjustment may explain egocentrism in perspective-taking. In one example (Epley et 
al. 2004), participants heard a recorded message which could be interpreted either as 
sincere or sarcastic. Participants were influenced by their own knowledge of the 
sincerity of the person leaving the message in judging how likely the intended 
recipient would be to interpret the message as sincere or sarcastic. This suggests that 
participants’ own knowledge affects their judgements, causing them to provide non-
normative responses. Epley and colleagues showed that egocentrism increased with 
time pressure and when participants performed a nodding action (suggesting they 
were being influenced towards accepting an insufficient adjustment) and proposed 
this as evidence of adjustment.  
 
It is clear that such an anchoring and adjustment strategy, be it conscious or not, could 
explain the occurrence of egocentric biases, but does it do so in Experiments 1-3? 
Imagine in our perspective-taking tasks, participants first calculate their own 
perspective, be it 3 circles, or that the figure looks like a number 6. If a participant 
were to adopt this strategy, then anchoring and adjustment would predict inconsistent 
trials to be more difficult as these are the only trials in which participants have to 
make any adjustments at all. This is exactly what was found suggesting anchoring an 
adjustment is a plausible interpretation of the results. However, whilst consistent with 
our findings, there is no specific evidence showing that adjustments are used in our 
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7.1.1.2.2 Routes to Egocentrism- Interference 
Anchoring and Adjustment, whilst influential in social psychology and in explaining 
adults’ estimates, has not to my knowledge been used as an explanation of egocentric 
errors made by children in classic ToM tasks. Such errors are more frequently 
explained by the Curse of Knowledge (Birch & Bloom, 2003), or by Realist biases 
(Mitchell et al., 1996). Whilst these explanations are not particularly clear about the 
nature and time course of self and other perspective-taking, what is clear is that these 
explanations do not propose that self-perspective is used as the necessary starting 
point in calculating the perspective of another. These theories suggest that one’s own 
perspective is a hindrance on perspective-taking. There are clearly, at least, two ways 
in which avoiding one’s own perspective could be particularly difficult in taking that 
of another. Firstly, it could be hard to calculate and impute the perspective of another 
in the light of one’s own perspective. This way of thinking is most in line with the 
original Piagetian concept of egocentrism as a fixation which prohibits or interferes 
with further processing (Piaget & Inhelder, 1956). Another alternative is that self 
perspective is processed automatically and once we have calculated the perspective of 
another it is simply hard to ignore our own view when making a response. Such an 
interpretation seems most in line with a view of ToM and executive functions 
proposed by Leslie and colleagues (Leslie & Polizzi, 1998; Scholl & Leslie, 1999; 
See also Apperly, Back, Samson & France, 2008; for a case where this must definitely 
be the case as participants are explicitly told a target’s perspective). Both of these 
possible forms of interference would be in line with the findings of egocentrism in 
Experiments 1-3. It may be hard to generate the perspective of other as seeing a 9 
when faced with a 6, or difficult to respond that another sees a 9 in the light of the fact 
you currently see a 6 (or both).  
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7.1.1.2.3 Resolving which route(s) to egocentrism is responsible for the 
findings 
Experiments 1-3 clearly showed egocentrism as a central feature of older children and 
adults’ judgements of the perspectives of others. This is in itself interesting and 
informative about the nature of the demands placed on effortful perspective-taking. It 
seems that at least one reason why ToM can require controlled and effortful 
processing is in allowing for ignoring one’s own perspective (as confirmed by 
Qureshi, Samson & Apperly, 2010 who showed egocentrism to increase under dual 
task conditions). With regards to visual perspective-taking experiments of the kind 
detailed in this thesis, theories of egocentrism make similar predictions. This is 
largely because the key difference between the different interpretations rests on time 
course, as opposed to outcome. 
 
One obvious way to investigate the time course of processing of perspectives in 
general, and divergent perspectives in particular, is by use of Electroencephalography 
(EEG) and in particular measures of Event Related Potentials (ERPs). ERP 
investigations allow for the investigation of neural responses to different conditions 
and provide resolution accurate at the millisecond level. This allows for understanding 
how, and more importantly when, different conditions are differentiated, both 
cognitively and neurally. ERP measures have been used in a number of studies of 
ToM. Appropriate time-locking to a given stimulus is often difficult using traditional 
measures of ToM, and most studies using such methods have only found late slow 
wave components over the left frontal cortex in comparison to false photograph 
conditions (e.g., Liu, Meltzoff & Wellman, 2009; Sabbagh & Taylor, 2000). Such 
findings are limited in how informative they are about the cognitive and neural time 
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course of ToM. Paradigms such as those I have used in this thesis would be ideal for 
use in combination with ERPs because the stimuli are presented at a very specific 
time point. Therefore it can be determined that this is when perspective-taking 
commences.  
 
A recent study (McCleery, Surtees, Graham & Apperly, submitted) used the measure 
of Level-1 visual perspective-taking detailed in Experiment 1 to examine the time 
course of this kind of perspective-taking. This study showed the temporo-parietal 
cortex to calculate and represent the perspective of self versus other and, later, the 
right frontal cortex to resolve conflict between perspectives during response selection. 
From this, we suggested that the egocentric effects found in our Level-1 perspective-
taking tasks may be the result of having to inhibit a strongly held self-perspective in 
making a response for the perspective of other. There was no evidence that self 
perspective was used in calculating other perspective. Consistency of perspective was 
resolved by the right frontal cortex after the temporo-parietal cortex had indexed self 
and other perspectives.  
 
7.1.1.2.4 Links between egocentrism and executive functions 
Whilst one interesting question related to egocentrism is the functional time-course of 
the processing involved and what this says about potential processing strategies, 
another is what allows us to avoid being entirely egocentric. In Experiment 4, we 
investigated links between egocentrism on a number of tasks and the executive 
functions in middle childhood. We showed that complex inhibitory abilities and the 
ability to switch between tasks predicted an individual’s level of egocentrism in visual 
perspective-taking. Egocentrism in belief reasoning was related to working memory 
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and inhibition. These findings suggest that the executive functions do continue to play 
a role in theory of mind beyond the age at which children first pass theory of mind 
tasks. Whilst not inconsistent with purely conceptual accounts, such a finding is 
necessary for accounts of ToM  relating to executive performance (Leslie, German & 
Polizzi, 2005) and executive competence (Russell, 1996). 
 
7.2 Efficient Processing of Perspectives 
Throughout this thesis I have made the case for efficient mechanisms for ToM. I 
believe that success by infants on tasks that seem to require ToM dictates this 
(Kovacs, Teglas & Endress, 2010; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2006; Sodian, Theormer & 
Metz, 2007; Song & Baillargeon, 2008; Southgate, Senju & Csibra, 2006). I have also 
made the case for such early developing and efficient mechanisms being limited. To 
describe and explain these limits, thus becomes crucial in developing a full 
understanding of ToM. Such investigations should not only focus on infants, but also 
on bringing convergence from findings with older children, adults and non human 
animals. 
 
7.2.1 Efficient/Automatic Processing of Visual Perspectives 
In Chapter 1, I set three criteria for visual perspective-taking to be considered 
efficient/ automatic: perspective-taking should occur in spite of prior information that 
it is not the task; such perspective-taking should actively hinder performance and 
finally the same effects should not be found when stimuli are inherently non-social. In 
Chapter 2 we investigated whether children’s Level-1 perspective-taking satisfied 
these criteria. On half of trials, children aged 6-11 and adults took their own 
perspective on a given scene. Importantly, participants were cued that it was their own 
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perspective they were taking prior to the trial, and even what they might expect that 
perspective to be, thus satisfying our first criterion. The difference between 
Inconsistent and Consistent trials is evidence that taking the avatar’s perspective was 
hindering task performance, as there was a cost to inhibiting the avatar’s perspective 
when it did not match the participants’ own. Experiment 1B demonstrated that this 
effect was not replicated using non-social stimuli. Any interference caused by 
switching between tasks was not as great as caused by ignoring an alternative 
perspective. Whilst the findings from adults replicate the findings of Samson, 
Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews & Bodley-Scott (2010), using a different method, the 
findings for children as young as 6 are completely novel. Level-1 perspective-taking 
is somewhat automatic even in 6-year olds. These results suggest that the findings of 
Samson et al. (2010) cannot be explained by a highly practiced adult perspective-
taking mechanism. 
 
7.2.2 Level-1 vs. Level-2 Perspectives 
Chapters 3 and 4 sought to investigate whether Level-2 perspective-taking is in any 
way automatic. That is to say, if people automatically calculate whether others see a 
given object, do they also calculate how they see it? Experiment 2 suggests that they 
do not. Children showed no interference from the perspective content of an avatar in a 
scene. Adults, appeared to do so, but further investigation suggested they had 
automatised some incidental aspect of the task. Experiments 3A and 3B directly 
examined adults’ Level-1 and Level-2 perspective-taking with exactly the same 
stimuli. In this case, adults did seem to show some level of interference from the 
Level-2 perspective of the avatar. This interference was not, however, any greater 
than the interference from an arbitrary task of mentally rotating to a given position. It 
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seems clear, then, that Level-2 perspective-taking does not satisfy the criteria set out 
for an automatic process in Chapter-1.  In Chapters 3 and 4 I discussed the importance 
of this finding and proposed that the Level-1/Level-2 distinction may approximate to 
a signature limit on ToM. Evidence of limits on adults’ ability to efficiently take the 
visual perspectives of others seems to converge with the limits to precocious abilities 
shown by infants and non-human animals. Whilst absence of evidence of Level-2 
perspective-taking is not evidence of absence, this convergence of evidence does 
suggest that this may be a limit on efficient mechanisms for perspective-taking in 
general. 
 
7.3 Limits to and future work on the investigation of cognitive processes for 
Perspective-taking 
The direct investigation of the cognitive processes involved in ToM is relatively 
novel. It is clear, then, that I should acknowledge what this investigation of automatic 
and controlled processing in visual perspective-taking lacks and outline a course of 
future research that would address these areas.  
 
Throughout this thesis I have spoken about ToM as a broad and varied social 
cognitive apparatus, responsible for a broad range of processes aimed at addressing a 
wide variety of everyday problems. A large part of this thesis has been devoted to one 
specific problem that ToM is required to solve, specifically how we judge what others 
see when they see differently from ourselves. It should hopefully have been clear 
throughout this thesis that I do not take it as a given that all aspects of ToM will be 
achieved by the same processes, in fact I think this is highly unlikely. To understand 
how a process operates, the cognitive resources it demands and the limits within 
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which it operates, careful attention is needed to manipulate the demands of a given 
task, the participant groups involved and the control conditions used. It would have 
been desirable to investigate a variety of processes within ToM, but certainly not if 
what was lost was the depth of investigation into a given process. Investigating visual 
perspective-taking, rather than another aspect of ToM was dictated by the nature of 
the evidence currently available. In many ways visual perspective-taking is the area of 
ToM with the most clarity as to the success achieved by different participant groups. 
That this is the case is quite remarkable considering the lack of attention placed on 
visual perspective-taking in comparison to belief reasoning. That infants and non-
human animals can track some elements of the visual perspectives of others 
(Flombaum & Santos, 2005; Hare, Call & Tomasello, 2001; Luo & Baillargeon, 
2007) is largely accepted within the field. Also, recent findings of automaticity in 
visual perspective-taking (Qureshi et al., 2010; Samson et al., 2010) may be the only 
clear evidence that ToM occurs automatically, although there is strong evidence of 
spontaneous processing of more complex aspects of ToM (Cohen & German, 2009; 
Kovacs et al., 2010). Thus investigating the limits of visual perspective-taking and 
how it develops is crucial in investigating whether such a process forms part of a core 
cognitive ToM.  
 
Even within visual perspective-taking, there have been limits to the investigations in 
this thesis. Firstly, the youngest children investigated have been aged 5. Younger 
children were tested in a pilot study, but struggled to cope with incidental task 
demands. It may seem unnatural, then, to promote this as being relevant to questions 
around the success of infants (not to mention non-human animals!) At several points 
in this thesis, I have defended the notion that mechanisms identified may be those 
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responsible for success in infants. The lack of qualitative developmental change in 
Level-1 perspective-taking and the fact that the similar process of Level-2 
perspective-taking has not been automatised, even in adults, lead me to believe that 
Level-1 perspective taking is likely to be originally automatic. Further evidence of 
automaticity in even younger children would be informative as it would clarify 
whether automatic perspective-taking is truly how infants pass ToM tasks that employ 
indirect measures. 
 
In Chapter 3 it was suggested that the Level-1/Level-2 distinction is ill-defined. It 
will, hopefully, have been clear why this loose approximation was maintained for our 
investigations. Equally, it is clear that further theoretical and experimental work is 
required to effectively refine this signature limit. That calculating the number of dots 
an avatar can see falls within the limits of an efficient perspective-taking process, but 
calculating how a numeral appears to an avatar does not, still leaves open many 
possibilities for the precise definition of the signature limit on visual perspective-
taking. One of the positive aspects I see in this line of research is that any definition of 
a signature limit on ToM would afford specific predictions. Further to this, there 
should be some investigation into other limits on this automatic perspective-taking. It 
seems implausible that in a crowded situation people are automatically taking the 
perspectives of everyone else (even for Level-1 perspectives), but how are relevant 
perspectives selected? Such a decision also hints towards another aspect of the limits 
of processing visual perspectives automatically, that is of the requirements of the 
stimulus itself. We know, so far, that a non-social stimulus does not precipitate the 
same degree of effect (Samson et al., 2010; Surtees & Apperly, in press, Chapter 2). 
We also know that an avatar can be facing perpendicular to the participant, or more 
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head-on. What is not clear is what specific features of this stimulus drive the effect. 
An interesting future line of investigation could look to isolate and vary the effects of 
eye gaze, head direction and body direction to see which of these features really 
triggers automatic visual perspective-taking. Further to this, with recent studies 
showing that belief states may have some privileged access to processing of social 
information (Teufel et al., 2009), investigation could identify whether this is the case 
for visual perspective-taking. Would participants still suffer interference from his 
perspective if they believed him to be blind? If this were the case, then participants 
would be responding to a purely stimulus-driven mechanism. If this were not the case, 
then this would suggest that some form of top-down control could prevent automatic 
processing. Importantly, though it may be the case that only certain systems may have 
access to controlling such a mechanism. For instance, in the way that Teufel et al. 
(2009) found belief states to access processing of seemingly automatic eye-gaze 
cueing (where deliberate control fails), it may be that such belief states can influence 
automatic perspective processing. 
 
7.4 Spatial Perspectives 
In Chapter 1, I proposed that there were several lines along which perspectives could 
be discriminated and also proposed that a place should be found for spatial frame of 
reference judgements within such distinctions. In Chapter 6 I investigated frames of 
reference using social and non-social stimuli. In Experiment 5A, where children and 
adults viewed stimuli in mixed blocks (seemingly the most naturalistic variant of our 
task), all of our age groups showed sensitivity to both their own perspective and that 
of a subject/object in a scene. This is the first time such an effect has been shown in 
children. With repeated presentation of a single referent participants no longer 
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considered their own position in the scene in making their judgements, provided 
another perspective was present. These effects were modulated by whether the 
referent was a subject with a perspective of his own, or merely a fronted object. Most 
notably, children only lost sensitivity to their own perspective in cases where they 
were confronted with another subject.  
 
In Chapter 6 itself, we discussed the significance of these findings, leaving here the 
vital point to suggest links between these findings and those within the rest of this 
thesis. Importantly, where do findings from spatial frame of reference tasks fit in with 
general considerations of when perspective-taking may be controlled or efficient? In 
both of the experiments in Chapter 6 participants made decisions under no time 
pressure, so clearly, these decisions gave opportunity for cognitive control. However, 
on the other hand, participants were never asked to explicitly consider the 
perspectives in the scene; therefore, any perspective-taking was incidental, 
spontaneous and possibly even automatic. In both experiments, participants 
encorporated the perspectives of both agents and objects into their decision making 
and Experiment 5B even identified a circumstance under which participants stopped 
using their own perspective at all in their judgements. On the one hand, it might seem 
puzzling that they did so, given the fact that processing perspectives is often found to 
be effortful with a cost to ignoring our own viewpoint. Added to this, previous 
research has found that, for above/below judgments, the relative and absolute frames 
of reference seem to be favoured over the intrinsic frame of reference (Carlson-
Radvansky & Irwin, 1993). So why is it that participants used the intrinsic frame of 
reference so heavily for Front/Back judgements? One possibility is that these 
judgements utilise the efficient mechanism for perspective-taking that I proposed in 
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Chapters 2-4 and thus require only limited cognitive resources. In tracking the content 
of another’s perspective, one is most commonly, by default, tracking what objects are 
in front of them and this may impact on judgements of spatial frames of reference. 
 
7.4.1 Future work on psychological and spatial perspectives 
Chapter 6 provides further evidence that investigating how we judge spatial 
relationships between people and objects may be important in understanding 
judgements of psychological and spatial perspectives in general (Kessler & 
Thompson, 2009; Michelon & Zacks, 2005; Zwickel, 2009). The current method 
tested children as young as 6-years old, but future work would be crucial in 
investigating whether decisions about spatial and psychological perspectives have a 
similar origin earlier in development. Whilst overt rating of linguistic statements in 
younger children would prove difficult, indirect measures would be possible. Taylor 
et al (2001), in a study using ERPs, showed that adults elicited an N-400 component, 
which is thought to be evidence of semantic integration, when viewing frames of 
reference which contradicted one another. This promotes the idea that even when 
participants make a clear response using one frame of reference they have difficulty 
integrating information from an incongruent frame of reference. There is no reason 
why a similar paradigm could not be used with young children and certainly no reason 
why agents could not be used instead of fronted objects. Such an experiment would 
allow us to track the development of frame of reference activation: Is it originally 
automatic, or automatised? Do socially driven judgements promote use of the 
intrinsic frame of reference, or is the intrinsic frame of reference a cue to perspective? 
Testing whether infants and young children would show a preference for choosing 
objects located in front of other objects/people may also impact on this question. This 
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would allow us to, to some extent, isolate the effects of frame of reference and 
frontedness. If we are automatically driven by the front of an object (related to a 
perspective), we would predict finding implicit preferences for objects located in front 
of other objects. If we are driven by the intrinsic frame of reference of an object, those 
items behind should be just as salient.  
 
As well as testing younger children, there is still much we don’t know about how 
adults integrate frames of reference and perspectives. Including multiple perspectives 
may provide for further information on how perspectives influence judgements. If 
another person sees a scene differently from us, are we more likely to describe the 
scene in terms of the intrinsic frame of reference which is the same for all? Another 
obvious future experiment would be to combine the visual perspective-taking 
paradigm used in Chapters 2-5 with fronted objects. It would be interesting to 
understand whether spatial perspectives may be calculated automatically- we know 
that frames of reference are (Carlson-Radvansky & Jiang, 1999), but there is no 
evidence that content is ascribed from this. In such an experiment, fronted objects, 
potentially both social and non-social, could be used in place of our avatar, with 




This thesis has investigated control and efficiency in ToM. Chapters 2-4 focussed on 
where the lines are drawn between these two elements when looking at an early 
developing ToM ability, visual perspective-taking. Controlled perspective-taking 
investigated in these tasks was always subject to egocentric interference. Efficient 
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perspective-taking was limited to Level-1 representations, and had developed at least 
by the age of 6. I suggest that an efficient mechanism is responsible for the success of 
infants, non-human animals and adults under a cognitive load. This process is 
critically limited. Development is needed to overcome egocentrism when giving 
direct responses and to aid flexibility. Children’s ability in ToM tasks improves over 
time, even once they have developed all the requisite conceptual apparatus to pass the 
full gamut of ToM tasks children become faster and more accurate. Chapters 2 and 3 
showed clear evidence of this, and Chapter 5 suggested that improving resources in 
inhibitory control and task switching may be responsible for some of this 
development. Limits and features of perspective-taking are unlikely to be solely 
linked to executive abilities: The specific nature of the representation required, the 
given task demands and the nature of the perspective-generating stimulus may well 
also prove important in regulating performance.  
 
When people talk about perspectives, generally, we assume an individual’s mental 
picture of the world. On the other hand, research from spatial perspective-taking 
provides fascinating insight into the processes involved in attributing the position of 
an object relative to another person (Kessler & Thompson, 2009; Michelon & Zacks, 
2005; Zwickel, 2009). In Chapter 6 we directly compared judgements involving a 
self- and other- perspective in scenes containing a social agent or a fronted object. 
The major features of frame of reference judgements were similar for both kind of 
referent, both self and other perspectives were considered in making judgements, but 
the nature of the stimulus did modulate ratings, and always in the direction of more 
social stimuli promoting the perspective of other.  
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As much as I hope that this thesis has answered some questions regarding 
perspective-taking and ToM more generally, it has also raised many. Questions about 
how we calculate and represent the psychological and spatial perspectives of self and 
other remain very strongly in focus. Processes for and routes towards efficiency in 
ToM are yet to be fully described and the exact similarities and differences between 
the usage of agents and objects in frame of reference judgements remains somewhat 
unclear. This challenge provides an exciting basis for future research which should 
test children and adults’ abilities in tasks that allow for careful offline consideration, 





Appendix 1:  Mean Response Times and Error Rates for Experiments 3A and 3B 
































































































































All pictures used within both Experiment 5A and Experiment 5B. Pictures where the 
ball was neither in front nor behind the other object with regard to a given frame of 
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